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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the hardware implementation and statistical analysis of new 
stream ciphers, Phelix and Salsa20. Both are candidates for the eSTREAM project, a 
project highlighting the state of stream cipher design and analysis. 
From a physical technology perspective, hardware implementation methodology 
consists of Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) design and Field 
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) design. When high performance is required, an ASIC 
is typically chosen as the implementation platform. However, FPGA platforms have 
become increasingly popular due to their flexibility and a diminishing performance 
tradeoff as compared with ASIC technology. Following this trend we have developed two 
versions of Salsa20, one for deployment on an ASIC, the other for an FPGA. The cipher 
Phelix is studied for application to ASIC environment. 
Implementing a cipher requires detailed knowledge of the cryptographic algorithm 
itself, particularly the underlying arithmetic. In the case of Phelix and Salsa20, both of 
which are composed of several simple operations: 32-bit addition, bitwise addition 
(exclusive or) and rotation, the most important operation is the 32-bit addition, for which 
we have investigated multiple structures for the adders and compared them in both speed 
and area. Different adder architectures are chosen for different designs, and the basic 
criteria is the concern of speed or area the overall implementation consumes. 
Two structures for Phelix have been implemented, one is a high speed design and the 
other one is aimed at compactness. The simulation results shows that it consumes about 
12,000 two-input NAND gates in the compact design and achieves more than one Gbps 
throughput in the high speed design. The speed of the compact design is 260 Mbps and 
the area of the high speed design is 64,200 two-input NAND gates. Up to four different 
structures are investigated for Salsa20 as extra considerations are given to the utilization 
of FPGA. The proposed VLSI implementations achieve a data throughput up to 4.8 
Gbps, and a compact FPGA design uses 194 slices and 4 memory blocks in a Xilinx 
device. The proposed designs in the thesis serve mainly as a quick evaluation of their 
hardware performance; hence, further architectural optimizations are certainly possible. 
Security analysis is an important concern in cipher designs. Thus, we have applied 
iii 
certain statistical tests, which are publicly available in the NIST (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology) test suite to test various sequences produced by using the 
Phelix and Salsa20 algorithms. Since the test suite has not considered the relationship 
between key, IV, internal state and the keystream, we also applied six novel tests to 
examine the ciphers. Two strategies are employed to interpret the test results: the 
examination of the proportion of sequences that pass a statistical test and the distribution 
of P-values to check for uniformity. NIST gives the definition of P-value: the probability 
that a perfect random number generator would have produced a sequence less random 
than the sequence that was tested. The experimental results show that both Salsa20 and 
Phelix have passed the tests in NIST, considering that P-value less than 0.01 indicate a 
possible weakness. An easily understood deviation is observed in the correlation test for 
the last internal state (the state after 9 double rounds) and the keystream in Salsa20. 
However, how this could be exploited in an attack is an open question. 
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Chapter 1 An Introduction to Cryptography 
1.1 Brief History of cryptography 
Cryptography is a fascinating topic related to confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of 
information and its origin. The earliest cryptography can be traced back to the Egyptians 
4000 years ago. At that time, cryptography was concerned solely with message 
confidentiality, such as encryption, which concerns the process of converting original 
information (plaintext) into indistinguishable gibberish (ciphertext). The most striking 
development of cryptography came with the proliferation of the computers and 
communication systems since 1960s. During this time, when humans communicate with 
each other by using digital signals instead of traditional written language symbols, large 
volumes of information exchanging over untrusted medium, such as the Internet, make 
the classical cryptographic methods out of date; security becomes a tremendously 
important issue to deal with. The search for new encryption schemes and improvements 
to existing information security mechanisms and cryptanalysis continues at a rapid pace. 
In 1978, the first practical public-key encryption algorithm was discovered, known as 
RSA, which is based on the intractability of factoring large integers. During 1970s, IBM 
designed the Data Encryption Standard (DES), the most common symmetric key 
cryptography scheme used today. DES has been used extensively in electronic commerce. 
Since 1975, some people have noted that the key size of DES is too small. Moreover, 
some others worried about NSA's involvement. In 1987, the well known stream cipher 
RC4 was created by Ronald Rivest. To generate a pseudorandom keystream, the cipher 
makes use of a secret internal state consist of 2064 bits and two 8-bit index pointers. The 
plaintext is combined with the keystream using the exclusive-or (XOR) function. In 1997, 
NIST launched a project to find primitives that were suitable to replace DES. Among the 
candidates, the Rijndael algorithm was selected at last in 2001 and has become the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Recently, quantum computing techniques in 
cryptography have attracted a lot of attention as a new area of research. It is believed that 
quantum mechanical principles used in computation might significantly outperform the 
current prevailing cryptography methods. 
Nowadays, the rapid growth of electronic applications and business based on the 
Internet has fueled the need for cryptographic methods to protect information processing. 
1.2 Information Security 
A very important issue related to cryptography is information security. Both of them 
share the common goals of protecting information. However, the scope of information 
security is larger than cryptography. Over the centuries, information security does not 
only use cryptography to mask usable information, but also includes the process of 
protecting data from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, destruction, modification, or 
disruption [1]. Information security requires a vast range of methods and the technical 
means is typically provided by cryptography. 
Some objectives are frequently used interchangeably in information security, 
computer security and information assurance. For example, Data Integrity is one of the 
objectives that are used in all of the three fields. It ensures that the information has not 
been altered by unauthorized or unknown means. Some other objectives include: 
I. Message Authentication: corroborates of the identity of an entity. 
2. Signature: binds information to an entity. 
3. Validation: provides timeliness of authorization to use information. 
4. Witnessing: verifies the existence of information by an entity. 
More objectives associated with information security are listed in [6]. 
Information security was mostly applied in military in the past, such as the old 
Caesar Cipher [70] and the Playfair Cipher [70], which was widely used by the British 
and U.S armies in World War I. World War II probably brought about most 
advancement in information security. Also, it witnessed the formalized classification of 
data based on the information sensitivity [ 61]. 
The core principles of information security include confidential ity, integrity and 
availability, which are known as the CIA Triad. Confidentiality is a service used to 
prevent information to be accessed, used or disclosed by unauthorized parties. 
Approaches providing confidentiality range from physical protection to cryptographic 
algorithms. Integrity is used to avoid unauthorized alteration of data. Data alteration 
includes substitution, insertion and deletion. Availability means that all the resources used 
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to process and protect the information are available and work correctly when needed. 
1.3 Background on Functions 
While this thesis will look into the details of implementation of different functions in 
selected ciphers, a familiarity with basic mathematical functions that are widely used in 
cryptography will be helpful. 
1.3.1 One-way Function 
A function f is called a one-way function if f(x) is easy to compute but hard to invert. 
"Easy to compute" means computationally feasible or equivalently, one can compute the 
function in polynomial time. "Hard" in the context refers to average case complexity [6]. 
The existence of a one-way function is partly dependent on an open conjecture P=t:NP, 
where P is the set of decision problems that are known to be solvable in polynomial time, 
and NP is the set of decision problems that can be solved by a non-deterministic Turing 
machine in polynomial time [51]. In other words, if P = NP, any function that can be 
computed in polynomial time can be inverted in polynomial time, which means that 
one-way functions do not exist. However, it is not know whether P =t:NP is the sufficient 
condition of the existence of one-way function. 
Many useful cryptographic primitives like pseudorandom number generators are 
based on the existence of a one-way function. Obviously, it is not known whether a 
one-way function candidate is indeed one-way at present. Some famous candidates 
supported by current research results include integer factorization and discrete logarithm. 
The widely used RSA cryptosystem is an example that utilizes integer factorization, 
while the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [82] uses the discrete logarithm problem. 
1.3.2 Permutation 
In a permutation, a set of objects or symbols are rearranged into distinguishable 
sequences. Permutations are invertible functions that are often used as a basic component 
in various cryptographic constructs, particularly in symmetric key cryptographic 
algorithms to encrypt large volumes of data. That is because the permutation is easy to be 
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implemented and works fast in hardware implementations since bit or byte level 
permutations do not require any extra resources but simply reorder logic signals. DES 
and triple DES use bit level permutations to spread the redundancy of the plaintext over 
the ciphertext. 
However, in software implementations, bit level permutations bring two challenges 
[63]. In existing RISC processors, O(n) • instructions are generally required in generic 
ways to achieve any one of n! permutations, that is the reason for old processors not 
supporting arbitrary bit level permutations except a restricted subset known as rotation. 
The other challenge is that the instructions may need more than two word-sized operands 
and/or produce more than one word-size result. For example, multiplying two I 024-bit 
operands in RSA requires two 16-word operands, if the computer is 64-bit word based. 
1.3.3 Substitution 
In cryptography, substitution is a method that substitutes the units of plaintext with 
ciphertext according to an alphabet; the "units" might be one symbol or a mixture of 
symbols. The receiver decrypts the ciphertext by performing an inverse substitution. 
The substitution function can be compared with transposition or permutation 
functions. The difference is that, in a transposition procedure, what changes is the order 
of the plaintext units, while in a substitution procedure, the units of the plaintext are 
retained in the same position in the ciphertext, but the units themselves are changed. 
Old substitution ciphers are often vulnerable to frequency analysis [10]. Hence, most 
of them, such as a simple affine cipher, are no longer in serious use. However, the 
concept of substitution is still being used today. From an unusual perspective, some 
modern bit-oriented ciphers (e.g. DES) can be considered as substitution ciphers with an 
enormously large binary alphabet. Additionally, some smaller substitution tools known as 
an S-boxes are often used for confusion, which obscures the relationship between the 
plaintext and the ciphertext. 
If a substitution scheme and a permutation scheme are used serially in a cipher, then 
it is called SP - network, or substitution-permutation network (SPN). AES is a case in 
• O(n) is called big 0 notation in computational complexity theory. It is often used to describe the relationship between 
the size of the input data and the running time or memory consumption of an algorithm [24] . 
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point [56]: in the substitution step, each byte in the process is replaced with its entry in a 
fixed lookup table, known as an S-box; in the permutation step, bytes in each row are 
shifted cyclically to the left. 
1.3.4 Exclusive OR 
Exclusive OR, also known as XOR, is a bitwise operator from binary mathematics. In 
modern ciphers, XOR is often used to mix key bits into the cipher data. It can be denoted 
as: 
C=PEBK 
where EB denotes XOR operation, C is ciphertext, P is plaintext and K is key. According 
to the principles ofXOR, the decryption process is merely reapplying the key as below: 
P = CEBK 
If the key or keystream is as long as the message, the system is similar to the one-time 
pad that is theoretically unbreakable. Besides, XOR is simple to implement and 
computationally inexpensive. It is provable that the uncertainty in attempting to guess the 
keystream is equal to that of directly guessing the plaintext. The security of the one-time 
pad is based on this. Clearly, when the length of plaintext is very long, it is impractical to 
maintain and distribute the keystreams. As a result, stream ciphers are introduced and 
developed by the loose inspiration from the one-time pad. More details will be discussed 
later. 
1.3.5 Modular Addition 
Many cryptographic primitives include modular addition because addition mod 2" is a 
nonlinear transformation over GF(2) and the operation is fast in both software and 
hardware. GF(2) is the Galois Field of elements 0 and l. Nonlinear transformation is of 
great importance in cryptography as it makes functions hard to invert. 
Keeping with the popularity of addition in ciphers, Klimov and Shamir proposed 
T-function in 2002 [5]. T-function employs addition mixed with multiplication and or in a 
certain way to update every bit the internal state. The authors of [57] investigated the 
probability distribution of the carry chain for integer addition. More literature that looked 
into modular addition for various aspects can be found in [33], [32], (13] and [37] . 
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1.3.6 Modular Multiplication 
Modular multiplication is widely used in cryptography as it has good diffusion properties 
[76]. It is a multiplication performed over a finite field. The most straightforward method 
for performing modular multiplication is to compute the remainder on division by the 
modulus. This is referred to as the classical modular multiplication algorithm. 
Since most applications are based on the binary representation system, the modulus 
is often a power of two (as in RC6). Therefore, some efficient algorithms without 
explicitly carrying out the classical modular reduction step are widely exploited. For 
example, in [76] a technique is proposed, which efficiently implements 2n+ I pnme 
modulus operation by using only two additional additions and one multiplication. 
1.4 Symmetric-key/Private-Key Cryptography 
There are many ways to divide cryptographic primitives. Figure 1.1 provides a schematic 
listing of the primitives considered. 
Security 
Ptimitives 
Unkeyed 
Primitives 
Symmetric 
-key 
Primitives 
Public-key 
Primitives 
Symmetric-key dphers 
Figure 1.1 A Taxonomy of Cryptographic Primitives )6) 
Among the list shown above, our main concern is symmetric-key cryptography and 
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public-key cryptography. Symmetric-key/Private-Key cryptography was the only kind of 
encryption publicly known until 1976 [73]. In this method, both sides of information 
communication share the same secret key, or different keys that are related in an easily 
computable way. The scenario can be described by the block diagram of Figure 1.2. 
E (m,k)= c 
Bob 
encryted 
file c 
D (c.k)= m 
Alice 
Figure 1.2 Two-party Communications Using Symmetric Key Cryptography 
It is assumed that both the sender Alice and the receiver Bob know the 
encryption/decryption scheme. The ciphertext is transmitted through an insecure channel, 
which is possibly eavesdropped by a third party Eve. 
An encryption algorithm E is employed to encrypt the plaintext m with the secret key 
k; c is the resulting output as the ciphertext. After Alice receives the ciphertext, the 
corresponding decryption algorithm D is used with the same secret key k to reveal the 
original plaintext m. 
Symmetric-key encryption can be divided into stream ciphers and block ciphers. 
1.4.1 Block Ciphers 
A block cipher is a symmetric-key cipher that operates on data in blocks. The input 
plaintext and the output ciphertext have fixed lengths, often 64, 128 or 256 bits. Another 
input is the secret key as shown below: 
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N-bit plaintext/ 
N-bit ciphertext-----~ 
M-bit secret key 
Encryption/ 
Decryption 
Algorithm 
N-bit ciphertext/ 
N-bit plaintext 
Figure 1.3 Encryption/Decryption Process of Block Ciphers 
The size of key is closely related to the security of the cipher. Typically, the key size 
relates to the effort and time needed to decrypt it by brute force. It is widely accepted that 
a key should be large enough to prevent a brute force attack. Different cryptographic 
systems may have different key sizes but with the same level of security in relation to 
other non-brute force attacks. 
For a specific block cipher, the length of a data block is fixed. When the message is 
longer than one block size, a mode of operation is required. Some modes of operation 
allow block ciphers to operate on a message of arbitrary length. The earliest modes 
described in the literature include Electronic Codebook mode (ECB), Cipher Block 
Chaining mode (CBC), Cipher Feedback mode (CFB), and Output Feedback mode 
(OFB). Another aspect to consider for messages coming in a variety of lengths is padding, 
which pads the final block before encryption. The simplest padding is to add null bytes or 
bits to the plaintext to make it a multiple of the block size. More padding methods can be 
found in [81]. 
Block ciphers are widely used in many applications and cryptosystems. An old and 
prevailing block cipher was the Data Encryption Standard (DES) with a block size of 64 
bits and a key size of 56 bits. In October 2000, the National Institute of Standard and 
Technology (NIST) selected Rijndael algorithm for a standard known as the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) [72] with the objective to replace DES. The result is a block 
cipher that is capable of supporting a block size of 128 bits and key sizes of 128, 192, and 
256 bits. 
1.4.2 Stream Cipher 
Stream ciphers treat the plaintext bit by bit or byte by byte continuously and generate one 
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bit/byte of ciphertext at a time. Much of the popularity of stream ciphers is due to the 
theory of one-time pad; originally known as the Vernam cipher [28] . 
Typically a stream cipher has a key setup phase and a pseudorandom bit generation 
phase (keystream generation). In the key setup phase, a secret key and a known initial 
vector IV are fed into the keystream generator to generate the initial internal state of the 
cipher and expand the original key when needed. In the pseudorandom bit generation 
phase, the keystream generator creates pseudo-random sequences to XOR with the 
plaintext bits. The encryption and decryption processes are shown in Figure 1.4. 
Key IV Key IV 
Stream Cipher Stream Cipher 
Keystrcam Keystrcmn 
Plaintext f ['\ 
\.. L/ Ciphe.rtext Ciphertext 
r 
' \.. ../ 
Plaintext 
Figure 1.4 Encryption/Decryption Process of Stream Ciphers 
As shown above, the sender and the receiver must be exactly synchronous. If digits 
are altered or removed from the message during transmission, it might cause decryption 
failure. However, several schemes can be used to rebuild synchronization. For example, 
regular points in the output can be selected and added with tags, which functions like a 
marker to inform the receiving side. 
Many stream cipher designs are based on linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) [80] 
as shown in Figure 1.5. LFSRs by themselves are trivially breakable but non-linear 
functions such as the use of clock-controlled generators [80] can be added to increase 
security. LFRS based stream ciphers are very popular since it is easy for them to be 
implemented in hardware, and their properties are well-understood. 
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Figure 1.5 A Linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) 
Sometimes, a stream cipher can be derived from a block cipher. For example, a block 
cipher in the output feedback (OFB) mode generates keystream blocks, which are then 
XORed with the plaintext to produce the ciphertext. Counter mode is another method to 
turn a block cipher into a stream cipher. It has similar characterist ics to OFB; the 
difference is that it allows a random access within the keystream during decryption 
because each encryption block operates on independent input, contrary to OFB, in which 
every output feedback block cipher operation depends on all previous ones. An example 
for counter mode is Salsa20 [20], a new stream cipher that will be introduced in Chapter 
4. It generates the next block of keystream by making use of successive values of a 
counter. 
Even when derived from a block cipher, most stream ciphers in practical use are still 
generated independently from the plaintext. It is error propagation free, but also has a 
drawback of requirement for synchronization. However, some stream ciphers violate the 
model : the keystream depends on the plaintext. An example is Phelix [22]. The authors 
claim that the basic reason for this violation is to incorporate message authentication "for 
free". 
The security of a stream cipher significantly depends on the period of the keystream, 
that is, the size of the keystream before it starts to repeat itself. It is a very practical 
concern and tradeoff between the security and the size of the keystream should be made 
based on the requirement of the targeted application. 
Compared with block ciphers, stream ciphers are more suitable for applications 
where plaintext comes in bursts, since the former works on blocks of fixed length, 
leading to a choice between transmission efficiency or implementation complexity. 
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Although it is impossible to conclude which one is more superior, block ciphers have 
received more attention when comparing the proceedings of the major cryptography 
conferences. This imbalance may due to the preoccupation of the block cipher Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) [70], which had mastered the area of symmetric key 
cryptography for many years. 
In October 2004, the state of stream cipher design and analysis were highlighted by 
the ECRYPT Network of Excellence in Cryptology, which initiated a workshop to 
develop a project called the ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project [34], with the goal to 
identify new stream ciphers that might become suitable for widespread adoption. 
1.5 Asymmetric-key/Public-key cryptography 
Public-key cryptography is also known as asymmetric cryptography. It uses a pair of keys 
(a secret key and a public key) instead of one secret key during the encryption and 
decryption process. The public key, as the name indicates, may be widely distributed, 
while the secret key is kept private. Only with the corresponding secret key, the plaintext 
encrypted with the public key can be decrypted. 
Public key cryptography is often divided into two categories based on their 
applications: public key ciphers and digital signatures, which are shown in Figure 1.6 and 
Figure 1.7, respectively. Only one transmission direction is shown in the figures since the 
other one is exactly the same except that the names "Bob" and "Alice" exchange. 
-
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Plaintext 
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Bob ' s 
public key 
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Peter 
Mike ~ Alice ' s public key 
E 
Encryption Algorithm 
(e.g. RSA) 
Transmitted 
Ciphertext 
Alice ' s private 
key 
r 
t 
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-
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-
-
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Decrypted algonthm Plamtext 
(Reverse of encryption ouput 
algorithm) 
Figure 1.6 Encryption/Decryption Process for Public Key Ciphers 
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Public key ciphers are used to ensure confidentiality, since only the receiver 's secret 
key can decrypt the message. To the contrary, in a digital signature, any one that holds the 
sender's public key can verify a message signed with the sender 's secret key. This 
method is used for message authenticity. 
Bob' s 
public key 
ring 
,.rtrt~ Peter 
Mike Alice' s public 
$500 
Plaintext 
input 
key 
Verify 
Encryption Algorithm 
(e.g. RSA) 
Transmitted 
Alice' s private 
key 
r 
Sign $500 
Decrypted algonthm Plaintext 
(Reverse of encryption ouput 
algorithm) 
Figure 1.7 SignNerify Process for Digital Signature 
Normally, a symmetric-key algorithm runs much faster than a public-key algorithm 
because of fewer computations, but public-key algorithms can facilitate key distribution. 
For example, if there is a communication group of n people, n(n-1)12 secret keys are 
required to ensure security in a symmetric-key system, and they should be changed 
regularly during distribution. It indicates that symmetric keys need to be distributed in an 
authentic and confidential manner. But in a public-key system, only authenticity is 
considered, thus, it simplifies key management. To take advantage of both, 
symmetric-key algorithms and public-key algorithms are not typically used alone. In 
modern cryptographic algorithm implementations, they are often used as a combination. 
1.6 Cryptanalysis 
Although breaking codes and ciphers has a very long history, the systematic study of 
cryptanalysis is relatively recent. In 1920, William Friedman firstly proposed the word 
"Cryptanalysis" for the methods and study to obtain the encrypted message, without 
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knowing the secret information, such as a secret key. The development of computers 
allows more complex encryption schemes related to binary format information. However, 
it has also facilitated cryptanalysis. 
During many years, the main concern in cryptography is to propose and implement 
good ciphers that stay ahead of cryptanalysis. Normally, a "good" cipher does not 
indicate absolute security, but is based on the standard that breaking it requires an effort 
that makes cryptanalysis too inefficient and impractical. 
Nowadays, many types of attacks on cryptographic systems have been invented. 
Most of them can be categorized into two branches: 
• A passive attack: threatens message confidentiality since the adversary can monitor 
the communication channel. 
• An active attack: not only threatens message confidentiality but also data integrity 
since the adversary might add, delete, or alter the original message that is 
transmitted through the communication channel. 
The objective of cryptanalysis can be recovering plaintext from ciphertext, or even 
deducing the decryption key. Based on the assumptions about how much information 
could be obtained by the adversary, cryptanalysis can be performed under the attacks 
below: 
• Ciphertext-only attack: the cryptanalyst only observes a collection of ciphertexts, 
and tries to deduce the decryption key. 
• Known-plaintext attack: the cryptanalyst has a group of ciphertexts and their 
corresponding plaintext. 
• Chosen-plaintext (chosen-ciphertext) attack: the cryptanalyst can access the 
ciphertext (plaintext) for an arbitrary chosen plaintext (ciphertext). 
• Adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack: improved version of chosen-ciphertext attack 
since the cryptanalyst chooses ciphertext based on information learned from 
previous requests. 
Practically, determining whether an attack is successful depends on the amount of 
resources it requires, or more specific, time complexity and space complexity. The 
former could be from a measurement on the number of basic computer instructions; the 
latter often indicates the amount of storage required to perform the attack. One of the 
13 
- ----·- -------------- ----------------
most important assumptions in modem cryptography is Kerckhoffs' Principle [11]: In 
assessing the security of a cryptosystem, on should always assume the enemy knows the 
details of the cipher being used. As a result, the security of a cryptosystem should be 
based on the key instead of the encryption/decryption algorithm it uses. 
1.7 Summary 
This chapter introduces various aspects of cryptography. Emphasis has been placed on 
the basic issues of block cipher and stream cipher. The discourse on the rudiments of 
cryptography leads us gradually to move deeper into the implementation and 
performance evaluation of ciphers. One of the major inspirations for working on 
hardware implementation of specific ciphers is the rapidly increasing demand for 
different hardware designs for various applications, some of which, such as cell phones, 
take compactness as most important factor in real use while others, such as virtual 
private network (VPN) applications, prefer high speed. 
The following chapter is about software implementation and hardware 
implementation design and methodologies. Selected topics about software/hardware 
co-designs and considerations for trade-offs can be found too. 
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Chapter 2 Cipher Implementation 
A cryptosystem can be developed by implementing one or several cryptographic 
algorithms either on general-purpose microprocessor [ 45] or on ASICs/FPGAs. Typically, 
the former is called software implementation, and the latter is known as hardware 
implementation. 
Also, to match the challenges of modem applications that have different 
requirements about speed and area efficiency, hardware/software codesign for 
cryptographic systems as a standard design technique has attracted much attention in 
recent years. 
2.1 Software Implementation 
Software implementation is a very flexible method to realize encryption/decryption 
algorithms. Most software implementations are based on a general-purpose processor and 
its corresponding instruction set. The algorithm is translated into a group of instructions, 
which will be accessed one by one, decoded into machine language and executed to 
fulfill encryption/decryption tasks. 
One important factor that decides the efficiency of software implementation is the 
basic underlying architectures, such as the word size of the processor. This is evident if 
one looks into the performance of AES on different platforms [29]. In the eSTREAM 
project, most stream ciphers are simple designs composed of a series of simple operations. 
Thus, when their corresponding codes run on a general processor, the hits or misses on 
Ll cache that is a typical component of today's RISC processors can have a significant 
impact on the performance. 
Another factor is the software language used. In most of the cases, ciphers 
implemented by assembly language generally produce better performance compared with 
interpreted language [39]. That is why most benchmarks to measure the performance of 
algorithms tend to choose low-level language for implementation. However, it does not 
mean giving up high-level language implementations. Some languages like Java have 
priority in flexibility with an interpreter, and they are very suitable for a wide range of 
cross-platform software implementations. In our hardware implementation, we also use a 
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Java software implementation to verify the generated keystreams. 
Sometimes, bad coding style may have a significant impact on the performance. For 
example, executing the code "c = 8 x a" can be much slower than executing an equivalent 
code "c = a<< 3", where "<<" means shift left. 
Nowadays, a majority of software implementations for symmetric-key cryptographic 
algorithms have a speed level of several hundred Mbps for the throughput. 
2.2 Hardware Implementation 
For the last decade, high-speed applications such as virtual private network (VPN) 
applications and secure e-commerce web servers have gained increasing acceptance in 
the industry. To sustain the high throughput, the demand for high-speed encryption is also 
rapidly increasing. A hardware implementation typically runs faster than its software 
counterpart. The main reason is that an application specific chip contains none of the 
baggage necessary to execute non-cryptographic workloads. Hence, many block ciphers 
implemented in hardware achieve throughput in Gbps by taking advantage of parallelism. 
For example, a full pipelined AES-128 hardware implementation that runs at 200 MHz 
has a throughput of 128 bits x 200 MHz = 25.6 GB/s. 
However, some ciphers are sequential in nature, such as LFSRs based stream ciphers. 
Hence, they can not be pipelined. Thus, the throughput is directly decided by the clock 
frequency. In general, the throughput can be defined as below [ 44]: 
Throughput = N x clock frequency 
where N is the width of the output processed per clock cycle. 
The clock frequency typically depends on the critical path, that is, the longest path 
between registers. When the critical path is relatively long, higher N can compensate to 
improve throughput. 
Except the advantage in speed, hardware implementation provides a suitable level of 
security related to side-channel attacks [ 15], which are based on considerable technical 
knowledge of the physical system, rather than the weakness of the algorithm itself. For 
instance, the timing information or the power leaks could provide the information for 
cryptanalysis. Thus, the well-studied underlying structure of a general processor saves 
much effort for cryptanalyst. Alternatively, a hardware implementation can be designed to 
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be explicitly resistant to side channel attacks. 
2.2.1 Methodology 
2.2.1.1 Traditional Methodology Used for Non-feedback Cipher Modes 
The traditional methodology for efficient implementations of secret key block ciphers is 
shown in Figure 2.1. 
Canbimt:i.anal 
Lot:ic 
Round 2 ( .----,..-_,.....;....,._-.,-__, 
One pipelining stage 
• 
• 
a) one round, no pipelining b) K round pipe lining 
Figure 2.1 Architectures Used for Non-feedback Cipher Modes 
Figure 2.1.( a) is known as a basic iterative structure. Based on the basic iterative 
architecture, a reasonable estimation for speed and area for a single round can be 
estimated. From these estimations, the pipeline stages can be decided without exceeding 
the available hardware resources. Usually, a single stage is the implementation for a basic 
round. Figure 2.l.(b) is a partial outer-round pipelined structure applied for limited 
resources. Extra registers are inserted between any two stages. In this way, with a K-stage 
pipeline, K blocks of data can be processed by the circuit at the same time. At the end of 
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a clock cycle, the output of each block will be stored in those registers. The throughput as 
well as the area increase proportionally to the number of stages, while the latency for 
encryption and decryption remains the same as in a basic iterative structure. 
Although pipelining increases the speed of the implementation significantly, 
equalizing data and control path latency are very important issues to guarantee the overall 
efficiency. Moreover, it cannot be used with the standard feedback modes such as OFB 
and CFB since the output of one iteration of the encryption/decryption process must be 
available before the next iteration can start. In our design, both iterative structure and 
pipelined structure are investigated for comparison on speed and area. 
2.2.1.2 ASIC Design Flow & FPGA Design Flow 
From a physical technology perspective, hardware implementation methodology 
consists of ASIC design and FPGA design. The cost of designing application specific 
integrated circuits (ASICs) is increasing every year. Issues such as non-recumng 
engineering (NRE) cost, clock tree synthesis, and time-to-market delays can have 
significant impact on ASIC design. 
In hardware implementations, major parts such as CPU and memories need to be 
connected by extra custom electronic circuitry. Glue logic is designed to do this job. 
Since the first programmable device with glue logic, both the speed and the density have 
increased dramatically. Hence, today's field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) play a 
central role in digital hardware implementations. With the support for numerous EDA 
tools, designers tend to choose FPGA when the volume of the product is less than 
millions of chips. Typical ASIC and FPGA design flows are shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 Comparison of ASIC & FPGA Design Flows [9) 
The ASIC back-end design involves more tasks than FPGA design. In both of them, 
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an initial design idea has to go through several steps before it is completely implemented 
in hardware or chips. In our design, we followed the guidelines shown in Figure 2.2, 
because formalized flows can improve design debugging capabilities. 
In the design specification step, we used a divide-and-conquer strategy called 
top-down methodology, while in more concrete design development stage we chose the 
modular design approach bottom-up methodology. More technical details can be found in 
[79]. 
Normally, for a design with sequential logic, we have two choices before RTL 
coding: synchronous design or asynchronous design. In synchronous design, there is a 
global clock to control all registers. Asynchronous design is widely used in 
communication system, where two or more different clock frequencies result in different 
clock domains, which require extra logic for synchronization. The main disadvantage is 
the existence of race conditions. In ASIC libraries, registers with asynchronous built-in 
"reset" pin consume more area and appear slower, therefore, all of our ASIC designs use 
registers with an external gate on the data path for a reset. That is, the reset is routed 
through the data pin. The clock must be running when the reset signal is asserted. 
However, it is not a problem for our FPGA design as there is already a reset tree in place. 
All registers have a built-in reset, so no extra care is needed. 
Clock gating is used in our ASIC designs for power optimization as memories have 
been used and data can be accessed only when the Write/Read enable signal is asserted. 
Read enable signal and write enable signal could be either separate or a same signal. 
Figure 2.3 shows an example for gated clock. Glitches may appear in such a design. 
However, the simulation results show that the period of the clock is long enough to 
ignore the glitches. FPGA designs have no such potential dangers since they have a clock 
enable pin that can be used to avoid the gate clocking. 
D 
Q 
QB l------1~ 
system cloc 
Figure 2.3 Gated Clock for Register Bit 
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2.2.2 Main Concerns in Hardware Implementation 
Before mid 1990s, the limits in VLSI technology and clock rate made the pursuit for 
speed in a hardware implementation become a general goal. However, with the fast 
development of VLSI design, the achievement of sheer speed occurs much easier than 
before. As a result, the considerations for cost and security of cryptographic 
implementation start to play a more important role in many applications. 
• Speed 
The most well-known and universal techniques used to speed up the hardware 
implementation are pipelining and parallel processing, which allow multiple blocks of 
data processed simultaneously. However, neither of them is suitable for the cipher 
feedback modes (e.g. CBC and CFB mode), as one iteration ofthe encryption/decryption 
process needs the results ofthe previous one. 
Moreover, different schemes are often applied based on the concrete arithmetic 
operations required in a cryptographic algorithm. For example, modular exponential 
operation is key part in public-key cryptography as the operands are usually very large. 
For the sake of speed, the number of time-consuming modular multiplications should be 
reduced as many as possible. A systolic array for modular multiplication is presented 
using the algorithm of P. L. Montgomery in [16]. Some other speed-up methods include 
Barret-Booth's method and [3] and Brickell's algorithm [25]. 
In some ciphers, such as Salsa20 and Phelix, which we implemented in hardware, the 
dominant cost operation is addition. Therefore, the subject of various adder structures is 
introduced and investigated in Chapter 4. 
Many ciphers take advantage of S-boxes, an array lookup table usmg an 
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input-dependent index. A case in point is the AES algorithm. The contents of an S-box is 
the multiplicative inverse in Galois Field (28) , combined with an affine transformation 
over GF(2). Unfortunately, GF arithmetic approach yields up to 15 XOR gate delays [65] 
though it is area efficient. In most Gbps applications, a single look-up table is constructed. 
Till now, a twisted binary decision diagrams (TBDD) approach is the fastest reported so 
far [53], where the fanout of signals is distributed in all of the S-boxes. 
Obviously numerous speed improvement methods may be done considering the 
properties of a specific algorithm. 
• Cost (area and power consumption) 
"Cost" can mean different things in real life. However, when it comes to hardware 
implementation, it typically indicates chip area and power consumption. Sometimes, 
when subtle aspects are considered, "cost" may include the actual cost financially. 
The first step to evaluate the area cost of a cipher is to define a metric for comparing 
digital logic. Traditionally, transistors are the atomic device in digital design. Table 2.1 
provides the area complexity in terms of transistors for a standard cell library from [69] . 
Table 2.1 Area complexity of CMOS standard cells 
Components Transistors 
2-input NAND 4 
2-inputAND 6 
2-input XOR 12 
D Flip Flop 26 
2:1 MUX 12 
However, the popular metnc nowadays IS a count of the number of a standard 
two-input NAND gates that would be equivalent to the area of the design, since 
cell-based methodology makes it possible for hardware designers to focus on the 
high-level (logical function) aspect of digital-design. Table 2.2 is the truth table for 
NAND gate 's behavior; Figure 2.5 is the NAND gate symbol that is in common use. 
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Table 2.2 The Truth Table of NAND Gate 
INPUTS OUTPUT 
A B ANANDB 
0 0 1 
0 1 1 
I 0 I 
I 1 0 
! A ---f""'h_ I ls~out 
!ooOOOo .. oO ooo oooOOOOoOOOOOOOOoOOoOoOOo .. oOoOOoOoO o oOOOOOHOOOOO 
Figure 2.5 NAND Gate Symbol 
For most portable devices such as mobile phones, which run on battery, power 
consumption is a major concern, even more important than compactness requirement, 
because the development of the techniques for energy storage is far behind that for cell 
technology [43]. Another concern related to power consumption is the cooling system of 
the chip. For some futuristic applications like smart card, the chip runs at ultra-low power. 
Sequential logic is carefully employed since flip flops require a clock to drive them, 
which consumes extra power. The relative power consumption for various CMOS 
components is illustrated in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 Power Consumption of0.18 Jlm CMOS Standard Cells 1431 
Components Normalized Power 
2-input NAND I 
2-inputAND 2.14 
2-inputXOR 3.36 
D Flip Flop 22.55 
2:1 MUX 2.77 
The methods used to reduce power can be divided into two categories: 
technology-based approaches and architecture-based approaches. Technology-based 
approaches focus on reducing the voltage. It is well known that for a CMOS circuit, the 
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power dissipation is due to three aspects: dynamic power, short-circuit power and leakage 
power. Among them, dynamic power is the largest. It is given by the equation shown 
below: 
Pdyamic = N (j x C L X V2dd) 
where f is the clock rate, CL is the switched capacitance, V dd is the supply voltage and N 
is the number of gate switches. Thus, power reduction can be achieved by voltage 
decrease. 
However, Kakumu and Kinugawa's critical voltage provides an lower bound on the 
supply voltage [48]. Therefore, it is more attractive to make efforts on architectural 
improvement. Moreover, architecture-based approaches often make compensation for the 
reduced circuit speed that is due to the lower operating voltage (CMOS gate delay 
increases according to the voltage decrease). 
The authors of [4] illustrate several architectural methods. One of them is a parallel 
structure, which makes sacrifice in area. This can be seen from Figure 2.6. 
a) Original Circuit b) Parallel Structure 
Figure 2.6 Parallel Scheme for Power Reduction (41 
The circuit shown in Figure 2.6.b runs at half of the original frequency with the same 
throughput. It should be note that the power consumption is not doubled though it looks 
like that with a doubled circuit structure. Assuming the original power consumption is Pt 
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= N (fi x CLI x V2dd 1), then the new power assumption is P2 = 2.15N (fi/2 xCLI x 
(0.58V dd 1)2) :::::::: 0.36PJ. 
• Security/ Implementation Attacks 
In addition to implementation efficiency (i.e. speed and area), security is very important. 
Implementation or side channel attacks are targeted on the possible weaknesses in 
specific implementation platforms instead of in the algorithm. These attacks include 
power analysis [59] and fault attacks [38]. 
In 1996 Kocher et al. introduced the concept of a timing attack, which is one of the 
general classes in side-channel attacks, by measuring how much time different 
computations take to perform to reveal sensitive information. For example, with detailed 
knowledge of a cryptographic algorithm, it is sometimes possible to determine the length 
of the key by watching data transmission with the CPU. Two years later Kocher et al. [59] 
proved that the power consumption in a cryptographic circuit could reveal the secret 
information too. In [38], a comprehensive study at fault attacks is provided. In a fault 
attack, errors are injected to the cryptographic core, while the resulting outputs reflect the 
faults. Current methods to avoid fault attacks, especially on symmetric ciphers, include 
linear error-detecting codes, such as Reed-Solomon code [64]. Rather than focusing on 
the overall possible faults, they concentrate on a certain group of possible faults for 
practical reason. 
However, side-channel attacks do not threaten stream ciphers as much as they do to 
block ciphers. This is because, in a stream cipher, the keystream process is typically 
independent of externally known data. In [15] , the authors pointed out that side-channel 
attack related publications on stream ciphers have only aimed at RC4 stream cipher. 
Attacks on other stream ciphers, especially LFSRs based ones are not available in the 
public literature yet. 
2.3 Software/Hardware Codesign 
Considering the advantages and disadvantages of software and hardware implementations, 
it is believed that some hybrid co-designs can provide excellent performance while 
maintaining the flexibility. Smart cards that are used in secure financial applications and 
e-commerce is an example of software/hardware codesign. In a smart card, the most 
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computationally intensive blocks run in targeted circuit to provide the speed and more 
physical security, and other blocks run on a general processor for flexibility. 
The main concern of co-designs is which parts of the cipher are mapped into 
hardware and software. There are two trends. One aims at adding hardware resources to a 
general purpose processor [45]. For example, a new instruction set is also added to the 
processor to facilitate cryptographic implementation. The other trend is to divide 
cryptographic algorithms into two stand-alone components; one runs on general 
processor and the other one runs on additional core. In [60], a stream cipher is modeled 
abstractly, as shown in Figure 2.7. It indicates that the stream cipher kernel and the 
iterated state variables are mapped into hardware (HW) while software (SW) provides the 
initial key and the nonce, which is often a pseudo-random number used only once. The 
keystream and the plaintext stream processing are also handled by software. 
r-------------------------, 
State Feedback Plaintext s tream 
f--
Key Key stream r \ 
Generator \__ _.) 
Nonce 
Ciphertext stream 
sw HW sw 
Figure 2.7 Example Scenario for a Stream Cipher [60) 
FPGAs are practically attractive to use in co-designs. The overwhelming problem to 
resolve before implementing a software/hardware codesign is how to split the work 
between the general processor and the application specific circuit. This problem includes 
many aspects, some of which can be very subtle. However, the decisions on the work 
which is allocated to FPGAs are relatively simpler to make because of FPGAs' inherent 
flexibility. FPGAs are very suitable to process large amounts of data, which indicates that 
a complex computational component or a bus interface can be implemented in them. 
A key factor in deciding how much computational task to assign to an FPGA is the 
"logic gate equivalence". It is the total number of logic gates that can work at the same 
time. Figure 2.8 shows a typical structure of FPGA logic block. However, in practice 
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many blocks will not work in a computation even if they are supposed to. It is largely 
because of improper routing, which is normally done by EDA tools instead of manually. 
The problem of routing problem for real implementation is studied by Inuani and Saul in 
[49]. 
A 
B 
c 
D 
clock 
Look 
Up 
Table 
~ I v DFlip output 
Flop 
· ~ 
Figure 2.8 Typical FPGA Logic Block 
One of the most attractive uses of FPGA in co-designs is the soft processors which 
can be configured to suit different applications. For example, the Virtex chips from Xilinx 
have 32-bit built-in soft processor known as MicroBlaze [52], which provides high speed 
hardware/software interfaces. This technique allows the designers to take an FPGA as a 
simple cross-compiler. In [36], the authors investigated the implementation of several 
most typical cryptographic algorithms based on MicroBlaze. They found that the 
flexibility offered by FPGAs can be used to notably increase the throughput of a 
software/hardware hybrid system. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter addresses the methodologies and main concerns for software and hardware 
implementations, respectively. In addition, it draws analogies between typical FPGA and 
ASIC design processes. 
Various trade-offs are very important. In software implementation, it is often 
reasonable to generate ciphertext for block cipher or keystream for stream cipher in 
blocks, whose size equals a multiple of the word size of the processor. As a result, the 
available bandwidth in the system can get optimum use. 
Software inherently has the ability for fine-granular control on the internal 
configuration and behavior of a cryptographic algorithm by using particular instructions. 
27 
However, performing such operations would require extra memory and execution time 
which decrease the speed ofthe implementation. In hardware implementation, the typical 
trade-off concern is the speed-area tradeoff. Considering the pipeline structure in Figure 
2.1, it is obvious that with more pipeline stages there is more speed gain but higher area 
consumption. 
The following two chapters illustrate the details of our hardware designs for Phelix 
and Salsa20 stream ciphers. Both of the ciphers were claimed to be designed with the 
special emphasis on their suitability for not only software implementations but also 
hardware implementations. 
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Chapter 3 Hardware Implementation of the 
Phelix Stream Cipher 
3.1 Introduction of Phelix Stream Cipher 
Phelix [22] is claimed to be a high-speed stream cipher. It is selected for both software 
and hardware performance evaluation by the eSTREAM project. The cipher supports an 
8-bit to 256-bit length key and a 128-bit nonce to generate the keystream bits. The 
plaintext is incorporated during the computation to produce a built-in Message 
Authentication Code (MAC). 
Our goal in implementing Phelix is to find out a reasonable synthesis result for two 
extreme situations: the compactness it can achieve without considering the throughput; 
the speed/throughput it can achieve without considering the area. Since circuits 
implemented in FPGAs are at least ten times larger and three times slower than the 
custom implementations [67], we have chosen ASIC-based approach to implement the 
two proposed designs for Phelix: compact Phelix implementation and high speed 
implementation. The basic features underlying FPGAs are explored in the next chapter 
that introduces various structures for Salsa20 as the property of Salsa20 is more suitable 
for a FPGA-based implementation, such as a relatively big requirement for memory 
compared with some popular stream ciphers. 
It should be noted that in block diagrams representing the designs, the input and 
output are not real 1/0s in a system. The designs are core based and the input and output 
could be internally interfaced with external circuits. 
3.1.1 Algorithm 
Phelix is targeted at 32-bit platforms. It is composed of simple operations: addition 
modulo 232, exclusive or, and rotation by a fixed number of bits. There are 5 words that 
are updated during each round, and 4 "old" words are stored in memory to be used in the 
keystream output function. 
One block that produces one word of keystream consists of two "half-block" functions 
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H, which is defined as: 
FUnction H (w0 , w 1, w~. w3 , w4 , K 0 , KL) 
Begin 
End. 
wo := wo ffi (wa ~ Ko); wa := w3 <#: 15; 
W t := W t ffi tv4; 
w!l := w~ e 'I!(); 
Wa := Wa Gl IVt; 
w4 := W 4 ffi IV;!; 
w4 := w4 <#: 25; 
Wo := U'o <#: 9; 
Wt := Wt <#: 10; 
w~ := u~ <#: 17; 
wa := Wo Gl (wa 83 K L); wa := u3 <#: 30; 
W t := W t Gl V4; W4 := W4 <#: 13; 
W 2 := W 2 ffi tt.'o; Wo := U'o <#: 20; 
wa:=wa ffi v s; Wt := Wt <#: 11; 
W 4 := W 4 G) tt.'J; W~ := U'J <#: 5; 
Return (wa , w t , W!J,Wa , w 4); 
Figure 3.1 H Function 
The bitwise exclusive-or of two words, denoted as "e ", is the sum of the words with 
carries suppressed. The symbol "<<<" represents left rotation, and " m" represents 
addition modulo 232. 
During the encryption, defining one step as a complete step for Phelix to update five 
active state words (w0, w" w2, w3, w4), at ith step, two 32-bit secret subkeys (Xi,o, Xi, 1) 
and one plaintext word Pi are applied to executions of the H function. The generation of 
the subkeys is introduced in Section 3.3.5. 
Selected details of the algorithm will be discussed in the analysis of Phelix cipher main 
components. For more insight of those components, refer to the initial paper [22). 
3.1.2 Security 
The authors of Phelix claimed that there is no attack against Phelix with less than 2 128 
operations. Actually, Phelix is a strengthened version of an earlier cipher, Helix [55], 
which was targeted by two attacks in 2004. One is an adaptive chosen-plaintext attack 
created by Muller [26). The other one was also published by Muller, which is a 
distinguishing attack [26] . The Phelix primitive was largely motivated to increase the 
security against the distinguishing attack. It expands Helix's 160-bit internal state to 288 
bits. 
However, in November 2006, Hongjun Wu and Bart Preneel published a paper titled 
"Differential Attacks against Phelix" [35]. This paper was largely derived from the 
differential attack against Helix stream cipher to recover the key. Their work mainly aims 
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at weak nonces and keys. They concluded that Phelix fails to strengthen Helix since the 
computational complexity of the attack is much less than that of the attack against Helix. 
However, a good cipher does not imply absolute security, and the confidence level in the 
amount of security is not merely dependent on several results of attacks. Selecting a 
potential prevalent cipher is even more complicated, and security is only one 
consideration among a large pool. 
3.1.3 Previous Work on Hardware Implementation on Phelix 
Until now there has been insufficient work on the hardware implementations of the 
candidate stream ciphers proposed for eSTREAM project. Most discussion and 
comparison focus on cryptanalysis. However, the authors of [68] demonstrated the FPGA 
performance of Phelix. The results are shown in Table 3.1. In order to avoid specific 
metric for individual devices, the authors of [68] chose the number of equivalent gates to 
measure area, where one gate is a two-input NAND gate (6 transistors). 
Table 3.1 FPGA Hardware performance ofPhelix [68[ 
Throughput Gate Implementation 
Xilinx Chip Slices Mbit/s Equiv Description 
Estimate 
XC2S100-5 1198 960.0 20404 (A) full-round 160-bit design, as per 
developers paper 
XC2S100-5 1077 750.0 18080 (B) half-round 160-bit design 
XC2S30-5 264 3.2 12314 (C) 32-bit data path 
The software/hardware codesign of Phelix has been studied in an undergraduate 
course at Virginia Tech called "Introduction to Codesign" [60]. They implement two 
identical half function blocks as the hardware component. 
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Figure 3.2 Block Diagram of Hardware Accelerator for Phelix 
The hardware design of one student group shown in Figure 3.2 1s of pure 
combinational logic, which can accomplish one state updating process in a single clock 
cycle, and leave the whole control complexity in software. 
Another two teams are more aggressive since the one implemented a half block as 
the basic iterative H function circuit, and the other one implemented eight double H 
function blocks as a parallel structure to relieve the communication bottleneck between 
software and hardware. Obviously, the synthesis result for the eight-fuii-H-block is quite 
large. A careful trade-off decision should be made. Table 3.2 shows the results for those 
three structures. All of them are implemented targeted on Xilinx Spartan3e FPGAs. 
Table 3.2 Results of Phelix Co-design 
Version Area (slices) Frequency(MHz) 
8x Full Block 4301 7.7 
Full Block 1190 48.6 
Half Block 459 76 
Unfortunately, the results are not good for comparison since the authors only provide 
the frequency instead of the throughput. 
32 
3.2 Compact ASIC Structure of Phelix 
3.2.1 Top Level Design 
The Phelix stream cipher can be implemented in many ways. The proposed compact 
structure focuses on function sharing to optimize the area. Figure 3.3 illustrates a 
minimal ASIC implementation consisting of one round of encryption and a memory 
recording the four old states. The specifications of the main blocks are given below: 
n_expand: converts a 128-bit input nonce to the 256-bit working nonce. 
key _mix: converts a variable-length input key to the fixed-length working key. 
sub key _gen: generates subkeys Xi,o, Xi, I for each block. 
ini_dp: decides the input of H_func. For the first eight blocks (initialization phase) , the 
generated keystream is discarded. 
H block: performs function H (w0,w1,w2,wJ,W4, Ko,Kt). 
FIFO: the "first in, first out" memory that stores the old states. 
n_cxpund 
elk 
key_mix 
subkcy...J!<n 
elk 
N(255:0) XO(J I :O) 
K(255:0) Xl() I:O) 
Lu4(J I:O) 
i(63:0) 
ini_dp 
init(127:0) 
win( l 59:0) 
wout( 159:0) 
H bloc~ 
"'' 
·tout 
XI(JI :O) 
XO(li :O) 
elk 
z.DI ) I.0)-
Zb4(3 1.0) 
Figure 3.3 Phelix Compact Structure 
Kcy.;trcun~) I :O) 
The top level controller can be presented by a finite state machine shown in Figure 3.4. 
When the system is turned on with the power plugged in or the Reset signal is triggered, 
the controller transfers to Idle state. When the start signal is asserted, the encryption 
circuit starts to work. 
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done_ h- ' I 'and 
Figure 3.4 State Diagram of the Top Level Controller 
The specifications of the states are given below: 
expand_kn: Convert a input key/nonce to the fixed-length working key/nonce. 
wait_kn: While stopping key_mix block and n_expand block, enable subkey_gen block, 
putting the first old state into the FIFO. 
initialize_begin: Set the initial five states of the H function, and enable the counter, 
which provides the block number. 
wait_h_l51 : Generate the keystream, and increase the block number. 
H 151: Do the function 
(Yo<i), Y1(i)' Y 2(i)' Y 3(i)' Y4(i)) := H (Zo(i), zl <i), Z 2(i)' Z 3(i)' Z4(i)' 0, Xi,o), where Y , X and Z are 
32-bit words, and i represents the block number. 
H 2"d: Do the function 
(z ( i+ l ) z (i+ l ) z (i+ l ) z (i+ l ) z (i+l )) ·= H(Y (i) y (i) y (i) y (i) y (i) P· X · ) where P· ·Is 0 , I , 2 , 3 , 4 · 0 , I , 2 , 3 , 4 , 1> I, I , I 
the plaintext word. 
wait_h_2"d: Store Z4 in the FIFO after each round . 
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Compute_MAC: Begin the MAC generation process. 
Since this design objective is sensitive to area, each sub-component is chosen to 
simply minimize the area. For instance, the rotation is realized by reordering the 
interconnections between logic cells instead of using shift registers. The discussion 
presented in this section concerns the structure of each main component that is 
implemented for the Phelix cipher. These basic components include 32-bit adder, H 
function block, key mixing block, nonce-expanding block and subkey generator. 
3.2.2 32-bit Adder 
Compared with other components, the 32-bit adder is the most expensive operation 
because of the speed and the area it consumes. The most convenient way to perform this 
operation is to use a ripple carry adder (RCA). 
A(J) 8(3) A(2) 8(2) A(l) 8(1) A(O) 8(0) 
Cout oout cin oout cin oout cin oout cin Cin 
um um 
Sum(J! Sum(2) Sum (I) Sum(O) 
Figure 3.5 A 4-bit RCA 
RCA is a straightforward adder and the layout is quite simple, which facilitates fast 
design. However, the speed of an adder mainly depends on the time taken by the carry 
chain. Since each full single-bit adder has to wait for the carry bit to be propagated from 
the previous adder, the delay is very significant, especially in 32-bit computation. 
Our design was developed for low resource, so the simple 32-bit RCA is used by 
sacrificing the throughput. The output is unregistered. 
3.2.3 H Function Block 
H function block and the adder are the basic function sharing components. Figure 3.6 is a 
block diagram that consists of two H functions: 
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Figure 3.6 One block of Phelix Encryption (221 
Based on the sources of the input data, the H function block is used in four phases. 
• In the key mixing process, the H function is used to create an R function that 
generates eight 32-bit working keys. 
Function R(wo,w,,w2,w3) 
Begin 
Local Variable w4 := l(U) + 64; II l(U) is the number of words in the input key. 
(wo,WI ,W2,W3,w4) := H(wo,WI ,w2,w3,w4,0,0); 
(wo,WI,w2,w3,w4) := H(wo,WJ ,W2,w3,w4,0,0); 
Return (wo,w, ,w2,w3); 
End. 
36 
• In the initialization phase, the input ofthe H function is set as: 
Z{ 8> := Kj+3 ED Nj for j = 0, 1, 2, 3 
z/ 8) := K1 
for i = -1 2, -11 , . . . , -9 
Pi := O fori = -8, -7, ... , -1 
where i represents the block number, z l) is the / h word of the ith block, Pi is the ith 
word of the plaintext. 
• After the initialization, H function is employed as below: 
(Yo(i), Y1(i)' Y2(i), Y3(i), Y4(i)) := H (ZoCi>. zl<i), Z2(i>, Z3(i>, zl>, o, x i.o) 
(z (i+l) z (i+ l) z (i+l) z (i+l) z (i+l)) ·= H(Y (i) y (i) y (i) y (i) y (i) p. X· ) 0 , I , 2 , 3 , 4 • 0 , I , 2 , 3 , 4 , to 1, 1 
The ciphertext words are computed by Ci := Pi ED Si, where Si := Y4(i) + Z4(i-4) and i 
ranges from 0 to 264-1 . 
• Just after the last word of the plaintext is encrypted, the internal state word Zo(i) will 
be XORed with the constant value Ox912d94fl , and the modified state is a new input 
for the H function block to start the post-mixing process, which computes the MAC. 
The simplified block diagram ofH function is shown below: 
32-bit Latch X 7 
Rotations & exclusive or 
operations & MUXes 
32-bit Latch X 5 
Figure 3.7 Simplified Datapath of the H Function Block 
The multiplexers (MUXes) connected to the input ports of the adder in the circuit are 
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of six input sources and a single output for adder sharing. To increase the speed of the 
encryption, we could design additional logic to perform the H function. It would require 
more adders and 32-bit exclusive-or function blocks that can work in parallel. However, 
it will dramatically increase the size of the H function circuit since the adder is the largest 
component compared with other simple function blocks, such as a 32-bit register. 
The complete block function is illustrated in Figure 3.8. The five input words are 
lathed when the H function block starts to work. Using a latch instead of a register might 
cause noisy inputs: if there is any glitch on the input of the latch, then, it will be 
propagated directly to the output. However, the area consumed by a latch is typically less 
than that consumed by a register. Two six-to-one MUXes are used to select the input for 
the single adder in the datapath of the H function block. The selection signals are given 
by an FSM. The results from the adder are stored in six latches. 
3.2.4 Key Mixing Block 
The key mixing block maps a variable-length input key to eight workings keys. Define 
function R as shown below: 
Function R(wo, WI, w2, w3) 
Begin 
End 
Local Variable W4 := I(U) + 64; 
(w0, WI, w2, w3, w4) := H(w0, WI, w2, w3, w4, 0, 0); 
(wo, WI, w2, w3, w4) := H(wo, WI, w2, w3, W4, w4, 0, 0); 
Return(wo, WI, w2, w3); 
Then, the key mixing process is a recursion: 
(~i, ~i+I, .. . , ~i+3) := R(~i+4, ~i+s, ... , ~i+7) EB (~i+S, ~i+9, ... , ~i+II) fori= 7, 
6, . .. , 0, where Ki represents a 32-bit word. The words (Ko, KI, ... , K7) forms the working 
keys ofthe cipher. 
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Figure 3.8 Complete Data path of the H Function Block 
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Figure 3.9 Data path of the Key Mixing Block 
There are four latch blocks (32-bit x 4) in the circuit. Two ofthem record the result of 
each recursion, including the final working keys; the other two are for the temporary 
variables. Although the H function block is shown in key mixing block's datapath, it is 
not exclusive but a basic public component in the top level structure. 
3.2.5 Nonce Expanding Block 
The nonce-expanding block is to extend a 128-bit nonce to the fixed 256-bit words by 
defining Nk := (k mod 4)- Nk_4 (mod 232) fork= 4, 5, ... , 7. 
Nino(31 :0) Nin,[31 :0) Nin2[31 :0) Nin3[31 :0) 
,------"-- • Nou1o(31 :0) 
.-----"'--+------.,.. Nout1[31 :0) 
'-------1~+---+------- Nout2[31 :0) 
'-------+--!---+----+------- Nout,[31 :0) 
kmod4 
(k = 4.5,6,7) 
Nout.(31 :0) 
Nout.(31 :0) 
Noulo(31 :0) 
Nout7[31 :0) 
Figure 3.10 Datapath of Nonce Expanding Block 
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The eight outputs of the block diagram are the expanded nonce N0, N 1, ... , N7. Usually, 
the modulo operation is implemented such that division with remainder is calculated each 
time. In this way, it can be slower and a waste of area. But for the case in Phelix nonce 
expanding, (k mod 4) equals (k and 3) in a bitwise operation. Thus we simply use an 
AND gate array instead of divider and comparator for efficiency. 
When k ranges from 4 to 7, (k mod 4) is of exactly 3 bits. So, it requires a zero _yad 
block to extend it to a 32-bit word for the 32-bit subtracter. The result of (k mod 4) can be 
used to notify one output latch to load the data at each clock cycle by using a block called 
"decoder Is". 
3.2.6 Subkey Generator 
The computation of subkeys can be done either on-chip or off-chip. If it is realized 
off-chip, in which subkey generation is performed outside and then is downloaded into 
the circuit memory, it requires only a memory. However, it may affect the security of the 
device. Thus, we implement the subkey generator block on-chip and provide additional 
block of hardware for this operation. 
According to [22], the subkey words for block i are defined by 
X;,o := K; mod 8 
Xu := K(; + 4)mod 8+ N; mod 8 +X;'+ i + 8 
, ll(i +S)/232 J if(imod4)=3 
X; = 4 x I(U) if(i mod 4) = I 
0 others 
Only when the working keys and the expanded nonce are ready to be used, the system 
controller can send a start signal to the subkey generator. 
It is easy to notice that all indices such as (i mod 8) and ((i+4) mod 8) are decided by 
the three least significant bits of the block number i. It indicates that we can take use of 
these three bits as the select signals for the three MUXes, whose outputs are Ki mods, xi· 
and N mod 8, respectively. The details are shown below: 
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Figure 3.11 Data path of Sub key Generator 
The block number starts from -8 in [22]. However, we start the block number from 0 in 
the initialization phase. Therefore, there is no need for adder to operate on the counter 
output i and the constant 8. 
3.3 High Speed ASIC Structure of Phelix 
The high speed implementation of Phelix stream cipher is not an overall change of the 
compact design; it only removes the features that will achieve compactness with the 
sacrifice of speed. For example, in the compact version, only a single carry ripple adder is 
used in H function block, while in the high speed version, six Kogge-Stone adders [46] 
are implemented for each addition. Various adder structures will be introduced in the 
following chapter since the structures of Salsa20 have chosen more adders to cater to the 
corresponding features. 
The figure below illustrates the top level of high speed Phelix implementation. To 
make it easy for understanding, we ignore some obvious I/0, such as the input reset. It is 
a synchronous design. Thus, all elk signals shown on each sub-block are driven by a 
global clock signal. In Sections 3 .3 . 1 ~3 .3 .4 , we will give the details of each sub-block 
shown in the top level block diagram in a bottom-up way. 
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Figure 3.12 Phelix High Speed Structure 
3.3.1 H Function Block 
The H function block is the most important component that decides the speed of the 
whole implementation. It is used in four different phases as we have introduced in the 
previous section. They are: key mixing phase, initialization phase, normal encryption 
phase and MAC generation phase. To speed up H function block, we split the six add 
operations into two groups: the group one includes ks_adderO, ks_adderl, ks_adder2, 
ks_adder3 and the group two includes ks_adder4 and ks_adder5. Since the second 
group's inputs depend on the output of the first group, they can not work in parallel. The 
main cost from the input to the output is the time consumed by the two adders. In this 
design, the combinational logic data path in front of the output registers can be divided 
into two clock cycles. However, no internal registers are added. It is controlled by a D 
flip flop, whose output connects to the load enable signal of the output registers. 
Therefore, the output is loaded every two clock cycles. The alternative method is to 
remove the D flip flop and make the whole H function completed in a single clock cycle. 
But it is not an efficient way as it may cause clock cycle waste when doing other work, 
such as XOR operation. 
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K0(31 :0) 
Zin0(31 :0) Zin I (31:0) Zin2(31 :0) Zin3(3 1:0) Zin4(31 :0) 
K I (31 :0)-----t------, 
Figure 3.13 H Function Block 
3.3.2 Key Mixing Block 
Key mixing block converts a variable-length input key to the fixed-length working keys. 
Each working key is a 32-bit word. The main components in key mixing block is called R 
function block, which is introduced in section 3.2.4. 
Firstly, it expands the input key into eight 32-bit words by padding with zeros to the 
most significant bits, if the length of the input key is smaller than 256 bits. Then, it 
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performs eight iterations; each one consists of an R function and an XOR function to 
produce an array of four new words as shown below: 
(K4;, ... , K4i+3) = R(K4i+4····· K4i+7)ffi(K4i+8 • .. .K4i+ll) i = 7, 6, ... , 0 
R function block is composed of two H blocks and it takes four clock cycles to 
accomplish one loop since each H function takes two. Consequently, 32 clock cycles (8 x 
4) are required for the key mixing phase to produce eight working keys. There are eight R 
function blocks in key mixing block in total. 
3.3.3 Nonce Expanding Block 
As shown in the top level block diagram, there is no elk as an input for N_expand block. 
It is pure combinational logic. Nonce expanding only happens in the initialization phase. 
So, it is not a very critical module for high speed design, which is focused on quickly 
producing keystream bits. The type of adder/subtracter in this block can be either ripple 
carry or Kogge-Stone. 
3.3.4 Keystream Generation Block 
The subkey generator in our design works "on the fly". That means the subkey 
computation is performed during the time when the keystream generator core (ks_gen) 
works on the previous plaintext word instead of pre-computed in the initialization phase 
and stored in a large memory. The structure of subkey generator is similar to the compact 
design, except that the high speed design uses Kogge-Stone adder. 
The ks_gen block requires four clock cycles to generate one keystream word. The 
reason is the same as that in the R function block: there are two H function blocks 
included. The data path of ks_gen is illustrated in Figure 3.14. Two H blocks are 
concatenated. The start signal for the second one is delayed by two clock cycles for signal 
alignment. 
The ks _gen block not only works in the normal keystream generation phase but also 
the initialization phase. So, its inputs are given by a ks_input_sel block as shown in the 
top level. The ks_input_sel block is very similar to ini_dp block in the Phelix compact 
design. It takes one clock cycle to make an input selection corresponding to the block 
number which is given by a counter. When the block number is between zero to seven 
and the start signal is asserted, it performs an initialization phase selection; when the 
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block number is larger than seven, it does nothing but pass the current input to the output 
directly. The FIFO that is used to store the previous four old states is combined in the 
ks _input _sel block. 
Plaintext() 1:"' 
sta n 
rs I 
~ 
Subkey0( 3 1:0 
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Zin4(3 1 :0 
)-
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Figure 3.14 Block Diagram of Keystream Generator 
3.3.5 The Controller 
-
Zo0(3 1:0)-
Zo4(3 1 :0) 
Kcyotream(J I :0) 
One tricky task to design a controller is to define the states in the system. If we define the 
states according to all control signals that the sub-components need, then any different 
combination of the signals could result in a new state, and the state transitions can cause a 
fair degree of "spaghetti- factor" when trying to follow the line of execution. Finite state 
machines are an adopted artificial intelligence technique, therefore, the representation of 
the states could be more abstract instead of catering to any trivial needs of 
sub-component, say, the selection signal of a MUX. With this in mind, we employed the 
idea that is often seen in framer cores used in communication systems. A typical example 
is in [54], which describe an implementation to perform basic word alignment and 
deframing for SONET/SDH system [23]. Usually, a frame has two indices, row and 
column. In hardware implementation, they are global signals and sent to every functional 
component, such as the error monitor. Those functional components perform the 
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corresponding tasks depending on the current row and column indices. Since in an ideal 
synchronous circuit the behavior of the whole circuit can be predicted exactly, they can 
cooperate well. In our design, we change the row and column indices to block number. 
With a correct block number, at a specific time, the key_ mix block knows whether it 
needs to generate the working keys; the subkey generator knows how to produce the 
subkeys; the core knows whether to send keystream _valid signal. The counter that 
generates the block number does not increment at every clock cycle but every four cycles 
as the encryption/decryption core requires four cycles to process one plaintext word. 
This method is greatly simplified to make the design more readable and easier for 
maintenance. There is no explicit central controller. To some extent, it can be considered 
as an FSM decomposition scheme. For the modules in the system, the input condition is 
the block number, the decisions they could make are the state machine related behavior. 
However, it might consume more resources since the sub-components have their own 
decision making system and are more independent. 
3.4 Synthesis Results of Phelix 
To our knowledge, there are no published ASIC implementations results for the Phelix, 
but a rough estimation from the authors of [22], is that the cipher can achieve speed of at 
least 200 MBps with 20,000 gates for the area. The targeted technology is not specified. 
Synthesis results of our design for Phelix are illustrated in Table 3.3. It consumes about 
12,000 two-input NAND gates in the compact design and achieves more than one Gbps 
throughput in the high speed design. 
Table 3.3 ASIC Implementation Results ofPhelix 
ASIC Device Throughput (Mbps) # of 2-input Nand gates 
0.18 Jl CMOS Compact High Speed Compact High Speed 
Design Design Design Design 
260.0 1,440.0 12,400 64,200 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we implement two structures for Phelix stream cipher: compact design 
and high speed design. Both of them are targeted for 0.18 micron CMOS technology. As 
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we expected, the H function is a core part of the entire circuit, and it determines the 
encryption speed. In our compact design, we only use a single adder in this function 
block and divide the circuit into several layers of combinational logic separated by 
latches. The high speed design removes all sharing components and allocates them to the 
function blocks exclusively. Moreover, it has no separate controller, when the input reset 
is low and start is asserted, all functional blocks cooperate according to the global clock 
signal. After the initialization phase, when the first word of the plaintext has been 
processed, the core sends out a keystream_valid signal to notify the peripheral devices. 
Table 3.3 shows that the high speed design consumes about two times more of area than 
the compact one does, but it comes with a four times higher throughput. Sample VHDL 
code for the Phelix cipher implementation is contained in Appendix A. 
The following chapter will investigate various hardware implementations for 
Salsa20. 
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Chapter 4 Hardware Implementation of the 
Salsa20 Stream Cipher 
4.1 Introduction of Salsa20 Stream Cipher 
Salsa20 stream cipher is another candidate of the eSTREAM project. It is claimed to 
provide high security, and is composed of several simple operations that are similar to 
Phelix. The core of Salsa20 is a hash function, encrypting a 512-bit block of plaintext by 
hashing the key (128-bit), nonce (64-bit), and a sequence number (64-bit) to a 512-bit 
output used as the keystream. 
In hardware implementations, FPGA designs typically consume more resources and 
run slower than their ASIC counterparts. However, development in the features of FPGA, 
such as intellectual property (IP) integration and high-speed 1/0 interconnects, has 
allowed FPGAs to play an important role in digital designs. Therefore, we have designed 
a compact FPGA hardware implementation for Salsa20, whose requirement for memory 
is relatively larger compared with other candidates. To find out two extreme situations in 
compactness and speed, we also designed the corresponding ASIC structures for Salsa20. 
In addition, for comparison we implement a basic iterative design, which incorporates 
trade-offs between area and speed. 
4.1.1 Algorithm 
The main function in the Salsa20 core is called the quarterround function. Defining y 
as a 4-word sequence then quarterround(y) is a 4-word sequence. If y = (yo;YI ;y2;y3), then 
quarterround(y) = (:zo;z1;z2;z3), where Yi and Zi are 32-bit words, i E {0,1,2,3}, and 
z1 = YI Ell ((yo+ YJ) <<< 7) 
z2 = Y2 Ell ((z1 +Yo) <<< 9) 
Z3 = Y3 Ell ((z2 + ZI) <<< 13) 
Zo =Yo Ell ((z3 + z2) <<< 18) 
The exclusive-or (XOR) of two words, denoted as "Ell", is the sum of the words with 
carries suppressed. The symbol "<<<" represents left rotation by the indicated number of 
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bits, and"+" represents addition modulo 232. 
If we consider the 64-byte input block x = (x[O], x[ 1 ], ... , x[ 15]) as a 4x4 matrix of 
32-bit words, the four elements in each row and each column will be modified by the 
quarterround function ten times, respectively. After that, the output is added with the 
original values, producing a 16-word keystream. 
In short, the keystream generation process can be shown as the flow in Figure 4.1: 
word 
Quarterround (x [OJ. x [1]. x [2]. x [3] ) 
{ Quarterround (x [5] , x[6] , x[7] , x[4] ) rowround (x) = Quarterround (x[10] , x[ll ] , x[8] , x [9]) 
Quarterround (x [15] , x[12]. x[13]. x [14] ) 
l Quarterround (x [0] , x [ 4] , x [8]. x [ 12]) 1 d( ) Quarter round (x[5] , x[9], x[13] , x[ l ]) co umnroun x = Quarterround (x[ l O], x[ 14] , x[2] , x[6] ) Quart erround (x [15] , x[3]. x[7] , x[ ll ] ) 
Figure 4.1 Salsa20 Keystream Generation 
4.1.2 Security 
In 2006, Crowley Paul Crowley reported a differential cryptanalysis of the 5-round 
Salsa20 model [58] and won Bernstein's US$1000 prize for "most interesting Salsa20 
cryptanalysis". Later, Fisher et al. reported a 6-round Salsa20 model in [66]. The most 
recent cryptanalysis of Salsa20 is in [78], which found a significant bias in the 
differential probability for Salsa20's 4th round internal state, yielded by assigning single 
bit differences to the initial vector which may be freely chosen by an attacker. However, 
the attack in [78] was only targeted on Salsa20/r (5~ r~ 8) instead of the full round 
Salsa20/20, where r is the number of rounds. 
4.1.3 Previous Work on Hardware Implementation on Salsa20 
Salsa20 was selected as one of the focus eSTREAM candidates for both Profile I 
(software) and Profile 2 (hardware) in Phase 2, and it received the highest voting score at 
the end of Phase 2 [66]. However, it was not selected for Profile 2 in Phase 2 since it 
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was not considered to be suitable for very resource-constrained hardware 
implementations. This also coincides with our conclusion in Section 4.3 though we have 
not been aware of any other pure hardware implementation results except rough 
estimation. 
The Salsa20 co-design was studied in an undergraduate course at Virginia Tech 
called "Introduction to Codesign" [60]. Through the reference C code, it can be found 
that in those co-designs, a component, which is a hardware accelerator is implemented 
targeted on Xilinx Spartan3e FPGA. 
Expanded Key&Non 
(64 byte) 
~,. 
_I 
I 
I 
Quarter 
/ Round 
Column 
Quarter 
Row /1 
Round 
Figure 4.2 Block Diagram of Hardware Accelerator for Salsa20 
It is clear that the co-design splits the double round function into two isolated blocks 
(column block and row block) to speed up the circuit. Table 4.1 shows that the speed up 
is limited. The reason is that during the execution, the output of the rowround function 
must be moved in and out for each iteration. It is a bottleneck for the overall 
performance. 
Table 4.1 Results of Salsa20 Co-design [60[ 
Cipher c GEZEL Area Speedup 
lines lines slices 
Salsa20 220 533 568 1.2 
Of particular interest is the last column in the table that illustrates the resulting 
performance improvement after introducing the hardware accelerator to the pure software 
design. However, neither the throughput of the software design nor that of the co-design 
is available in the literature. 
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4.2 Analysis of Salsa20 Cipher Main Components 
Considering the simple operations like addition modulo 232, exclusive or, and rotation by 
a fixed number of bits from the bottom level of the structure of Salsa20 circuit, the 
speed-and-area tradeoff in the ASIC design have been discussed in the previous chapter. 
However, we have not only looked into ASIC structures (fast structure, basic iterative 
structure and compact structure) for Salsa20, but also a compact structure in context of 
FPGA design. 
Basically, FPGA is reconfigurable and more flexible compared with ASIC design. It 
has distinct properties such as rich sequential logic resources on-chip and fast carry chain 
in the configurable logic blocks. As a result, we present the performance of various adder 
structures and their effects on the cipher performance in this section. Also, the main 
second level components like quarterround block, memory block are discussed for both 
ASIC and FPGA implementation. 
4.2.1 32-bit Adder 
In the literature, there exist plenty of stream ciphers whose internal states or output 
keystreams are based on modular additions. This is partly due to the fact that, when 
implemented in software, they are able to produce outputs at a very high speed. However, 
adder structures are of great concern in hardware implementation, especially in those 
where addition is the most responsible factor to decide the overall speed. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a ripple carry adder (RCA) consumes least area 
compared with other adder structures in ASIC design. Therefore, we still use RCA for 
compact ASIC implementation for Salsa20. However, it is very important to consider the 
actual targeted FPGA device to achieve the highest levels of performance in both speed 
and area. For example, the number of rows and columns of configurable logic blocks 
(CLBs) can affect the partitioning of the implemented adders. Nowadays, most 
commercial FPGAs have provided specific arithmetic hardware resources. Figure 4.3 is a 
carry logic diagram integrated in Xilinx Virtex 2.5 V FPGA. 
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Figure 4.3 Carry Logic Diagram [74) 
The carry chain contains a 2-input multiplexer (MUXCY) and an XOR (XORCY) gate. 
The function generator is a simple look up table (LUT). In a single CLB, there are two 
LUTs and each LUT can be implemented as a partial adder. 
It is obvious that the predefined adder targeted in Yirtex 2.5 V FPGA is a carry skip 
adder [74]. Table 4.2 shows the results of our implementations for various 32-bit adders 
in terms of speed and area. It can be seen from the table that in hardware designs, the 
growth in area consumption might not be linear to the increase of the speed. 
Table 4.2 Comparison of Adder Implementations 
on a Xilinx Virtex-IITM 2V250FG256 Board 
Primitive Component Critical Path Area (CLBs) 
Delay (ns) 
carry ripple adder 31.89 31 
carry skip adder 6.87 16 
(using the dedicated carry logic) 
carry look-ahead adder 23.68 82 
CSA with add-one circuit 23.31 40 
Sklansky parallel prefix adder 15.77 78 
Brent-Kung parallel prefix adder 15.77 79 
Kogge-Stone parallel prefix adder 7.72 110 
All of the adder structures listed above are applicable to general purpose designs, 
though some of them might not look like to be. For example, in our FPGA 
implementation of carry ripple adder structure, the speed is more than four times slower 
than the fastest parallel structure. It looks very unlikely to be actually implemented in 
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industry. However, a different target technology can result in a significant difference. In 
[84], the authors also give a comparison of various adder structures, such as carry ripple 
adder and carry look-ahead adder. Instead of FPGA, they chose the 0.7Jlm CMOS 
technology to implement all of the designs. Based on their implementation results, the 
carry ripple adder is not the slowest one. Besides, the carry skip adder has larger area 
requirements than others for all bit sizes. 
The proposed adder implementations targeted on FPGA demonstrate the importance of 
taking advantage of the dedicated carry logic. In the FPGA, in which the dedicated 
resources are so much faster than the general purpose routing, it is very hard, impossible 
in many cases, to build an adder that is faster than the built in adder structure with the 
same area consumption. Moreover, without the use ofthe built-in carry chain logic, even 
if we implement a carry-skip adder of the same structure, we need two LUTs per full 
adder instead of one and speed degradation will appear too because of the irregular 
routing. Based on the results, we choose the Xilinx vendor predefined adder for the 
compact FPGA design of Salsa20. 
When it comes to fast implementation, the parallel prefix adder is used. To illustrate 
parallel prefix adders, we should understand the prefix graph first. The basic idea is 
looking for cases in which carry out of a set of bits is the same as carry in. The carry 
produced at the ith stage is given as follows: 
ci+l = XiYi +(xi ffiyi)Ci 
where x; and y; are the inputs of the ith stage. The equation can be interpreted as stating 
that a carry is asserted if both operand bits are 1, and the carry from the previous stage is 
propagated if one of x; andy; is 0. Therefore, we have Gi and Pi denoting the generation 
and propagation at the ith stage: 
Define an associative binary operator 6 as: 
Yo= Xo 
Y; = X;~Yi-l 
We can get the most important property: 
X1~(x2~(x3~4)) = Cx1~2)~(x3~4) 
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Thus, 
C,. =G,.:O· 
, 
where k is the level within the hierarchical structure and i, j define the range of the sub 
block. For example, in a 16-bit Ripple Carry Adder, which is represented graphically in 
Figure 4.5, The black circle is the specific carry operator L.. To graphically illustrate 
how to generate (G, P) pair by using !:::,, one of the black circles shown in Figure 4.5 is 
marked by** and shown below: 
(G, P)~ (G,P)Jo 
(G,P)~o 
Figure 4.4 An Example of the carry operator 6. 
Input bits (15:0) 
Most significant bit f. Least significant bit 
stage I4 2 I 
0 
2 
3 
I5 
•• 
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I g g g 
Figure 4.5 16-bit Ripple Carry Adder 
The more black circle (operator L.) there are, the more area the adder structure 
requires. From our FPGA synthesis results, we find that the fastest parallel prefix adder is 
the Kogge-Stone adder, which has minimum logic depth (the number of stages shown in 
Figure 4.6) and full binary tree with minimum fan-out, resulting in a fast adder but with a 
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large area. 
15 14 13 12 I I 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 I 0 
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Figure 4.6 16-bit Kogge-Stone Parallel Prefix Adder 
For the moderate basic iterative structure, more attention is paid to the tradeoff 
between speed and area. Therefore, carry select adder (CSA) is more suitable since it can 
be considered as a tradeoff between the adders shown above. There are many 
improvements focusing on increasing the efficiency of CSA [ 68-72]. In [ 41 ], the authors 
use the first zero finding circuit and MUX to reduce the area without speed penalty. 
The carry select scheme divides the adder into three blocks as shown below. Sum and 
carry values are generated for possible carry values. Those values are fed into a 
multiplexer, who selects the correct sum and carry-out for the next stage. 
a[3 OJ 
b[3:0J 
a]3:01 rn]3:01 f--t--. 
b]3:0] n]3:0] 
0]3"0] 
partial_ adder_ slice_ 4 
c]3:0] 
_,_,...__m]3·0] s ]3 OJ ~--. 
'----1---1>-----"Lnl'---3 0--'-1 _ _J 
sum_block_ 4 
Figure 4. 7 Block diagram of a 4-bit carry select adder 
4.2.2 Quarterround Block 
cout 
s[3:0J 
A single quarterround function regards its 16-byte input as an array of 4 words. We can 
choose between implementing the function using purely combinational design and using 
sequential logic with registers to divide the combinational circuit into small but faster 
sub-components. Both designs are illustrated in Figure 4.8. 
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.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
yO 
yl 
y2 
y3 
(a) Combinational design 
dri><=add _ out(24 OOWNTO O)&add _ oo~l I OOWNTO 25); 
dr I <=add_ out(22 OOWNTO O)&add _ oo~l I OOWNTO 23); 
dr2<=add_out(l8 OOWNTOO)&add_oo~ll OOWNTO 19); 
drl<=add_out(IJ OOWNTOO)&add_ou~ll OOWNTO 14); 
(b) Sequential design 
Figure 4.8 Data path of Quarterround Block 
The combinational design shown above does not illustrate the main registers to store 
the final results (Zo, z1, z2, z3). If those registers are counted, it takes 2,900 2-input NAND 
gates and the critical path cost 20.72 ns, while the sequential version takes 2,050 2-input 
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NAND gates and the critical path is 7.4 7 ns. Although the sequential design of 
quarterround function block works at a higher clock frequency, it spends 10 clock cycles 
to finish the four modifications for the input words at a time (Figure 4.8.b). In terms of 
those results, it is reasonable to choose the faster combinational quarterround function as 
the basic block for the fast ASIC structure of Salsa20 and the sequential version for the 
compact structure. 
Figure 4.9 Finite State Machine of the Sequential Quarterround Block 
The finite state machine in Figure 4.9 shows how the sequential quarterround block 
works. When the start signal is asserted, the controller transits from idle state to load_ all 
state, in which the selection signals for the four MUXes in front of the registers are 
asserted (Figure 4.8.b). At the next positive edge of clock signal, the inputs selected by 
the MUXes have been held constant for specific period, called the setup time. Thus, the 
registers load all of them without metastability. In the quarterround block, there are only 
four registers requiring clock trigger. The states load_Z; (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) perform data 
loading, as the name implies. In calculate_Z; (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) states, the selection signals 
for all MUXes in the datapath are provided and kept stable during those clock cycles. 
Quarterround block works in a sequential manner as the calculation of Z; (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) 
depends on the previous one. 
4.2.3 Memory Block 
Salsa20 encryption performs 320 invertible modifications for its 64-byte input data. The 
resulting words are added to the original ones to produce a 64-byte keystream. 
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Obviously, it requires memory to store the original input as well as the temporary data 
after each quarterround function. 
Memory is usually a significant expense in most applications. Today's advanced 
FPGAs provide rich on-chip memories, which are maturely designed for compactness 
and speed. If properly employed, it can lead to a significant improvement in the latency 
ofthe overall design. 
The Xilinx Virtex FPGA provides synchronous read/write block RAM in its 
primitive library. Each port of the block ram can be independently configured as a 
read/write port. In our FPGA design, four block rams are used. Each one is configured to 
16-bit data width. The concatenation is shown in Figure 4.10: 
CLK 
DIN[31 :0] 
ADDR[3:0 ] 
WR 
EN 
16 X 32-bit RAM 
,--- DlN[15:0] 
-
ADDR[O: l] 
-
WR DOUT[IS:O] 
-
EN 
[) CLK 
_. DOUT[31 :0] 
DIN[31 :16] 
ADDR[3:2] 
WR DOUT[31 : 16) 
EN 
-
[) CLK 
Figure 4.10 A 32-bit Wide RAM 
The memories for Salsa20 ASIC compact structure are more complicated. Unlike 
FPGA design, we do not use the same structure for all memory blocks, since the control 
logic for the memory that only works as a buffer to store the original input without 
modifying during the keystream generation is much simpler than the other one, which 
will update the contents from the quarterround function block. 
59 
BeRister liB1rix 
Regjste r matrix 
din( l27:0) 
----+l din( l27:0) 
n:goutO rcgout i .S 
(a) MemO (b) Meml 
Figure 4.11 Block Diagram of Memory Blocks in ASIC implementation 
The two types of memories are shown in Figure 4.11 , named MemO and Mem I, 
respectively. The capacity for both memories is I 6 x 32-bit. But the controller of MemO 
has a row/column select signal to tell the register matrix which data array to update. This 
is decided by the property of quarterround function : row modification and column 
modification are interleaved. The 32-bit width output ports are only used at the end of ten 
double rounds. Each 32-bit sum is a word of keystream. 
The synthesis result in Table 4.3 illustrates the assumed difference. MemO consumes 
more area and runs slower because of the more complicated control logic. MemO stores . 
the 16 original 32-bit words, and its contents will be modified after each quarterround 
function. Mem1 stores the 16 original 32-bit words, which will not be touched until the 
quarterround function block has been used for twenty times. 
Table 4.3 Synthesis Results for Different Memory Blocks 
AREA CRITICAL PATH 
COMPONENTS (# ofNAND CRITICAL PATH PASSING TIME 
gates) (ns) 
MemO (modify) 5,820 FSM-output_sel- 2.22 
dout_dingle 
Mem 1 (no_ modify) 4,662 FSM-output_sel- dout 2.09 
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4.2.4 Control Unit based on Various Datapath 
4.2.4.1 Controller of the Compact ASIC Structure 
In a traditional controller consisting of a Finite State Machine (FSM) and combinational 
output logic, a large number of states can dramatically impact the logic equations, 
number of gates, and clock rate. A state consists of the condition (inputs trigger), state 
transition and outputs (control signals). There are two main methods of FSM design, 
focusing on handling where to generate the outputs. They are Moore Machine, whose 
outputs are associated with the current state of the device, and Mealy Machine, whose 
outputs are associated with not only the current state but also the input signals. 
condition 
1-------------- if mealy machine ----------------1 
I 
I 
I 
state register output logic 
Figure 4.12 Block Diagram of FSM 
control signals 
Due to their simple structure and predictability, FSMs are easy to implement. An 
FSM can be implemented by different encoding methods. In our design, we used the most 
popular encoding scheme called one-hot encoding. One-hot encoding requires a D flip 
flop for each state, while another encoding method called binary encoding only requires 
llog2N l D flip flops for N states. It seems like that the latter is more efficient. However, 
decoding an encoded binary FSM leads to increased logic levels between states, while in 
a one-hot encoded FSM, the states are already in the decoded format and, consequently, 
only simple combinational logic is needed as a part of FSM. 
The design of controllers significantly depends on the structure of datapath. In 
compact ASIC design of Salsa20, the datapath consists of two 32-bit x 16 memory blocks 
and one quarterround function block. 
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Figure 4.13 Data path of Compact ASIC Structure for Salsa20 
The specifications of the main blocks are given below: 
• Quarterround: performs quarterround function . 
• MemO(modify): stores the 16 original 32-bit words, and its contents will be modified 
after each quarterround function. 
• Meml(no modify): stores the 16 original 32-bit words, which will not be touched 
until the quarterround function block has been used for twenty times. 
Based on the datapath of the figure above, it is easy to define five states that output 
different control signals. 
In idle state, nothing happens; arbitrary control signals for the datapath are sent to the 
datapath. The controller is transited to load _rows state if the start signal is asserted. At 
this state, one row (128 bits) of the 512-bit data block is loaded into the registers in 
parallel. The quarterround block starts to work at quarter _en state. The output of the 
quarterround block is fed back to the memory at load_ z state. The controller goes to add 
state if twenty rounds have been accomplished. After add state, in which the modified 
data is added with the original one to produce the keystream, a new process for the next 
input data block can begin. 
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Figure 4.14 FSM of Compact ASIC Structure for Salsa20 
4.2.4.2 Controller of the Basic Iterative and High Speed ASIC Structure 
The datapath of an iterative structure consists of four quarterround function blocks, since 
the four rows or the four columns are encrypted independently. The control unit is simply 
a combination of a counter and a comparator. 
a .. d y Ke y tlr .. • 
Figure 4.15 Salsa20 Basic Iterative ASIC Structure 
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After the start signal is asserted, the quarterround function begins to work on the 4x4 
data matrix during the odd clock cycles. The data matrix performs a transpose function 
during every even clock cycle. It takes 40 clock cycles to finish the whole data 
modification (encryption). 
The controller of the high speed ASIC structure is exactly the same as the basic 
iterative structure as the former can be seen as a concatenation of the latter. 
4.2.4.3 Controller of the Compact FPGA Structure 
Since our compact design implemented in FPGA employs two 32x 16 bits predefined 
memory and reuses the adder for compactness, the number of states required to produce 
different control signals for the datapath is largely increased. It is composed of ten row 
functions, ten column functions, and an addition for one data block, and each row or 
column function requires four states for a row or column (since each modification for an 
element in a row or column needs different control signals). 
To decrease the number of states and simplify the controller structure, the proposed 
design uses a partial microprogramming controller. A complete microprogramming 
controller [14] consists of address generator, address register, ROM, instruction register 
as the figure below: 
Condition 
ROM Instruction register Control 
Signals 
Figure 4.16 General Structure of Microprogramming Approach 
In our design, we keep FSM, whose output is not the control signals but the states. A 
6-bit counter is used to generate the address. The control information is loaded into the 
memory in the initialization phase, and the controller sends out a microinstruction to the 
datapath every clock cycle. Here, the microinstruction for Salsa20 are the read/write 
enable signal, memory address, selection signals for the MUXs, and a ready signal to 
notify other functional blocks to receive the keystream. It is a flexible method, especially 
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for further improvement, because program changes only cause slight difference in the 
memory, which contains control information. The controller also eases the pressure on 
the designer when the design needs flexibility. 
Start 
Rst 
Control 
Signals 
-
-
-
• 
I 
Address Generator 
.I ~ FSM Counter 
~ 
Instruction 
Register ROM 
-(Control 
Information ) 
Figure 4.17 Controller ofSalsa20 (FPGA implementation) 
4.3 The Synthesis Results of Salsa20 
All designs are simulated by using Modelsim and synthesized by using 
LeonardoSpectrum evaluation edition. Synthesis results for Salsa20 are illustrated in 
Table 4.4. Table 4.5 shows a comparison between ciphers from the previous work done in 
[47]; the device that was employed was Xilinx FPGA 2V250fg256 [75], which is used by 
us too. 
Table 4.4 Implementation Results of Salsa20 
Compact Basic Iterative Fast Compact 
Structure (ASIC) (ASIC) (ASIC) (FPGA) 
0.18~ CMOS 0.18~ CMOS 0. 18~ CMOS Xilinx FPGA 2V250fg256 [7 1) 
Device 
Throughput 71 .2 Mbps 255 4.8 38 
Mbps Gbps Mbps 
14,100 23,408 470,000 194 
Area 2-input Nand gates 2-input Nand gates 2-input Nand gates CLB slices 
+ 
4 Block RAMs 
Throughput/ 5.05 10.90 10.21 0.20 
Area Mbpslkgates Mbps/kgates Mbps/ kgates Mbps/s lices 
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Table 4.5 Cipher performance and area comparison 147) 
Cipher Area Frequency Throughput Throughput I 
(slices) (MHz) (Mb/s) Area 
AS/I 32 188.3 188.3 5.88 
W7 608 96.0 768.0 1.26 
EO 895 189.0 189.0 0.21 
Helix 418 32.0 1024.0 2.45 
RC4 140 60.8 120.8 0.86 
Salsa20* 194 96.0 38.0 0.20 
The implementation result of Salsa20* in Table 4.5 is obtained from our design. It is 
unsurprising that Salsa20 based on a compact context is slower and consumes more area 
than other popular stream ciphers, since it performs a large number of invertible 
modifications, each of which changes one word of the matrix in a sequential manner. 
However, the high speed ASIC design achieves a more acceptable throughput to area 
ratio. The best throughput to area ratio comes from the basic iterative design as it has 
considered the trade-off between speed and area. 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we implement Salsa20 in various structures. Both ASIC and FPGA 
implementations are considered. The proposed VLSI implementations achieve a data 
throughput up to 4.8Gbps targeted for 0.18 micron CMOS technology, and a compact 
FPGA design uses 194 slices and 4 memory blocks in a Xilinx device. The FPGA results 
are compared with other stream ciphers, considering two major quality metrics: area and 
speed. 
Salsa20 has now been removed from the focus list in terms of hardware performance. 
However, the document of eSTREAM project shows that they only compare the 
selected candidates for extremely resource constrained hardware environments. It is 
apparent that Salsa20 can be implemented for very high speeds in digital hardware. 
Moreover, it is hard to predict the influence of the FPGA design tools and the HDL 
design entry method on the synthesis results. Considering that Salsa20 has received the 
highest weighted voting score of any Profile I algorithm at the end of Phase 2, we believe 
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that it is reasonable to provide more comparisons for this cipher in terms of hardware 
performance. 
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Chapter 5 Statistical Test of Salsa20 and 
Phelix 
5.1 Introduction 
Statistical testing is one of the topics in the theory of statistics, which is based on the idea 
that a sample from the set of all possible outcomes of the experiment will be 'typical' to 
analyze the whole set. In this chapter, we will focus on one particular field of statistical 
testing: randomness testing. Such testing is important because common cryptosystems 
require key/keystream to be generated in a random fashion. We have employed a test 
suite provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [8] 
specifically for the tests of cryptographic sequences. NIST is a non-regulatory US agency, 
whose mission is to promote measurement science, standards, and technology. It provides 
an empirical statistical test suite discussing particular standards of testing random and 
pseudorandom number generators. In this test suite, sixteen recommended statistical tests 
are provided namely; frequency, block frequency, runs, longest run of ones in a block, 
matrix rank, discrete Fourier transform, non-overlapping template matchings, 
overlapping template matchings, universal test, Lempel-Ziv compression, linear 
complexity, serial, cumulative sums, approximate entropy, random excursions, random 
excursions and variants. We have chosen four of them to apply to the sample sequences 
generated by Salsa20 and Phelix. The corresponding algorithms and the test results will 
be discussed later. 
Considering that the tests from NIST are not particularly designed for testing the 
security of stream ciphers, in other words, they do not consider the internal states, input 
key, or IV of the ciphers; we have divided our study into two phases. In the first phase, 
keystreams are generated from each cipher and tested by using the selected tests from the 
NIST test suite. In the second phase, several structural tests that consider the properties of 
stream ciphers are applied to both Phelix and Salsa20. 
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5.2 General Discussion 
In this section, we shall see how to utilize probability distributions to carry out a 
statistical test. Also, some basic concepts in statistical testing will be introduced. 
5.2.1 Randomness 
For a real random generator, the properties of the output sequences have to meet some 
standards. A variety of statistical test algorithms can be applied to a keystream to evaluate 
whether it meets those randomness requirements. A random bit sequence could be 
interpreted as that the probability of '0' or '1 ' happens in the sequence should be exactly 
0.5. Furthermore, the bits are independent. Randomness is a probabilistic property. In 
other words, it is the property of a random sequence can be characterized and described 
in terms of probability. There is no "complete" set of tests for judging whether a sequence 
is random or not, because each test only assesses the presence or absence of a particular 
"pattern", sometimes called test statistic, which, if detected, would indicate that the 
sequence is random based on a certain hypothesis. To understand test statistic, we must 
look into the concepts of null and alternative hypothesis first. A null hypothesis, which is 
denoted as H0 supposes that the sequence being tested is random. Any other hypothesis is 
called the alternative hypothesis. For each applied test, a decision or conclusion is 
derived that accepts or rejects the null hypothesis. 
5.2.2 Test Statistic and P-value 
Having null and alternative hypotheses, the next step is to find out a statistic which shows 
up any departure from Ho. There is not only one type of statistic that can be chosen. For 
example, some tests, such as T test [ 18] chooses a statistic noted as T, 
T = X n - IJ 
Sn /Vn. 
where x.~ is the sample mean, ll is the expected mean, n is the size of the sample and 
1 n ? 
Sn2 = - L (xi- Xnr 
n - 1 . 1 1 = ' 
which is the sample variance. 
Some tests choose different statistics. In chi-square goodness-of-fit test [ 18], the test 
statistic is often written as 
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where Oi is an observed frequency; Ei is an expected (theoretical) frequency, asserted by 
the null hypothesis. 
The computed test statistic should be compared with a critical value determined by a 
theoretical reference distribution of this statistic under the null hypothesis. If the test 
statistic value exceeds the critical value, the null hypothesis for randomness is rejected. 
Otherwise, the null hypothesis (the randomness hypothesis) is not rejected (i.e., the 
hypothesis is accepted). A result which is unlikely to occur if H0 is true is called a 
significant result. Consequently, the significance level of a test is the maximum 
probability, assuming the null hypothesis, that the statistic would be observed. The 
P-value is the probability that the null hypothesis will be rejected in error when it is true. 
It can be described as P (reject H0 I H0 is true) mathematically. In practice, a significance 
level a is set prior to a test. If P-value 2: a , then the null hypothesis is accepted. If P-value 
< a , then the alternative hypothesis is accepted. The parameter a is typically chosen in the 
range [0.00 1, 0.01]. In the NIST test suite [8], a has been set to 0.0 1. It indicates that one 
would expect 1 sequence in 100 sequences to be rejected by the test if the sequence is 
random. 
An example including the related concepts is given below: 
Assume there is a random sample of size n, taken from a normal distribution with an 
unknown mean 1-l· The observed mean is x. Then what we are interested in is whether x 
differs significantly from a particular value 1-lD for 1-l· Thus the null hypothesis is given by 
H0 : 1-1 =!J.D. If the standard deviation is known, and the value is cr, then we have the test 
statistic: 
X- j.J 
z = 0 
CT I .j; 
If Ho is true, then z is a standard normal variable. The observed value of z is denoted 
as ZQ. The probability P (lzl 2: Zo) is represented by the shaded area in Figure 5.1. It is the 
P-value. Given an a of value 0.01 , we can get a value c from P (lzl > c) = a. If IZol is 
greater than lei , then Ho will be rejected. 
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Zo positive Zo negative 
1~ positive 7-(J negative 
Figure 5.1 An Example of Statistical Test [18[ 
5.3 Test Model 
Figure 5.2 shows the model for statistical test. The sample generator could be Salsa20 or 
Phelix keystream generator or other derived generator, because the data sequences we 
have tested are not only the keystream, but also some new sequences that would represent 
certain properties or correlations between key, lV, internal states and a part of keystream. 
A large amount of sequences produced by the generator are used as the input of the 
selected test algorithm, which will calculate the test static and the corresponding P-value. 
Based on the P-value, we can decide whether the sequences have passed the test. The 
decision does not indicate weak keys or internal states recovery, but can be used for 
distinguishing the sequence being tested from a truly random one. 
Theoretical 
Distribution t---
Statistics 
-----. P-value 
Statistical 
Test Decision 
Sample 1-- Test Statistics -----. Generator Generator 
s1gmficance level 
Figure 5.2 Model for Statistical Hypothesis Test 
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5.4 Keystream Tests 
In this section, randomness properties of the output keystream are examined. We generate 
a large amount of keystream and apply certain statistical tests. Details of the test 
algorithms are introduced in each sub-section. 
5.4.1 Frequency (Monobit) Test 
The frequency test is one ofthe most basic tests, which focuses on the proportion of zeros 
and ones in a sample sequence. The number of ones and zeroes are expected to n/2; n is 
the length of the input sequence. The test algorithm is described below: 
Input sequences; 
for i - 0 to n-1 do /In is the length of s 
ifs[i]= 0 thenx[i] := -1; 
ifs[i]= I thenx[i] :=+ I; 
Sn = ~~ x[i]; 
1• 0 
Sobs := IS nil Fn; //Compute the test statistic. 
P-value := erfc(Sobsl ..fi ); //erfc is the complementary error function 
Figure 5.3 Frequency Test Algorithm 
This test makes use of De Moivre-Laplace theorem, which is defined as the fact that 
for a sufficiently large number, say n, of independent Bernoulli trials [ 42], the distribution 
of Sobs (the binomial sum) is approximately a standard normal distribution. 
According to the Central Limit Theorem, 
lim P(Sobs 5, z) = ¢>(z) = ,;._ l e-u212du 
n-+oo v2n co 
where 1/'(z) is the cumulative probability function of the standard normal distribution. The 
complementary error function of z is defined as 
erfc(z) = }z; [ e-u2 du 
Then the corresponding P-value equals erfc(Sob/ ..fi ), since the P-value IS 
2[1-f/J(ISobs I)] 
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5.4.2 Frequency Test Within a Block 
The focus of this test is similar to the frequency test, but it divides the whole sequence 
into M sub-blocks. The frequency test (monobit) can be seen as a special case, where 
M= I, of block frequency test. The test algorithm is described below: 
Input sequence s; 
I Partition s into M non-overlapping blocks, n is the length ofthe sequence. 
I N is the length of the sub-block. 
M=Ln / N J; 
for i +--- 0 to M-1 do /In is the length of s 
N - 1 
L: s[j] 
p[i] = J=O ; II calculate the proportion of ones in each N-bit block 
N 
M - 1 
2(obs) = 4N L (p[i]- 0.5) 2 ; 
1=0 
P-value = igamc (M/2, x\oruy2); II igamc is the incomplete gamma function 
Figure 5.4 Block Frequency Test Algorithm 
It is recommended that the length of each sequence to be tested should be at least 
100. The block size N is selected such that N ~ 20, N > O.Oln and M < 100. In our test, 
n=512, N=20 and M=25. lfn is not a multiple of the selected N, M is the floor of(n/N), 
the largest integer that is not greater than (n/N). 
The function noted as igamc( ) in Figure 5.4 is called incomplete Gamma function, 
which is derived from Gamma function. They are based on an approximation formula [8]. 
(5.1) 
. ( ) I I r -t, a-ld = __ 1_ [ e-'ta-ldt rgamc a ,x = --- e t 
i(a) i(a) (5 .2) 
The formula (5.1) is Gamma function and (5.2) is incomplete Gamma function . More 
details can be found in the Handbook of Applied Mathematical Functions [46] . The 
statistic x2(obs) is referred to chi-square distribution with M degrees of freedom. 
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5.4.3 Discrete Fourier Transform Test 
The discrete Fourier transform (OFT) is often used for Fourier analysis of finite-domain 
discrete-time signals. It is widely employed to analyze the frequencies in a sampled 
signal. The OFT statistical test focuses on the peak heights in the discrete Fourier 
transform obtained from the sample sequence. 
If the sequence is random, then the proportion of peaks that exceed the 95% 
threshold should not be significantly different than 5%. 
Input sequences; 
for i +- 0 to n-1 do lin is the length of s 
if s[i]= 0 then x[i] := -I; 
ifs[i]= I thenx[i] :=+1; 
S = DFf(x); II A sequence of complex variables is produced 
I S' is the ftrst nl2 elements inS. Since the complex conjugate ofs[i] equals s[n-i], 
I the other half of S is ignored. 
= modulus(S'); 
T = Fn; the 95 % peak height threshold value 
0 = 0.95n/2; the expected theoretical (95 %) number of peaks that are less than T. 
I = the observed number of peaks that are less than T 
N-N d = 1 0 ; test statistic 
.J n x 0.95 x 0.05 I 2 
P-value = erfc ( ldll2 ); llerfc is the complementary error function 
Figure 5.5 Discrete Fourier Transform Test Algorithm 
According to the central limit theorem, the distribution of the value of the test 
statistic d can be considered as standard normal distribution N (0, l) when n is large 
enough. 
Though the report [8] claims that the default threshold value of the OFT test, which 
is Fn , is not correct, the correct value of the variance of the test statistic remains 
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unsolved. Therefore, we still use the default value in our tests. 
5.4.4 Runs Test (Wald-Wolfowitz Test) 
In this test, a run is defined as an uninterrupted sequence of identical bits. For instance, 
"1111 000111 00" is divided in four runs, two of which consist of" 1" and the others of "0". 
If there are too many runs, the data is likely to alternate in a nonrandom order. 
Runs test can be used to test the randomness of a sequence, by measuring whether the 
number of runs of various lengths is as expected. 
nput sequences; 
:= (number of ones in s)/n; //n is the sequence length 
:= 21 .J;;; 
(l7t- 1121 >-r) then break; II the test should not be run under this circumstance 
//because of a failure to pass the Frequency test. 
n-1 
V, (obs) := L r(k) + 1; II where r(k)=O if s(k)=s(k+ 1), and r(k)=1 otherwise. 
k;l 
-value := erfc " II erfc IS the complementary error function (IV (obs)-2nn-(l-n-)1) . . 
25n-(l-n-) 
Figure 5.6 Runs Test Algorithm 
Considering an oscillation as a change from a one to zero or vice versa, a large value 
for Vn(obs) would indicate an oscillation between substrings is too fast; a small value 
would indicate that the oscillation is too slow. 
5.4.5 Experimental Results and Analysis 
NIST has adopted two approaches to interpret the test results: the examination of the 
proportion of sequences that pass a statistical test and the uniform distribution of P-values 
[8]. 
5.4.5.1 Proportion of Sequences Passing a Test 
A P-values pass proportion is directly related to a, the significance level. For example, 
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given an a = 0.01, if 1000 sequences are tested, and 998 of them have P-values :=:: 0.0 I , 
then the pass proportion is 0.998. The low and high bounds can be computed using the 
formula: 
1-a±3~a(1-a) 
m , where m is the number of tested sequences. 
If the proportion falls in this interval, Ho is accepted. 
For m = 1024, and a = 0.01 , the lower bound of the P-values pass proportion is 
0.980672, and the higher bound is 0.999328. The results for each test applied to I 024 
keystream sequences are given in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 the Result of Proportion of Sequences Passing a Test 
Cipher Test 
Frequency Block Frequency Discrete Fourier Runs 
Salsa20 Transform 
Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion 
0.972656 0.992187 0.985351 0.994328 
Frequency Block Frequency discrete Fourier Longest Run 
Phelix transform 
Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion 
0.982359 0.993342 0.980963 0.998799 
There is one P-value corresponding to the application of a statistical test on a single 
sequence, and in our tests, 1024 (210) keystream sequences of length 512 (29) bits are 
generated from both Salsa20 and Phelix respectively. Therefore, there are 1024 P-values 
for each test. Table 5.1 shows that only the proportion of Salsa20's keystream sequences 
passing the frequency test is out of the acceptable interval. 
5.4.5.2 Uniform Distribution of P-values 
To examine the uniformity of the distribution of a set of P-values, we have to learn about 
the chi-square goodness-of-fit test (also know as the x2 goodness-of-fit test). It is one of 
the most widely used statistical tests when one wants to see if the observed frequencies of 
multiple mutually exclusive categories are significantly different from those which could 
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be expected as random. 
Suppose that YI , y2, .. . , Yk and PI , p2, ... , Pk are the observed and expected 
frequencies for the ones that have appeared in the k different n-bit keystreams. Then, the 
chi-square statistic for the test is: 
k LPs =1 
s=l 
If the observed value ofx2 is x2_o, then the P-value equals the probability P(x2 2: x2_o). 
More details of the x2 goodness-of-fit test could be found in [ 18]. 
One of the common misunderstandings about P-value is that it is the probability that 
the null hypothesis is true. In fact, it does not attach probabilities to hypotheses, but the 
probability that a perfect random number generator would have produced a sequence less 
random than the sequence that is tested. In those tests that we have chosen from the NIST 
suite, the computed test statistics could be anywhere on the x-coordinate of a standard 
distribution. The distribution of P-values is supposed to have the property of uniformity. 
Appendix G gives an example of how those P-values distribute. The idea of evaluating 
the uniformity of the obtained P-values is to divide the interval between 0 and I into 10 
equal sub-intervals, and the P-values that lie within each sub-interval are counted and 
tested via an application of the x2 goodness-of-fit test. In this way, the P-values' P-value 
is obtained. The test statistic is 
where F; is the frequency of P-values in sub-interval i, and m is the number of the tested 
sequences. A new P-value is calculated by the function igamc (9/2, l 12). Not like the 
previous P-values, the new P-value tends to be close to one as (Fi - 1/1 0) is very small 
based on the test results. For a good random sequence, the new P-value should be close to 
I. Table 5.2 illustrates all test statistics we have observed and their corresponding 
P-values. All new P-values obtained are very close to 1. The values shown in the table are 
not the accurate ones, but the rounded numbers, as they are enough to illustrate the 
uniform distribution. 
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Table 5.2 The Result of Uniform Distribution ofP-values 
Cipher Test 
Frequency Block Frequency Discrete Fourier Runs 
Salsa20 Transform 
xz New xz New l New x" New 
P·value P-value P-value P-value 
0.14427 0.99998 0.12797 0.99999 0.02583 0.99999 0.13556 0.99999 
Frequency Block Frequency discrete Fourier Longest Run 
Phelix transform 
xl New xl New xl New x" New 
P-value P-value P-value P-value 
0.10589 0.99999 0.01785 0.99999 0.00509 0.99999 0.14339 0.99999 
5.5 Correlation Tests 
The tests from NIST are not particularly designed for testing the security of stream 
ciphers. They simply focus on testing the randomness look of the keystream sequence. In 
other words, they do not consider the cipher structure including the internal states, input 
key, and IV of the ciphers. The authors of [50] applied four structural randomness tests to 
the stream ciphers of eSTREAM, including Phelix and Salsa20. They are Key/Keystream 
Correlation Test that considers the correlation between key and the corresponding 
keystream using a fixed IV, IV/Keystream Correlation Test that considers the correlation 
between IV and the corresponding keystream using a fixed key, Frame Correlation Test 
that considers the correlation between keystreams using different IV values, and Diffusion 
Test that examines the diffusion property of each bit of key and IV. They also introduced 
another two tests, which are not applied but left as a future study: Internal State 
Correlation test and Internal State/Keystream Correlation Test. Each of the six tests 
produces new sequences of data to which randomness tests can be applied. In [50], the 
randomness of the sequences was tested by considering the appropriateness of the fit to 
the binomial distribution, using the x2 goodness of fit test. 
In this section, we apply the four randomness test algorithms introduced in 5.4 to the 
new sequences to extend the result. Only the chi-square goodness-of-fit test is employed 
in [50] for evaluation. Additionally, we apply the last two statistical tests of [50], which 
were not investigated for Phelix and Salsa20. 
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5.5.1 Testing New Sequences 
5.5.1.1 Sequence Generation Process 
In this section, we describe the process to generate the sequences to be tested for the first 
few tests mentioned in [50]. To evaluate various correlations for stream ciphers, new 
sample sequences representing particular properties of the stream cipher are required. 
According to [50], the first two types of sequences are obtained by the operation 
keystream[O to i-1] e s[O to i-1] 
where keystream[O ... i-1] are the first i bits of the keystream, and s[O . .. i-1] represents 
i-bit key for key/keystream correlation sequence tests and i-bit IV for JV/keystream 
correlation sequence tests, respectively. 
The algorithm to generate the frame correlation sequence is shown below: 
Randomly choose key, IV; 
fori+- I toN II N=L024 
do 
I I L=512, encryption could be Salsa20 or Phelix key stream generator 
Ks[i] = first L bit of encryption (IV, key); 
Increment IV; 
fori+- I to L 
do 
for j +- I toN 
do 
sequence[i] = sequence[i] & ks[j][i]; II & is concatenation 
etum sequence 
Figure 5.7 Frame Correlation Sequence Generation Algorithm 
In Figure 5.7, L is an arbitrary length of the keystream and N is the number of 
repetitions to produce a keystream with fixed 256-bit key and incremented values of IV. L 
sequences are initialized to empty before operation. The sequence sequence[i] indicates 
the ith bit of the sequence, ks[j][i] indicates the ith bit of the jth keystream segment U 
ranges from 1 toN and i ranges from 1 to L). It is illustrated in Figure 5.8. 
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~cqucth.·c( I J 
Figure 5.8 Diagram of Frame Correlation Sequence 
The last type of sequence generated aims at the diffusion property of each bit of key 
and IV. That is, each bit of IV and key should affect the keystream with equal probability. 
M is a (K + V)x L zero matrix; I I k is the length of the key; V is the length of the IV 
M[l] 
M[2] 
M[K +V] 
fori +-- I toN I/N= I024 
do 
Randomly choose key and IV 
Keystream[i] := encryption(IV, key); 
for j +-- l to K 
do 
key' := change one bit of the original key; 
d[j] := Keystream[i] ED encryption (IV, key); 
M[j] := M[j] + d[j]; 
for j +-- I to V 
do 
IV' := change one bit of the originallY; 
d[j] := Keystream[i] ED encryption (IV', key); 
M[K+j] := M[K+j] + d[j]; 
Return M; 
Figure 5.9 Diffusion Sequence Generation Algorithm 
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5.5.1.2 Experimental Results and Analysis 
The evaluation strategies used for new sequences are the same as that used in previous 
section 5.3: the proportion of sequences passing a test and the distribution of P-values 
which should be uniform between 0 and 1. The results are summarized in Table 5.3 and 
5.4. 
Table 5.3 Proportion of Sequences Passing a Test 
acceptable range [0.980672, 0.999328] 
Discrete Fourier 
Tests Frequency Block Frequency Transform RlUlS 
... 
"' ~ e) 
E. g proportion proportion proportion proportion ll) 
u ;::) I ~ 
0 S1 0.996094 0.997070 0.984375 0.991210 
<;:A S2 0.985352 0.991211 p .979492j 0.988281 V) 
co S3 ~.92382~ P.953t2~ P.I1328tl ~.8632811 ("./) 
S4 0.989583 0.992188 0.981771 0.989583 
S1 0.979492 0.993164 0.985352 0.989258 
.~ S2 0.992188 0.993164 0.990234 0.988281 ~ S3 ~.89062~ b .94921q 10.1237821 ~.8906251 ;_ 
S4 0.994792 0.989583 k>.973958j 0.984375 
+ S I : Key/Keystream Correlation Sequence (Number of Sequences = I 024, Sequence Length = 256) 
+ S2: IV /Keystream Correlation Sequence (Number of Sequences = I 024, Sequence Length = 128) 
+ S3: Frame Correlation Sequence (Number of Sequences = 512, Sequence Length = 1024) 
+ S4: Diffusion Sequence (Number of Sequences = 384, Sequence Length= 512, Repeat 1024 times) 
As the results in Table 5.3 indicate, we obtained some deviations from the acceptable 
range of the proportions that pass the tests, and those deviation values are circled in the 
table. The Frame Correlation Sequence of both Salsa20 and Phelix fails all the four tests 
and is particularly poor for the OFT test. This may indicate that Salsa20 and Phelix do not 
satisfy the necessary property as the frames generated using consecutive IVs are 
correlated. Whether this can be exploited particularly in a cryptanalysis is not clear and 
merits further study, particularly in relation to the OFT test. For further investigation, we 
have provided the source code that is related to frame correlation sequence generation 
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and testing process in the Appendix F. 
Table 5.4 The Result of Uniform Distribution of P-values 
Tests 
discrete Fouriel' 
Frequency Block Frequeucy transfom1 Runs 
Cipher ~noe "!! New P-value ·l New P-value 1.1 New P-value 1.1 New ?-value 
0 Sl 0.07397 1.00000 o.oim 1.00000 0.1.6953 1.00000 p.oi236J ~ S2 0.16499 1.00000 0.01313 1.00000 118315 0..99846 0.04609 
c; S3 o.432n 0..99998 0.13541 1.00000 8.61479 0.47356 0.58081 (I) 
S4 0.03461 1.00000 0.02770 1.00000 0.21745 1.00000 0.03706 
Sl 0.04198 1.00000 0.01.142 1.00000 0.14113 1.00000 0.01063 
.~ S2 0.15280 1.00000 0.00397 1.00000 1.34-W<S 0..99815 0.01900 
"iJ 
...c S3 0.4947:5 0.99997 0.12:518 1.00000 8.76799 0.4:5896 0.43684 0.. 
S4 0.03339 1.00000 0.0512:5 1.00000 026139 1.00000 o.040n 
+ S I : Key/Keystream Correlation Sequence (Number of Sequences = I 024, Sequence Length= 256) 
+ S2: IV /Keystream Correlation Sequence (Number of Sequences = I 024, Sequence Length = I 28) 
+ S3: Frame Correlation Sequence (Number of Sequences = 512, Sequence Length = 1024) 
+ S4: Diffusion Sequence (Number of Sequences = 384, Sequence Length = 512, Repeat 1024 times) 
1.00000 
1.00000 
0.99994 
1.00000 
1.00000 
1.00000 
0.99998 
1.00000 
The same situation has happened in the proportion results: deviation is obtained only 
when the discrete Fourier transform test is applied to the frame correlation sequences. 
However, it is hard to conclude that whether there are structural weakness in Salsa20 and 
Phelix or in the test itself, since the frame correlation sequences from both Salsa20 and 
Phelix have passed the frequency test, the block frequency test and the runs test, while 
the other three different sequences have passed the discrete Fourier transform test as well. 
5.5.2 Keystreamllnternal States Correlation Test 
The purpose of the test in this section is to evaluate the correlation between the internal 
states and the first k bits of the keystream [50]. The main idea is that at any time if the 
internal states have a distinguishing property such as low/high weight, the resulted 
keystream should behave randomly in terms of its weight. Both Salsa20 and Phelix 
support various key and IV lengths. We used key size of 256 bits and IV size of 128 bits. 
For further analysis, other key and IV sizes may be considered. 
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5.5.2.1 Algorithm 
In this test, k represents the size of an internal state memory and m k-bit keystreams are 
generated from m randomly generated keys and a fixed IV. During the encryption, each 
state (a k-bit data block) is stored to XOR with the keystream. The obtained results are 
calculated for their weights, and the m weights are grouped into categories. Then, the 
observed frequencies are calculated and the chi-square goodness-of-fit test is applied to 
calculate P-values. 
Figure 5.10 shows the theoretical distributions for k=512 (the length of Salsa20's 
internal state) and for k=288 (the length of Phelix's internal state) based on binomial 
distribution. 
0 .03 0 .04 
0.03 
0 .02 
0 .02 
0 .01 
0.01 
0.00 
~ ~ 0 .00 .l'!""llllli.J.J.41JUJ.LL.lJUJ.I.Ij-UWJ.lllW¥J.W.W..W.J.j.ULLllll.LI..J4!I- ~ ~ 
221 234 247 260 273 286 118 12B 134 142 150 158 1BB 
a. k=512, p=0.5 b. k=288, p=0.5 
Figure 5.10 Theoretical Distribution 
The category limits for Phelix are chosen as { 0 - 118, 119 - 126, 127 - 134, 135 - 142, 
143 - 150, 151 - 158, 159- 166, 167- 287}. In general, if the random variable follows 
the binomial distribution with size k and variance p, we write Binomial (k, p). If the 
encryption algorithm is secure, the distribution of the weights is Binomial (k, 0.5). 
Cumulative probabilities are calculated depending on the categories. They are observed 
frequencies, which will be compared to the expected ones in the chi-square test. 
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IFix IV; 
Initialize weights w to zero; 
fori- I tom 
do 
randomly generate a key; 
keystream := encryption(IV, key); 
for j- I ton 
do 
internal_ state[ i] [j] := encryption _round( current_ state); 
II i is the index for r keystream; j is the index for j1h state 
k_xor_s[i][j] := internal_state[i][j] XOR keystream; 
w[i][j] := number of ones in k_xor_s; 
II group the weights into the selected categories 
fori- I to C II Cis the number of categories 
if w [ i][j] is in category[k] 
W[k] := W[k] + I; 
Chi-square of Goodness-of-fit test on W; 
Figure 5.11 keystream/lnternal States Correlation Test Algorithm 
In the algorithm above, the function encryption round is defined as a double round 
function [20] for Salsa20 or two half functions [22] for Phelix. 
5.5.2.2 Experimental Results and Analysis 
Table 5.5 shows the test result for Salsa20. 215 keystreams are generated according to the 
different input keys of 256-bit length. Each is related to ten internal states. One internal 
state consists of 512 bits. IV is the concatenation of the input nonce and the sequence 
number. In our test, it is chosen as {57, -121 , 9, -62,-105, 60, 1, -10} & {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
0}, where & indicates concatenation and each number separated by comma is a byte. The 
values of the test statistic and the P-values are shown below. 
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Table 5.5 Test Results for Salsa20 
Internal 
State Number xz P-value 
1 0.008030 0 .928598 
2 0.008700 0.925686 
3 0 .008364 0.927129 
4 0 .005190 0.942567 
5 0.008252 0.927618 
6 0.008017 0.928654 
7 0.007110 0.932803 
8 0.006595 0.935277 
9 0.006992 0 .933361 
10 19 .16823 1 .196899E-5 
It can be seen from the above that the P-value for the correlation of the last internal 
state and the keystream is far less than the significance level, which is 0.0 l in the NIST 
test suite. It is not surprising when we look back into the process of keystream 
generation. 
The four constants in [20] are Co, C 1, Cz, and C3, where Co= (101, 120, 112, 97), Ct = 
(110, 100,32, 51), C2 =(50, 45, 98, 121), and C3 = (116, 101,32, 107). If each ofko, kt 
and IV is a 16-byte sequence, then 
X = (Co, ko, Ct. IV, Cz, kt , C3); 
keystream = Salsa20(X) 
= X + (final internal state) 
Therefore, the correlation between the keystream and the final internal state 
significantly depends on X. If IV starts from 0 or other small number, a segment of 
continuous zeros will appear in X, resulting a small P-value. If IV is changed to { -84, 38, 
-7, -99, 112, 73, -116, 102, -50,-75, 18, 10, 84, -55, 93, -15}, then the last x2 value equals 
0.17045 and the corresponding P-value is 0.679709. 
Table 5.6 shows the test result for Phelix. 2 15 keystreams are generated according to 
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the different input keys of 256-bit length. There are nine internal states for each 
keystream generation process. One internal state consists of288 bits. 
Table 5.6 Test Results for Phelix 
Internal 
State Number x2 P-value 
1 0.013279 0.908200 
2 0.013104 0.908864 
3 0.011896 0.913147 
4 0.013117 0.908816 
5 0.014341 0.904678 
6 0.013360 0.907982 
7 0.011528 0.914497 
8 0.012151 0.912226 
9 0.013619 0.907097 
Phelix has 9 states for a keystream: 5 "active" states and 4 "old" states that are only 
used in the keystream output function. Therefore, keystreams of 288 (32X9) bits are 
generated using a fixed randomly chosen IV for each key. 
According to the test result, we did not obtain deviations from the expected values as 
all of them are much higher than the significance level 0.0 1. 
5.5.3 Internal States Correlation Test 
5.5.3.1 Algorithm 
The purpose of this test is to evaluate the correlation between internal states generated 
from similar IVs. Firstly, key and nonce (for Salsa20, nonce is a part of IV, and for Phelix, 
nonce equals IV) are chosen randomly and at each round the internal state is stored. Each 
state is of n bits. With incremented values of nonce this procedure is repeated M-1 times . 
Therefore, a matrix of size M x n is obtained at the end; each element in this matrix is an 
internal state vector. The column weights (number of ones in each column) of the matrix 
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are calculated. Then, the chi-square goodness-of-fit tests are applied. The process of the 
sequence generation is very similar to frame correlation sequence generation. 
Taking Salsa20 as an example, it has 10 internal states and each is 512 bits. Starting 
with an IV of value 0 and repeating the keystream generation by incrementing IV by one 
at each time for (2 10 -1) times, we obtain the matrix shown in Figure 5 .12. The column 
weights are calculated for the chi-square goodness-of-fit test. 
15121 
IS[ 1][10] 1 
Figure 5.12 Salsa20 Internal States Matrix 
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Fix IV; 
Nonce = 0; 
I for Salsa20, nonce is a part of IV; for Phelix, nonce equals IV 
Initialize weights w to zero; 
for i +- I to m I I m = I 024 
if i > 1 
IV = IV + 1; 
for j +- I ton II n is the number of the states 
do 
internal_state[i]U] := encryption _round( current_state ); 
II i is the index for i1h keystream; j is the index for fh state 
for j +- I ton 
for k +- 1 to L II Lis the size of one internal state 
fori+- 1 tom 
if internal_state[i]U][k] = 1 
w[Lx U-1) + k] := w[Lx U-1) + k] + I; 
II group the weights into the selected categories 
Chi-square ofGoodness-of-frt test on w ; 
Figure 5.13 Internal States Correlation Test Algorithm 
5.5.3.2 Experimental Results and Analysis 
For the internal states correlation test, m = 210 keystream are generated but ignored. Only 
the internal states are stored and form a matrix. Salsa20 has ten internal states while 
Phelix has nine. Table 5.7 and 5.8 shows the test results. 
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Table 5.7 Test Results for Salsa20 
Internal Table 5.8 Test Results for Phelix 
State Number x2 P-value Internal 
1 0 .008037 0.9286 State Number x2 P-value 
2 0.008920 0.9248 1 0.015103 0.9022 
3 0 .008359 0.9272 2 0 .013360 0.9080 
4 0.008193 0.9279 3 0.012151 0.9122 
5 0.007252 0.9321 4 0.013340 0.9080 
6 0 .008030 0.9286 5 0.013465 0.9076 
7 0.006932 0.9336 6 0 .010523 0.9183 
8 0.006893 0.9338 7 0.012350 0.9115 
9 0.006542 0 .9355 8 0 .013514 0.9109 
10 0.006992 0.9334 9 0.012380 0.9114 
According to the test results, no significant weaknesses are found for either Salsa20 
or Phelix as all of them are much higher than the significance level 0.01. 
5.6 Conclusions 
In this study, we use four of the empirical statistical tests given in the NIST suite 
to analyze the randomness of the Salsa20 and Phelix keystreams. Since the test suite did 
not consider the relationship between key, IV, internal state and the keystream, we also 
applied two novel tests, which are proposed in [50] to examine the ciphers. In addition, 
we provide the results of uniform distribution of P-values as well as the proportion of 
sequences passing a test. 
The experimental results shows that both Salsa20 and Phelix have passed the tests in 
NIST, considering that P value less than 0.01 indicate a possible weakness. Significant 
deviation is observed in the correlation test for the last internal state (the state after 9 
double rounds) and the keystream in Salsa20, but this is easily explained when 
considering the cipher structure and it remains to be seen whether this can be exploited 
on cryptanalysis. Also, both Salsa20 and Phelix failed the frame correlation test for OFT 
test and this may indicate that Salsa20 and Phelix does not satisfy the necessary 
properties as the frames generated using consecutive IVs are correlated. However, how 
this could be exploited in an attack is an open question. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and Future Work 
6.1 Summary of Research 
In this thesis, we deal with hardware implementations for two stream ciphers proposed 
for the eSTREAM project: Salsa20 and Phelix. Both of them are claimed to be suitable 
for software and hardware implementation since they are built on a series of simple 
operations: 32-bit addition, bitwise addition (XOR) and rotation operations. No S-box is 
needed. 
Generally speaking, Salsa20 is a hash function in counter mode. The hash function 
performs 320 invertible word modifications. Each modification is an XOR operation on 
two 32-bit words, or a rotated sum of two 32-bit words. The resulting data block is added 
to the original input as the last step to accomplish one keystream generation process for 
512 bits. Each data block representing the internal state is of 512 bits. In our design, it is 
a 4x4 register or RAM matrix, with 32-bit size for each entry. There is no correlation 
between any two 512-bit keystreams. 
Considering that the needs of different applications in communication systems 
demand different structures for cryptographic algorithms in hardware, we investigated 
four different structures for Salsa20: compact ASIC structure, basic iterative ASIC 
structure, fast ASIC structure and a compact FPGA structure. An ASIC implementation is 
typically faster and more compact compared with an FPGA implementation. However, 
FPGA provides flexibility with its configurable logic. In terms of choosing one targeted 
device for hardware implementation of a protocol or algorithm or a whole 
System-on-Chip (SoC), many factors should be considered, such as time-to-market, chip 
area, time to working silicon, cost considerations, etc. In our study, we choose Xilinx 
Vertex FPGA for the proposed Salsa20 compact structure because Salsa20 requires 
memory to store the original input data as well as the temporary data after each 
quarterround function, while FPGAs provide rich on-chip memories, which are designed 
for compactness and speed. If properly employed, it can lead to a significant 
improvement in the latency of the overall design. A micro-programming controller is 
used to replace the traditional finite state machine in the controller. This method 
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translates physical design into programming. Further improvement can be done by simply 
adding or modifying the microinstructions. Here, the microinstruction for Salsa20 is of 
fixed-length binary digits, which include the read/write enable signal, memory address, 
selection signals for the MUXes, and a ready signal to notify other functional blocks to 
receive the keystream. They can be mapped to higher programming language easily. 
However, since it is a small design, it is unnecessary to do the mapping specification. 
The other three structures are designed and synthesized by using 0.18 micron CMOS 
technology. Several schemes are used for speed increase or area decrease. For example, 
in Salsa20 fast ASIC structure, full pipeline structure has been implemented and each 
stage out of twenty consists of one round of Salsa20's encryption process. Each stage is 
exactly the same as the Salsa20 basic iterative structure, and controlled by a single central 
controller. In the basic iterative structure, parallelism is applied: four quarterround 
function blocks in the datapath operate on the four rows or columns of the data matrix 
simultaneously and independently. A common reused module in the designs is the adder, 
more details could be found in the section 4.2.2, Figure 4.8. The throughput of Salsa20 
ranges from 38 Mbps implemented in FPGA requiring 194 CLB slices to 4.8 Gbps 
implemented in ASIC requiring the equivalence of 468,160 2-input NAND gates. 
The synthesis results illustrate that the throughput to area ratio for Salsa20 compact 
FPGA structure is only 0.20. It is an unsurprising small value compared with other 
popular stream cipher implementation results. Recalling the original encryption algorithm 
and the compact FPGA design of Salsa20, it is obvious that it performs a large number of 
invertible modifications, each of which changes one word of the matrix in a sequential 
manner. This is the main reason for the lower throughput of the compact structure. 
Phelix is a high-speed stream cipher with built-in message authentication code (MAC) 
functionality. The same as Salsa20, it is composed of a series of simple operations: 
addition modulo 232, exclusive or, and rotation by a fixed number of bits. There are 5 
words that are updated during each round, and 4 "old" words are stored in memory to be 
used in the keystream output function. One block that produces one word of keystream 
consists oftwo "half-block" functions H. 
The H function block is very critical in terms of performance as it is used in four 
phases. Since the proposed compact implementation for Phelix aims at compactness, we 
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use a single 32-bit carry ripple adder in the H block and divide the circuit into several 
layers of combinational logic separated by latches or registers. The high speed 
implementation removes the features that facilitate compactness with the sacrifice of 
throughput. Also, it employs the fastest adder we have evaluated. 
The other components included in the top level hierarchy are key mixing block, 
nonce-expanding block, subkey generator and a buffer to store four old states. Vendor 
supported libraries are employed since it is an efficient way to do the implementation by 
using the primitives. The throughput of the compact ASIC design for Phelix is 260 Mbps 
targeted for 0.18 micron CMOS technology, and the corresponding area is equivalent to 
12,366 2-input NAND gates. The high speed implementation achieves a throughput of 
1,440.0 Mbps with an equivalent area of 64,200 2-input NAND gates. 
To sum up, the proposed designs can be divided by two methods; the first one is 
based on the different technologies (FPGA design and ASIC design) and the second one 
is based on the implementation schemes, either for compactness or for high speed. The 
table below is the comparison of FPGA design's advantages and ASIC design 's 
advantages. One's advantage implies the other 's corresponding shortcoming. 
Table 6.1 Comparison of FPGA Design and ASIC Design 
FPGA Design Advantages ASIC Design Advantages 
• No NRE (non recurring expenses) • Less power consumption 
• Use of embedded processors, which is • Less area requirement 
very difficult to implement in an ASIC • Lower per-unit cost 
• Flexibility m the design process • Higher internal clock frequency 
(reprogramability) 
The advantages and disadvantages of the different schemes are listed below: 
• Basic iterative structure 
Advantages: The required hardware resources are decremented as only one round of the 
cipher. Considered as a basic stage, basic iterative structure is easy to be expanded. 
Disadvantages: This architecture has higher register-to-register delay because of the 
MUX added in front of the input registers and so we have to either split one clock cycle 
into 2 or decrease the frequency. 
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• High speed structure based on full-pipelining 
Advantages: This structure has the highest throughput. 
Disadvantages: The overall latency of a pipelined structure is slightly lower than in a 
non-pipelined equivalent. This is due to the fact that extra registers must be added to the 
data path of a pipelined structure. However, in our design, the result of each stage, which 
is a basic iterative structure has already been registered. Therefore, there are no extra 
registers added. 
• Compact structure based on module reuse 
Advantages: It decreases the area required, especially when the reused module is a 
significant cost in terms of area consumption in the whole design. 
Disadvantages: extra multiplexers and other control logics have to be implemented, and 
this could decrease the clock frequency. 
• Compact structure based on the employment ofFPGA's generic module (e.g. RAM) 
Advantages: The rich on-FPGA block RAMs can store more than several lookup table's 
worth of memory elements and they are typically have higher densities and faster access 
times compared with lookup-table-configured memories. Besides, their timing 
characteristics are more predictable. 
Disadvantages: In FPGAs with the block RAMs of very big size, it could be a waste to 
configure a block RAM for a pure 64 bytes data block. 
It is hard to conclude the advantages and disadvantages for the high speed structure 
based on faster major functional module (e.g. parallel adder) in a system. But problems 
may occur due to the module itself. For example, high speed carry look-ahead adders 
may have fan-in and fan-out difficulties, which indicate that the design could have 
difficulties to drive a large number of inputs or outputs. For more details of fan-in/fan-out, 
refer to [85]. 
Although stream ciphers are inspired by the one-time pad (OTP) theory, which was 
proved to be perfectly secure, stream ciphers make deviation from OTP, since they do not 
meet the requirement that the key stream is at least the same length as the plaintext, and 
generated completely at random. The keystreams from a stream cipher algorithm are 
produced by deterministic generators. Thus, an attacker may be able to recover a part of 
secret key or internal state by using the improved distinguishing attack. 
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In our study, we use various statistical tests given in the NIST suite to analyze the 
randomness of the Salsa20 and Phelix stream ciphers. They are the frequency test, the 
frequency test within a block, the discrete Fourier transform test and the runs test. It is 
assumed that the keystreams should be indistinguishable from a random sequence and 
secure enough to keep the key and the internal states secret. 
Since the test suite did not consider the relationship between key, IV, internal state 
and the keystream, we applied two novel tests presented in [50]: keystream/internal states 
correlation test and internal states correlation test to examine the ciphers. We also 
generate four new types of sequence to look into more possible correlations. They are 
key/keystream correlation sequence, IV/keystream correlation sequence, frame 
correlation sequence and diffusion sequence. 
The experimental results show that both Salsa20 and Phelix keystreams have passed 
the tests in NIST. For each experiment, the significance level was fixed at 0.01 , which 
implies that, ideally, no more than one binary sequence should be rejected for each 
sample of 100 binary sequences evaluated by a statistical test. Deviation is observed in 
the correlation test for the last internal state (the state after 9 double rounds) and the 
keystream in Salsa20. It is explained in Section 5.4.2. In Section 5.5.1 , the frame 
correlation sequences from either Salsa20 or Phelix do not pass the discrete Fourier 
transform test. It is not because of the sample size as we have applied multiple lengths 
ranging from 2 10 to 220 for this single test. More study is needed in this case to explain the 
phenomenon. 
6.2 Future Work 
Hardware implementation and analysis for new stream ciphers are interesting research 
areas and there are many aspects that should be taken into account. Basically, there are 
two most important factors to consider: (1) hardware complexity, in FPGA designs, 
measured by the number of configurable slices, and in ASIC designs, measured by the 
number of standard cell NAND gates; (2) speed or throughput. Although in the 
eSTREAM project, the hardware implementations are dedicated for the low end 
environment, which indicates that the compactness is the most important consideration, 
more studies on the trade-offs between area and speed of the hardware implementation 
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for a chosen cipher is undoubtedly necessary since the ultimate goal is wide spread 
adoption. 
Another potential future work is the cipher co-design based on FPGAs. As we know, 
FPGAs provide a very flexible platform for cipher implementations. The high speed 110 
interface, embedded IP cores, block RAMs, and especially the configurable 
microprocessor like Xilinx's MicroBiaze form a suitable environment for 
hardware/software co-designs of cryptographic systems. Unlike sheer software 
implementation or hardware implementation, co-design is a relatively new area. Since 
traditional design methodologies are not adequate to address the co-design challenges, 
people often fall into pitfalls when they try to gain the advantages of both while 
neglecting the communication between them and a proper mapping process to divide the 
cryptographic system into software part and hardware part. To implement a cipher 
efficiently by using co-design methodology, the bottlenecks of both software and 
hardware should be taken into account. Moreover, additional analysis on programming 
techniques may be helpful for the overall performance. 
The randomness of pseudorandom sequences could be evaluated by using statistical 
tests. The NIST suite provides a relatively comprehensive collection of generic tests. We 
only used four of them. It typically spans more properties that a good cryptographic 
algorithm should satisfy by applying the whole suite. These properties include any 
detectable correlation between plaintext/ciphertext pairs, any detectable bias due to single 
bit changes to either a plaintext or a 128-bit key, in addition to many others. The NIST 
suite has ignored the internal structures of stream ciphers. Statistical tests taking the 
internal structure, key or IV loading phases into account are very limited compared with 
sole keystream tests. The correlations between key, IV, internal state and keystream are 
important factors in the design of a stream cipher since availability of the keystream and 
IV should not leak any information about the internal state or secret key. More attention 
could be paid in this area. 
96 
- -··----------------------------------------
Reference 
[I] 44 U.S.C § 3542 (b)(!) (2006), available at 
http:/ /www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode44/usc _sec_ 44 _ 00003 542----000-.html 
[2) A. Beaumont-Smith and C. Lim. Parallel prefix adder design. Proc. 15th IEEE Symposium on 
Computer Arithmetic, pages 218- 225, 200 I. 
[3] A. Booth, A signed binary multiplication technique, Quarterly Journal of Mechanics and 
Applied Mathematics ( 1951 ), pp. 236-240. 
[ 4] A. Chandrakasan and R. Brodersen. Low-Power CMOS design. IEEE Press, 1998. 
[5] A. Klimov, A. Shamir (2003). "Cryptographic Applications ofT-functions", Selected Areas in 
Cryptography, SAC 2003, LNCS 3006: 248-261, Springer-Verlag. 
[6] A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, and S. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography, pp.3- 5, 
CRC Press, 1996. 
[7] A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, and S. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography, pp.43- 45, 
CRC Press, 1996. 
[8] A. Rukhin, J. Soto, J. Nechvatal, M. Smid, E. Barker, S. Leigh, M. Levenson, M. Vangel, D. 
Banks, A. Heckert, J. Dray, and S. Yo. A statistical test suite for random and pseudorandom 
number generators for cryptographic applications. 200 I. http://www.nist.gov. 
[9] ALTERA, ASIC to FPGA Design Methodology & Guidelines, July 2003, ver. 1.0 
[10) Abraham Sinkov, Elementary Cryptanalysis : A Mathematical Approach, The Mathematical 
Association of America, 1966. ISBN 0-88385-622-0. 
[II] Auguste Kerckhoffs, La cryptographie militaire, Journal des sciences militaires, vol. IX, pp. 
5- 38, Janvier 1883, pp. 161-191, Fevrier 1883. 
[12] B. Parhami, "Computer Arithmetic: Algorithms and Hardware Designs", Oxford University 
Press, 2000. 
[13] B. Schneier, J . Kelsey, D. Whiting, D. Wagner, C.Hall, N. Ferguson, The Twofish Encryption 
Algorithm: A 128-Bit Block Cipher," John Wiley & Sons, April 1999, ISBN: 0471353817. 
[ 14] B. W. Bomar, "Implementation of Microprogrammed Control in FPGAs", IEEE Transactions on 
Industrial Electronics, vol. 49, pp. 415-422, April, 2002. 
[15] C. Rechberger. Side channel analysis of stream ciphers. Master 's thesis, Institute for Applied 
Information Processing and Communications (IAIK), Graz University of Technology, 
Inffeldgasse 16a, A-801 0 Graz, Austria, 2004. 
[16] C.D. Walter, Systolic modular multiplication, IEEE Transactions on Computers 42 (1993) (3), 
pp.376-378 
[17] Chen, Y., Hai Li, Roy, K., Chena-Kok Koh, Cascaded carry-select adder (C/sup 2/SA): a new 
97 
structure for low-power CSA design, Low Power Electronics and Design, 2005. ISLPED 
apos;05. Proceedings of the 2005 International Symposium on Volume , Issue , 8-10 Aug. 2005 
Pages 115 - 118 
[ 18] Chris Chatfield, Statistics for Technology: A Course in Applied Statistics, Second Edition, 
Chapman & HaiVCRC publishers, 1978. 
[ 19] Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver: The Mathematical Theory of Communication. The 
University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1949. ISBN 0-252-72548-4 
[20] D. Bernstein, "The Salsa20 Stream Cipher", presented at Symmetric Key Encryption Workshop, 
Aarhus, Denmark, May, 2005. Also available at www.ecrypt.eu.org/strearnlsalsa20.html. 
[21] D. Coppersmith, S. Halevi, and C. S. Jutla. Cryptanalysis of stream ciphers with linear masking. 
In CRYPTO, pages 515- 532, 2002. 
[22] D. Whiting, B. Schneier, and S. Lucks , "Phelix- Fast Encryption and Authentication in a Single 
Cryptographic Primitive", presented at Symmetric Key Encryption Workshop, Aarhus, Denmark, 
May, 2005. Also available at www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/phelixp2.html. 
[23] David R. Smith, Digital Transmission Systems, Third Edition, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2004. 
[24] Donald Knuth. The Art of Computer Programming, Volume I: Fundamental Algorithms, Third 
Edition. Addison-Wesley, 1997. ISBN 0-201-89683-4. Section 1.2.11: Asymptotic 
Representations, pp.l 07-123. 
[25] E. F. Brickell, A survey of hardware implementation of RSA. In: G. Brassard, Editor, Advances 
in Cryptology, Proceedings of CRYPT0'98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science vol. 435, 
Springer-Verlag (1989), pp. 368-370. 
[26] Frederic Muller, Differential Attacks against the Helix Stream Cipher, FSE 2004, pp94-108 
[27] G.J. Simmons, editor. Contemporary Cryptology, The Science of Information Integrity. IEEE, 
New York, 1992. 
[28] G.S. Vemam. Cipher printing telegraph systems for secret wire and radio telegraphic 
communications. J. Am. lnst. Elec. Eng., 55: I 09-115, 1926. 
[29] Guido Bertoni!, Luca Breveglieril, Pasqualina Fragneto, Marco Macchetti,and Stefano 
Marchesin, "Efficient Software Implementation of AES on 32-Bit Platforms," in Cryptographic 
Hardware and Embedded Systems- CHES 2002, pp. 159-171, B.S. Kaliski Jr., .K. Ko, C. Paar. 
[30] H. Bar-El, H. Choukri, D. Naccache, M. Tunstall, and C. Whelan, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice 
Guide to Fault Attacks," Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/10, 2004. 
[31] H. Englund and T. Johansson. A new simple technique to attack filter generators and related 
ciphers. In Selected Areas in Cryptography, pages 39-53, 2004. 
[32] H. Lipmaa, J. Wallen, P. Dumas, On the Additive Differential Probability of Exclusive-Or," Fast 
Software Encryption 2004 (B. Roy, W. Meier, eds.), vol. 3017 of LNCS, pp. 317-331, 
98 
---------------------------- ------
Springer-Verlag, 2004. 
[33] H. Lipmaa, S. Moriai, Efficient Algorithms for Computing Differential Properties of Addition," 
FSE 2001 (M. Matsui, ed.), vol. 2355 of LNCS, pp. 336-350, Springer-Verlag, 2002. 
[34] Homepage for the eSTREAM project: www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream 
[35] Hongjun Wu and Bart Preneel, "Differential-Linear Attacks against the Stream Cipher Phelix", 
available at http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/phelixp2.html 
[36] 1. Gonzalez! , F.J. Gomez-Arribas, Ciphering algorithms in MicroBiaze-based embedded 
systems, lEE Proceedings - Computers and Digital Techniques -- March 2006 -- Volume 153, 
Issue 2, p. 87-92 
[37] J. Wallen, Linear Approximations of Addition modulo 2n, Fast Software Encryption 2003 (T. 
Johansson, ed.), vol. 2887 ofLNCS, pp. 261-273, Springer-Verlag, 2003. 
[38] J.J. Hoch and A. Shamir, Fault analysis of stream ciphers, In Marc Joye and Jean-Jacques 
Quisquater, editors, Chryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems -CHES 2004, volume 
3156 of LNCS, pages 240- 253. Springer-Verlag, 2004. 
[39] John Waldron, Introduction to RISC Assembly Language Programming, Addison Wesley, 1998. 
ISBN 0-201-39828-1 
[40] K. Hamano, F. Satoh, and M. Ishikawa, "Randomness test using discrete Fourier transform," 
Technical Report 6841 , Technical Research and Development Institute, Japan Defense Agency, 
Sept. 2003. 
[41] K. Rawwat, T. Darwish, and M. Bayoumi, A low power carry select adder with reduces area, 
Proc. Of Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems, pp. 2 18-221 , 2001. 
[42] Kai Lai Chung, Elementary Probability Theory with Stochastic Processes.New York: 
Springer-Verlag, 1979. 
[43] Kumar S., Lemke K., Paar C. , Some thoughts about Implementation properties of stream 
ciphers, SASC2004, 14-15.10.2004 
[44] L. Batina, J. Lano, N. Mentens, B. Preneel, I. Verbauwhede, "Energy, Performance, Area versus 
Security Trade-offs for Stream Ciphers," In ECRYPT Workshop, SASC- The State of the Art of 
Stream Ciphers, pp. 302-310, 2004 
[45] L. Wu, C. Weaver, T. Austin, " CryptoManiac: A Fast Flexible Architecture for Secure 
Communication", Proceedings of 28th Annual International Symposium on Computer 
Architecture, 2001. 
[46] M. Abramowitz and 1. Stegun, Handbook of Mathematical Functions, Applied Mathematics 
Series. Vol. 55, Washington: National Bureau of Standards, 1964; reprinted 1968 by Dover 
Publications, New York. 
[47] M. D. Galanis, P. Kitsos, G. Kostopoulos, N. Sklavos, 0. Koufopavlou, and C.E. Goutis 
"Comparison of The Hardware Architectures and FPGA Implementations of Stream Ciphers ", 
99 
In proceeding of 11th IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Circuits and Systems, 
(ICECS 2004), Tel-Aviv, Israel, December 13-15, 2004. 
[ 48] M. Kakumu and M. Kinugawa, "Power-supply voltage impact on circuit performance for half 
and lower submicrometer CMOS LSI," IEEE Trans. Electron Devices, vol. 37, no. 8, pp. 
1902-1908, Aug. 1990. 
[49) Maurice Kilavuka Inuani and Jonathan Saul, Technology mapping of heterogeneous LUT-based 
FPGAs, In Luk et al. [LCG97], pages 223- 234. 
[50] Meltem Sonmez Turan, Ali Doganaksoy, Cagdas Calik, Statistical Analysis of Synchronous 
Stream Ciphers, eSTREAM, ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project, 2005. 
www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/papersdir/2006/0 12. pdf 
[51] Michael Garey, and David S. Johnson: Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of 
NP-Completeness. New York: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1979. 
[52] MicroBlaze Hardware Reference Guide, Xilinx User Guide, available from the Xilinx website 
support.xilinx.com, March 2002. 
[53) Morioka, S. and Satoh, A., A IOGbps Full-AES Crypto Design With a Twisted BDD S-Box 
Architecture, IEEE Tran. on VLSI Systems, Vol. 12, No.7, July 2004, pp 686-691. 
(54) Nick Sawyer, Word Alignment and SONET/SDH Deframing, Xilinx applicat ion notes, available 
at http://direct.xilinx.com/bvdocs/appnotes/xapp652.pdf 
[55] Niels Ferguson, Doug Whiting, Bruce Schneier, John Kelsey, Stefan Lucks and Tadayoshi 
Kohno, Helix: Fast Encryption and Authentication in a Single Cryptographic Primitive, Fast 
Software Encryption- FSE 2003, pp330-346 
[56) Niels Ferguson, Richard Schroeppel, Doug Whiting (2001). "A simple algebraic representation 
of Rijndael". Proceedings of Selected Areas in Cryptography, 200 I, Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science: pp. 103- 111, Springer-Verlag. Retrieved on 2006-10-06. 
[57] 0. Staffelbach, W. Meier, Cryptographic Significance of the Carry for Ciphers Based on Integer 
Addition," Crypto '90 (A. Menezes, S. A. Vanstone, eds.), vol. 537 of LNCS, pp. 601-614, 
Springer-Verlag, 1991. 
[58] P. Crowley: "Truncated Differential Cryptanalysis of Five Rounds of Salsa20," SASC 2006 -
Stream Ciphers Revisited, Workshop Record, pp. l98-202, 2006. Available at 
http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stvl/sasc2006/ 
[59] P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, B. Jun, "Differential Power Analysis," technical report, 1998; later published 
in Advances in Cryptology - Crypto 99 Proceedings, Lecture Notes In Computer Science Vol. 
1666, M. Wiener, ed., Springer-Verlag, 1999. 
[60] Patrick Schaurnont and Ingrid Verbauwhede, "Hardware/software codesign for stream ciphers", 
presented at Symmetric Key Encryption Workshop, January, 2007. Also available at 
http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/hw.htrnl 
100 
[ 61] Quist, Arvin S. (2002). Security Classification of Information, Volume I. Introduction, History, 
and Adverse Impacts. Oak Ridge Classification Associates, LLC. Retrieved on 2007-01-11. 
[62] R. Hashemian, "A New Design for High Speed and High-Density Carry. Select Adders", 43. rd. 
Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems,. Lansing, Michigan, August 8-11, 2000. 
[63] Ruby B. Lee, Xiao Yang, and Zhijie Shi, Validating Word-Oriented Processors for Bit-level 
Permutations and Multi-word Operations in Pervasive Secure Computing Paradigms, Princeton 
University Department of Electrical Engineering Technical Report CE-L2002-004, November 
2002. 
[64] S. B. Wicker and V. K. Bhargava, Reed-Solomon Codes and their Applications, IEEE Press, 
New York, 1994. 
[65] Satoh, A., Morioka, S., Takano, K., and Munetoh, S., A Compact Rijndael Hardware 
Architecture with S-Box optimization," Asiacrypt 200 I, LNCS 2248, pp.239- 254, 200 I 
[66] Simon Fischer, Willi Meier, C?me Berbain, Jean-Francois Biasse, Matt Robshaw, 
Non-Randomness in eSTREAM Candidates Salsa20 and TSC-4, lndocrypt 2006 
[67] Steven Brown, Rovert Francis, Johnathan Rose, and Zvonko Vranesic. Field Programmable 
Gate Arrays. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 
[68] T. Good, W. Chelton, M. Benaissa, Review of stream cipher candidates from a low resource 
hardware perspective, available at www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/papersdir/2006/0 16.pdf 
[69] VLSI Computer Architecture, Arithmetic, and CAD Research Group - Department of Electrical 
Engineering, liT, Chicago, IL. liT Standard Cells for AMI 0.5um and TSMC 0.25um/0.18urn 
(Version 1.6.0), 2003. 
[70] W. Stallings, Cryptography and Network Security Principles and Practices, Prentice Hall press, 
third edition, 2003. 
[71] W. Stallings, Data and Computer Communications, 8th Edition, Prentice Hall, 2007. 
[72] W. Stallings, "The Advanced Encryption Standard", CRYPTOLOGIA, Volume XXVI, NO. 3, 
July 2002. 
[73] Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, New Directions in Cryptography, IEEE Transactions on 
Information Theory, vol. IT-22, Nov. 1976, pp: 644-654. 
[74] Xilinx Inc., San Jose, Calif., "Design Tips for HDL Implementation of Arithmetic Functions," 
2000, www.xilinx.com. 
[75] Xilinx Inc., San Jose, Calif., "Virtex, 2.5 V Field Programmable Gate Arrays," 2003, 
www.xilinx.com. 
[76] Xuejia Lai. On the Design and Security of Block Ciphers. Hartung-Gorre Verlag, 1992. 
[77] Y. Kim and L-S Kim, .64-bit carry-select adder with reduced area,. Electronics Letters, vol. 37, 
pp. 614-615, May 2001 
[78] Yukiyasu Tsunoo, Teruo Saito, Hiroyasu Kubo, Tomoyasu Suzaki and Hiroki Nakashima, 
101 
"Differential Cryptanalysis of Salsa20/8". Available at 
http:/ /www.ecrypt.eu.org/strearn/papersdir/2007 /01 0. pdf 
[79] Z. Navabi, VHDL analysis and modeling of digital systems, McGraw-Hill press, second edition, 
1998. 
[80] Thomas Beth and Fred Piper, The Stop-and-Go Generator. EUROCRYPT 1984, p88-92. 
[81] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Padding (cryptography) 
[82] S. Vanstone , A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, Handbook of Applied Cryptography, pp.425, CRC 
Press, 1996. 
[83] Adam Osborne, An Introduction to Microcomputers Volume 1 Basic Concepts,2nd Edition, 
Osborne-McGraw Hill, Berkely California, 1980, ISBN 0-931988-34-9 pgl-1 
[84] A.Th. Schwarzbacher and J.P. Silvennoinen and P.A. Comiskey, Benchmarking CMOS Adder 
Structures, Irish Systems and Signals Conference, Cork, Ireland, pp. 231-234, June 2002. 
[85] E. Andrew Parr, The Logic Designer's Guidebook, NY: McGraw-Hill 1984, pp. 21. 
102 
.----------------------------- ------ --- ----
Appendix A: Selected Simulations Results for 
Phelix 
The simulation results were obtained from both fast and compact structures. The values 
of the parameters for them are chosen differently, but the input length is the same. That is, 
64 bytes of the plaintext, 32 bytes of the inputkey and 16 bytes of the nonce. 
Phelix fast 
plaintext : 
30379186 a409778e alf4al93 adcbc457 8064el17 611ef4db 89764619 7e06d964 
a530c522 fa9ea710 12461967 d023bde7 9c28d69b 6579d4d1 160ce27 13d46583 
inputkey: 
eb840c37 e6b27430 550ca430 789b6a0e 7e498f2f 68dcd5fc cce57a89 a5ea440f 
nonce : 
f9d2067f c9022dad cabd09cd e00f8d36 
workingKey : 
c6a2c00d f4 7a93b7 a2b77454 43db9eb0 7cccd425 6934d90d 38c5b13f 2ac7d22e 
keys t ream : 
edd8c447 a8232241 445483d 0 33be954d 6884f7 6b 9534e74c 4c3528b3 f39835af 
6d1ae1dc 9bb a4759 1af428dc 7f56fbd6 8b9b9044 c7a8a9e 54a8092c 566e2940 
' pheb)•~'~" - 10 ~-~ - --- ------- --- -- -- -·-·-·-
' phelix_l•~/c~ n I I 111 1, , I I I Ill 111 Ill I I I' I 
ID- ph~-~~~l..'tc)':.tle~ (.384F7GE • :. 
1
. 1 ~~ :~ .l ) 1 ~ ~ • 1 • J ~ '1 ) •· • 1 • ) , ~ 1 1 ~ f ~ • • • ; .. ~ 1.1 
9-/ pheli>i_fo-.fll 1J 1 ___ ~11_,, _ __j_I'--~J ___ I~____)~I· ___ jJL_____;l __ "~'--
Phelix_compact 
plain text : 
5007fc86 1a0ea26b dc20138 1bbe0e0d 45dc22b5 bcfa2acf a1b16166 dca89b47 
3ad67e03 5d1b9ad6 7b689ee9 b68f8426 828097b7 a8f3d351 b663478a bb5ea400 
input key : 
4dc4ee80 b9b95ddb e9605b1f 717bdb6b 28302ad6 25bff123 3ce75d00 5eb17d3 
nonce: 
19a2717f 3f07588b 368a6972 4e01d6ec 
worki ngKey : 
df9d8059 3b f6d9d6 ee1 964bd 4a63c4d8 d 173df6 2f531cad 7accd1 4d ad571d89 
keystream : 
32lfc2fd f8e20829 f da9a5f0 36a34711 862 73386 f46f35ff 696e2c7d a709c98 
e3cb5475 86809de0 6339d67f 491852f4 810f728 d9c5ee3b 1d6b4a64 83f0f5ca 
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Appendix B: Selected Simulations Results for 
Salsa20 
Simulation results obtained from various structures are given. Either the nonce or the 
sequence number consists of 8 bytes. The keystream shown in the waveform is the result 
of one encryption process, which generates a 64-byte data block. 
Salsa20_asic_compact 
Nonce & SequenceNumber: 4 d1 ed 1c 79 71 4e 44 ae e9 32 6a 3b 10 51 87 
Key : ac Be 29 92 Sb 73 Be 2c 58 9c ca 83 ed 42 69 81 fd 10 82 fc ff 22 Sa 
d3 b8 45 bd d2 ff 77 4f 7f 
Keystream: c2e0f0ca 24531958 5918e6b6 79538b0 2d285da 6240c8dc 39dba208 
889ce2f2 d465d35c ea22076 f2c45a64 f90421fa a6b445fe a57a8b70 fe9eeffe 
d640cae8 
Salsa20 asic fast 
Nonce & SequenceNumber : f7 f aS 2e 39 56 29 d9 4f 4c 69 1b 96 f6 f2 a7 
Key : Sa 85 56 52 bd d9 69 dO 62 6 44 e6 fe 65 62 cd b7 66 7a b7 a6 c2 af a4 
b4 f7 86 38 ed e3 66 81 
Keystream : c2e0f0ca a4ad0ab4 a0d3b37a cc880cc4 9ac4cbfc 6240c8dc 5d501fee 
b252ac72 36d2989e 4fe5ed2c f2c45a64 6ef4cd6e 495f854c 710def68 2cdc7da 
d640cae8 
Salsa20 asic basic iterative 
- - -Nonce & SequenceNumber : ab 86 3a 41 6e a9 aO 84 d7 40 44 f7 23 bb 5 5 2 
Key : 7b ed 4b 3 77 48 fd 7f Sb e fO fO 15 7d dB a6 e6 ac 57 29 55 cf fa 2b 
9b 1e 22 0 8c db 96 58 
Keystream : c2e0f0ca 697daf6 fffa90ee ele01cb6 4db0fa2a 6240c8dc 82750d56 
94152dc ee888 1ae a40b7646 f2c45a64 52af59cc 57f59eaa 443d36 b12db718 d640cae8 
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Salsa20_FPGA_compact 
Nonce & SequenceNumber: a9 d5 6f 23 93 bb 6f 7b 5d 7d bO 89 c7 4a 4b 4 
Key: d1 ab 62 aO 57 11 d5 3 ba 13 4b 82 11 9 dB ed ba 11 23 lb 70 66 2 9 41 
51 b9 b8 ee c8 e4 a1 56 
Keystream : c2e0f0ca 40c557a2 7aa22ae 4962774 dbb01222 6240c8dc 46dfab52 
f6df7726 1360faba 896958e f2c45a64 36462374 8252cce0 dd71 7 2a2 ad43c 99 0 
d640cae8 
Appendix D: Selected Source Code for Phelix 
library IEEE; 
use IEEE. std_logic_1164.all; 
package mypackage is 
type byte_vector is array (natural range <>) of bit_vector(7 downto 0) ; 
type word_vector is array (natural range <>) of bit_vector(31 downto 0) ; 
type word_vector_std is array (natural range <>) of std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) 
function bv2slv (b:bit_vector) return std_logic_vector; 
end mypackage; 
package body mypackage is 
function bv2slv (b:bit_vector) return std_logic_vector is 
variable result : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
begin 
for i in 0 to 31 loop 
case b (i) is 
when '0' => result (i) := '0'; 
when ' 1' => result(i) : = '1' ; 
end case; 
end loop; 
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return result; 
end; 
end mypackage; 
library IEEE; 
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_ll64.All; 
entity KSadder is 
generic ( size : natural := 32 ) ; 
port (A, B : in Std _Logic_ Vector ( size -1 down to 0 ) ; 
sum : out Std _Logic_ Vector ( size -1 down to 0 ) ; 
Cout : out Std _Logic ) ; 
end KSadder ; 
architecture structural of KSadder is 
-- G(i)U), P(i)U) : "group Generate", "group Propagate". i =group left position, j =group 
right position 
type Tr is array (size -1 downto 0) ofStd_Logic_ Vector (size -1 downto 0) ; 
signal G, P : Tr ; 
procedure half_adder 
(signal G, P: out Std_Logic; signal A, B: in Std_Logic) is 
begin G <=A and B; P <=A xor B; end half_ adder; 
procedure BK 
(signal GO, PO: out Std_Logic; signal Gil, Pll , GI2, PI2: in Std_Logic) is 
begin GO <=Gil or ( Pll and GI2 ); PO <= Pll and PI2; end BK; 
function koggestone ( i , j : integer) return integer is 
variable p : integer ; 
begin 
p :=2; 
while p <= i - j loop 
p := p + p; 
end loop; 
if j = 0 or i - j + 1 = p then 
return i + 1 - p/2 ; 
else 
return 0; 
end if ; 
end koggestone ; 
begin 
-- "half adder" cells row 
half adders : for i in size -1 downto 0 generate 
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half_adder( G(i)(i), P(i)(i), A(i) , B(i)) ; 
end generate half_ adder _row ; 
--operator 
for_ i : fori in size -1 downto 1 generate 
for j : for j in i -1 downto 0 generate 
if_ kg : if koggestone (i, j) > 0 generate 
BK( G(i)G), P(i)(j), G(i)(koggestone(i, j)), P(i)(koggestone(i, j)), G(koggestone(i, j) -1 )(j), 
P(koggestone(i, j) -1 )(j) ) ; 
end generate if_kg; 
end generate for j ; 
end generate for_ i ; 
Cout <= G(size -1 )(0) ; 
-- "XOR" gates row 
XOR row : for i in size -1 downto I generate 
Sum(i) <= P(i)(i) xor G(i -1 )(0) ; 
end generate XOR_row; 
Sum(O) <= P(O)(O) ; 
end structural ; 
-- H block for high speed 
library IEEE; 
use IEEE. std_logic_ll64.all; 
use IEEE. std_logic_unsigned.all; 
entity h_block is 
port ( elk, rst, start in std_logic; 
zi nO in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
zinl in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
zi n2 in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
zin3 in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
zin4 in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
xi nO in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
xinl in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
zoO out std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) ; 
zol out std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) ; 
zo2 out std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) ; 
zo3 out std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) ; 
zo4 out std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) 
) ; 
end h_block; 
architecture rtl of h_block is 
signal ziO, z_lO, z_20, z_30, z_40, 
zi l, z_ll, z_21, z_31, z_4 1, 
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zi2, z_12, z_22, z_32, z_42, 
zi3, z_13, z_23, z_33, z_43, z_53, z_63, 
zi4, z_14, z_24, z_34, z_44, 
xO, x1 
std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) ; 
- - six adders, six useless cout 
signal coutO, coutl, cout2, cout3, cout4, cout5 
: std_logic; 
signal flag : integer := 0; 
component Ksadder 
generic (size: natural:= 32) --size: Number of bits 
port (A, B: in Std_Logic_Vector size -1 downto 0) ; -- A,B: addends 
S : out Std_Logic_Vector ( size - 1 downto 0 ) ; -- S: Sum; 
Cout : out Std_Logic ) ; - - carry out 
end component ; 
-- left rotation 
function lrotate( din : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
n : integer) 
return std_logic_vector is 
variable dout: std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); 
begin 
dout := din((31 - n) downto 0) & din(31 downto (32-n)); 
return dout; 
end lrotate; 
begin 
ziO <= zinO when flag = 0; 
zi1 <= zin1 when flag = 0; 
zi2 <= zin2 when flag = 0; 
zi3 <= zin3 when flag = 0; 
zi4 <= zin4 when flag = 0; 
xO <= xinO when flag = 0; 
x1 <= xinl when flag = 0; 
z_13 <= zi3 xor xO; 
add_z_lO: KSadder port map (ziO, z_13, z_10, coutO); 
z_23 <= lrotate (zi3, 15); 
add_z_ll: KSadder port map (zi1, zi4, z_ll, coutl ) ; 
z_14 <= lrotate (zi4, 25); 
z_12 <= zi2 xor z_lO; 
z_20 <= lrotate (z_lO, 9) ; 
z_33 <= z_23 xor z_11 ; 
z_21 <= lrotate (z_11, 10); 
add_z_24: KSadder port map (z_14, z_12, z_24, cout2); 
z_22 <= lrotate (z_12, 17); 
add_z_13: KSadder port map (z_33, x1, z_13, cout3) ; 
z_30 <= z_20 xor z_43; 
z_53 <= lrotate (z_33, 30) ; 
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z_31 <= z_21 xor z_24; 
z_34 <= lrotate (z_24, 13); 
add_z_32: KSadder port map (z_22, z_30, z_32, cout4); 
z_40 <= lrotate (z_30, 20); 
add_z_63: KSadder port map (z_53, z_31, z_63, cout5); 
z_41 <= lrotate (z_31, 11); 
z_44 <= z_34 xor z_32; 
z_ 42 <= lrota te (z_32, 5) ; 
syn_in: process (rst, elk, start) 
begin 
if (rst = ' 1') then 
flag <= 0; 
elsif (elk=' 1' and elk' event) then 
if (flag= 0 and start=' 1') then 
flag <= 1; 
else 
flag <= 0; 
end if; 
end if; 
end process syn_in; 
syn_out: process (elk, flag) 
begin 
if (elk = ' 1' and elk' event ) then 
if (flag= 1)then 
output registers 
zoO <= z_40; 
zo1 <= z_41; 
zo2 <= z_42; 
zo3 <= z_63; 
zo4 <= z_44; 
end if ; 
end if; 
end process syn_out ; 
end rtl; 
-- H block for compactness 
library ieee; 
use ieee. std_logic_l164.ALL; 
entity H_func_dp is 
port ( kO in std _logic_ vector 
k1 in std_logic_vector 
lsO in std_logic; 
ls1 in std_logic ; 
ls2 in std_logic; 
ls3 in std_logic; 
ls4 in std_logic; 
(31 
(31 
down to 0) ; 
down to 0) ; 
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ls5 in std_logic; 
ls6 in std_logic; 
mux 
-
sel in std_logic_vector (2 downto 0) ; 
wOO in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
w01 in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
w02 in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
w03 in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
w04 in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
w40 out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
w41 out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
w42 out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
w43 out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
w44 out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0)) ; 
end H_func_dp; 
architecture BEHAVIORAL of H_func_dp is 
signal ainO std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal ain1 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal aout std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal kO_in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal wOO_in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w01 in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w02_in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w03_in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w03 xor_kO std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w04 in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w10 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal wll std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w12 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w13 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w14 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w20 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w21 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w22 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w23 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w23 
-
add_k1 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w24 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w30 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w31 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w32 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w33 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w34 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w40 
-
in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w41 in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w42_in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal w44_in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
signal XLXN_21 std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
component latch 
port ( gate in std_logic; 
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din in std_logic_vector (3 1 down to 0) ; 
dout out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ) ; 
end component; 
component mux_6to1 
port ( iO in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
i 1 in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
i2 in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) : 
i3 in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
i4 in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) : 
i5 in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) : 
s in std_logic_vector (2 downto 0) ; 
q inout std_logic_vector (31 downto 0)) ; 
end component; 
component rot15 
port ( din in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
dout out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0)) : 
end component: 
component rot25 
port ( din in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
dout out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0)) ; 
end component; 
component adder_predefined 
port ( A in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
B in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
s out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0)) : 
end component; 
component rot9 
port ( din in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
dout out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ) ; 
end component; 
component rot10 
port ( din in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
dout out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0)) ; 
end component; 
component rot17 
port ( din in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
dout out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0)) : 
end component; 
component rot30 
port ( din in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
dout out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0)) ; 
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end component; 
component rot13 
port ( din in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
dout out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0)) ; 
end component; 
component rot20 
port ( din in std_logic_vector (31 downto 0) ; 
dout out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0)) ; 
end component; 
component rot11 
port ( din in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
dout out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0)) ; 
end component; 
component rot5 
port ( din in std_logic_vector (31 downto 0) ; 
dout out std_logic_vector (31 downto 0) ); 
end component; 
component xor_array 
port ( a in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
b in std_logic_vector (31 down to 0) ; 
c out std_logic_vector (31 down to 0)) ; 
end component; 
begin 
l atch_w10 latch 
port map (din(31 downto O) =>aout(31 downto 0) , 
gate=>lsO, 
dout (31 downto O) =>wl0 (31 downto 0)) ; 
latch_wll : latch 
port map (din(31 downto O) =>aout(31 downto 0), 
gate=>ls1, 
dout(31 downto O) =>w11(31 downto 0)); 
latch_w23K1 : latch 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>aout(31 downto 0) , 
gate=>ls3, 
dout(31 downto O)=>w23_add_kl(31 downto 0)) ; 
latch_w32 : latch 
port map (din(31 downto O) =>aout(31 downto 0), 
gate=>ls4, 
dout (31 downto O)=>w32(31 downto 0)); 
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mux_ainO : mux_6tol 
port map (i0(31 downto O) =>wOO_in(31 downto 0), 
il(31 downto O) =>w0l_in(31 downto 0), 
i2(31 downto O)=>wl4(31 downto 0), 
i3(31 downto O)=>w23(31 downto 0), 
i4(31 downto O)=>w22(31 downto 0), 
i5(31 downto O) =>w33(31 downto 0), 
s(2 downto O) =>mux_sel(2 downto 0), 
q(31 downto O)=>ain0(31 downto 0)); 
mux_ainl : mux_6tol 
port map (i0(31 downto O)=>w03_xor_k0(31 downto 0), 
il(31 downto O)=>w04_in(31 downto 0), 
i2(31 downto O)=>w12(31 downto 0), 
i3(31 downto O)=>XLXN_21(31 downto 0), 
i4(31 downto O)=>w30(31 downto 0), 
i5(31 downto O)=>w31(31 downto 0), 
s(2 downto O)=>mux_sel(2 downto 0), 
q(31 downto O)=>ainl(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_83 : rotl5 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>w03_in(31 downto 0), 
dout(31 downto O) =>wl3(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_84 rot25 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>w04_in(31 downto 0), 
dout(31 downto O)=>wl4(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_86 : adder_predefined 
port map (A(31 downto O)=>ainl(31 downto 0), 
8(31 downto O) =>ain0(31 downto 0), 
S(31 downto O)=>aout(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_ll5 : rot9 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>wl0(31 downto 0), 
dout(31 downto O)=>w20(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_ll7 : rotlO 
port map (din(31 downto O) =>wll(31 downto 0), 
dout(31 downto O) =>w21(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_l30 : latch 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>aout(31 downto 0), 
gate=>ls2, 
dout(31 downto O) =>w24(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_l31 : rotl7 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>wl2(31 downto 0), 
dout(31 downto O)=>w22(31 downto 0) ); 
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XLXI_134 : rot30 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>w23(31 downto 0), 
dout(31 downto O)=>w33(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_136 : rot13 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>w24(31 downto 0), 
dout(31 downto O) =>w34(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_138 : rot20 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>w30(31 downto 0), 
dout(31 downto O)=>w40_in(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_142 : rotll 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>w31(31 downto 0), 
dout(31 downto O)=>w41_in(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_l44 : rot5 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>w32(31 downto 0), 
dout(31 downto O)=>w42_in(31 downto 0)); 
latch_winO : latch 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>w00(31 downto 0), 
gate=> ls5, 
dout(31 downto O)=>wOO_in(31 downto 0)); 
latch_winl : latch 
port map (din(31 downto O) =>w01(31 downto 0), 
gate=> ls5, 
dout(31 downto O) =>wOl_in(31 downto 0)) ; 
latch_win2 : latch 
port map (din(31 downto O) =>w02(31 downto 0), 
gate=> ls5, 
dout(31 downto O) =>w02_in(31 downto 0) ) ; 
latch_win3 : latch 
port map (din(31 downto O) =>w03(31 downto 0), 
gate=> ls5, 
dout(31 downto O) =>w03_in(31 downto 0) ) ; 
latch_win4 : latch 
port map (din(31 downto O) =>w04(31 downto 0), 
gate=> ls5, 
dout(31 downto O) =>w04_in(31 downto 0)); 
latch_kO : l atch 
port map (din(31 downto O) =>k0(31 downto 0), 
gate=>ls5, 
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dout(31 downto O)=>kO_in(31 downto 0)); 
latch_kl : latch 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>kl(31 downto 0), 
gate=>ls5, 
dout(31 downto O)=>XLXN_21(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_l57 : latch 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>aout(31 downto 0), 
gate=>ls6, 
dout(31 downto O) =>w43(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_l58 : latch 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>w42_in(31 downto 0), 
gate=>ls6, 
dout(31 downto O) =>w42(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_l59 : latch 
port map (din(31 downto O) =>w44_in(31 downto 0), 
gate=>ls6, 
dout(31 downto O)=>w44(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_l60 : latch 
port map (din(31 downto O) =>w4l_in(31 downto 0), 
gate=> ls6, 
dout(31 downto O)=>w41(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_l61 : latch 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>w40_in(31 downto 0), 
gate=>ls6, 
dout(31 downto O) =>w40(31 downto 0)); 
xor_wlO : xor_array 
port map (a(31 downto O) =>kO_in(31 downto 0), 
b(31 downto O)=>w03_in(31 downto 0), 
c(31 downto O)=>w03_xor_k0(31 downto 0)); 
xor_wl2 : xor_array 
port map (a(31 downto O) =>wl0(31 downto 0), 
b(31 downto O)=>w02_in(31 downto 0), 
c(31 downto O)=>wl2(31 downto 0)); 
xor_w30 : xor_array 
port map (a(31 downto O)=>w20(31 downto 0), 
b(31 downto O)=>w23_add_kl(31 downto 0), 
c(31 downto O)=>w30(31 downto 0)); 
xor_w31 : xor_array 
port map (a(31 downto O) =>w21(31 downto 0), 
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b(31 downto O)=>w24(31 downto 0), 
c(31 downto O)=>w31(31 downto 0)); 
xor_w44 : xor_array 
port map (a(31 downto O)=>w34(31 downto 0), 
b(31 downto O)=>w32(31 downto 0), 
c(31 downto O)=>w44_in (31 downto 0)); 
xor_23 : xor_array 
port map (a(31 downto O)=>wl1 (31 downto 0), 
b(31 downto O) =>w13(31 downto 0) , 
c(31 downto O)=>w23(31 downto 0)); 
end BEHAVIORAL; 
LIBRARY ieee; 
USE ieee. std_logic_1164.all; 
ENTITY SHELL_H_CTR IS 
END; 
PORT (CLK,RESET,start: IN std_logic; 
done, lsO, lsl, ls2, ls3, ls4, ls5, ls6,mux_sel0,mux_sell,mux_sel2 OUT st d_l ogic 
) ; 
ARCHITECTURE BEHAVIOR OF SHELL_H_CTR IS 
TYPE type_sreg IS (H_done, idle,wlO_gen,wlO_load,wll_gen,wll_load,w23Kl_gen, 
w23Kl_load,w24_gen,w24_load,w32_gen,w32_l oad, w44_gen); 
SIGNAL sreg, next_sreg : type_sreg; 
SIGNAL ls : std_logic_vector (6 DOWNTO 0); 
SIGNAL mux_se l : std_logic_vector (2 DOWNTO 0) ; 
BEGIN 
PROCESS (CLK, RESET, next_sreg) 
BEGIN 
IF ( RESET=' 1' ) THEN 
sreg <= idle; 
ELSIF CLK=' 1' AND CLK'event THEN 
sreg <= next_sreg; 
END IF; 
END PROCESS; 
PROCESS (sreg,start) 
BEG IN 
CASE sreg IS 
WHEN H_done => 
done<=' 1' ; 
mux_se l <= (std_logic_vector' (H lOlH)); 
116 
ls <= (std_logic_vector' ("1000000")); 
next_sreg<=idle; 
WHEN idle => 
done<=' 0' ; 
mux_sel <= (std_logic_vector' ("000")); 
ls <= (std_logic_vector' ("0100000")); 
IF ( start=' 1' ) THEN 
next_sreg<=w10_gen; 
ELSE 
next_sreg<=idle; 
END IF ; 
WHEN wlO_gen => 
done<=' 0' ; 
mux_sel <= (std_logic_vector' ("000")); 
ls <= (std_logic_vector' ("0000001 ")); 
IF ( start=' 1' ) THEN 
next_sreg<=w10_load; 
ELSE 
next_sreg<=w10_gen; 
END IF; 
WHEN w10_load => 
done<=' 0' ; 
mux_sel <= (std_logic_vector' ("000")); 
ls <= (std_logic_vector' ("0000001")); 
IF ( start=' 1' ) THEN 
next_sreg<=w11_gen; 
ELSE 
next_sreg<=w10_load; 
END IF; 
WHEN w11_gen => 
done<=' 0' ; 
mux_sel <= (std_logic_vector' ("001")); 
ls <= (std_logic_vector' ("0000010")); 
IF ( start=' 1' ) THEN 
next_sreg<=w11_load ; 
ELSE 
next_sreg<=w11_gen; 
END IF; 
WHEN w11_load => 
done <=' 0' ; 
mux_sel <= (std_logic_vector' ("001")); 
ls <= (std_logic_vector' ("0000010")); 
IF ( start=' 1' ) THEN 
next_sreg<=w24_gen; 
ELSE 
next_sreg<=w11_load; 
END IF; 
WHEN w23K1_gen => 
done<=' 0' ; 
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mux_sel <= (std_ logic_vector' ("011 ") ) ; 
ls <= (std_logic_vector' ("0001000")); 
IF ( start=' 1' ) THEN 
next_sreg<=w23K1_load; 
ELSE 
next_sreg<=w23K1_gen; 
END IF; 
WHEN w23K1_load => 
done<=' 0' ; 
mux_sel <= (std_logic_vector' ("011")); 
ls <= (std_logic_vector' ("0001000")); 
IF ( start=' 1' ) THEN 
next_sreg<=w32_gen; 
ELSE 
next_sreg<=w23K1_load; 
END IF; 
WHEN w24_gen => 
done<=' 0' ; 
mux_sel <= (std_logic_vector' ("010")) ; 
ls <= (std_ logic_vector' ("0000100")); 
IF ( start=' 1' ) THEN 
next_sreg<=w24_ load; 
ELSE 
next_sreg<=w24_gen; 
END IF ; 
WHEN w24_ load => 
done<=' 0' ; 
mux_sel <= (std_logic_vector' ("010") ) ; 
ls <= (std_logic_vector' ("0000100")); 
IF ( start=' 1' ) THEN 
next_sreg<=w23K1_gen; 
ELSE 
next_sreg<=w21_ load; 
END IF ; 
WHEN w32_gen => 
done<=' o· ; 
mux_sel <= (std_ logic_vector' ("100")); 
ls <= (std_ logic_vector' ("0010000")); 
IF ( start=' 1' ) THEN 
next_sreg<=w32_load; 
ELSE 
next_sreg<=w32_gen; 
END IF; 
WHEN w32_ load => 
done<=' o· ; 
mux_sel <= (std_ logic_vector' ("100") ) ; 
ls <= (std_ logic_vector' ("0010000")); 
IF ( start=' 1' ) THEN 
next_sreg<=w44_gen; 
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ELSE 
next_sreg<=w32_load; 
END IF; 
WHEN w44_gen => 
done<=' 0' ; 
mux_sel <= (std_logic_vector' ("101")); 
ls <= (std_logic_vector' ("1000000")); 
IF ( start=' 1' ) THEN 
next_sreg<=H_done; 
ELSE 
next_sreg<=w41_gen; 
END IF; 
WHEN OTHERS => 
END CASE; 
END PROCESS; 
ls6 <= ls (6) ; 
ls5 <= ls (5); 
ls4 <= 1s(4); 
ls3 <= ls(3); 
ls2 <= ls(2); 
ls1 <= ls(1); 
lsO <= ls (0) ; 
mux_sel2 <= mux_sel(2); 
mux_sell <= mux_sel(1); 
mux_selO <= mux_sel(O); 
END BEHAVIOR; 
LIBRARY ieee; 
USE ieee. std_logi c_l164. all; 
ENTITY H_CTR IS 
END; 
PORT (ls : OUT std_logic_vector (6 DOWNTO 0) ; 
mux_sel : OUT std_logic_vector (2 DOWNTO 0); 
CLK,RESET,start: IN std_logic; 
done : OUT std_1ogic); 
ARCHITECTURE BEHAVIOR OF H_CTR IS 
COMPONENT SHELL_H_CTR 
PORT (CLK,RESET,start: IN std_logic; 
done, lsO, ls1, ls2, ls3, ls4, ls5, ls6,mux_sel0,mux_sel1,mux_sel2 OUT 
std_logic); 
END COMPONENT; 
BEGIN 
SHELL1_H_CTR : SHELL_H_CTR PORT MAP (CLK=>CLK,RESET=>RESET, start=>start,done 
=>done, lsO=>ls(O), ls1=>ls(l), ls2=>ls(2), ls3=>ls(3), ls4=>ls(4), ls5=>ls(5), ls6 
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=>ls(6), mux_selO=>mux_sel(O) ,mux_sel l=>mux_sel(l), mux_sel2=>mux_sel(2)); 
END BEHAVIOR; 
Appendix E: Selected Source Code 
Salsa20 
----ASIC_ Compact 
LIBRARY ieee; 
USE ieee.std_logic_ II64.all; 
LIBRARY ieee; 
USE ieee.std_ logic_unsigned.all; 
ENTITY SHELL CONTRO IS 
PORT (CLK,mem _ done,quarter _ done,RESET,start: IN std _logic; 
done,load _ all,mux _ mO,mO _start,m I_start,quarter _rd _start,roundO,round I ,round2, 
round3,round4,round5,round6,serial :OUT std_logic); 
END; 
ARCHITECTURE BEHAVIOR OF SHELL CONTRO IS 
TYPE type_sreg IS (add,idle,load_rows,load_z,quarter_en); 
SIGNAL sreg, next_sreg: type_sreg; 
SIGNAL round : std_logic_ vector (6 DOWNTO 0); 
BEGIN 
PROCESS (CLK, RESET) 
BEGIN 
IF ( RESET=' I' ) THEN 
sreg <= idle; 
ELSIF CLK ='I' AND CLK'event THEN 
sreg <= next_sreg; 
END IF; 
END PROCESS; 
PROCESS (sreg, mem _ done,quarter _ done,start,round) 
BEGIN 
next_sreg<=add; 
CASE sreg IS 
WHEN add => 
IF ( start=' I' AND mem _done=' 1' ) THEN 
next_sreg<=load _rows; 
ELSE 
next_sreg<=add; 
END IF; 
WHEN idle => 
IF ( start=']' ) THEN 
for 
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next_sreg<=load_rows; 
ELSE 
next_sreg<=idle; 
END LF; 
WHEN load rows => 
IF (start=' I' AND mem_done='l') THEN 
next_sreg<=quarter _en; 
ELSE 
next_sreg<=load _rows; 
END IF ; 
WHEN load z => 
IF ( start='O' ) THEN 
next_ sreg<=load _ z; 
ELSIF (round=87 and mem_done='J') THEN 
next_sreg<=add; 
ELSIF (round<87 and mem_done='l') THEN 
next_sreg<=quarter _en; 
END IF; 
WHEN quarter_en => 
IF (start=' I' AND quarter_ done='!') THEN 
next _sreg<=load _ z; 
ELSE 
next_ sreg<=quarter _en; 
END IF; 
WHEN OTHERS => 
END CASE; 
END PROCESS; 
PROCESS( sreg ) 
BEGIN 
CASE sreg IS 
WHEN add => 
mux_ mO<='l'; 
mO_start<=' l '; 
m I_ start<=' I'; 
load_ all <='0'; 
serial<=' I'; 
quarter _ rd _ start<='O'; 
done<=' I'; 
round <= (std _ logic_ vector'("OOOO Ill")); 
WHEN idle => 
mux_mO<='O'; 
mO _start<='O'; 
m I_ start<='O'; 
load_ all <='0'; 
serial<= 'O'; 
quarter _ rd _start<='O'; 
done<='O'; 
round <= (std _ logic_ vector'("OOOO Ill")); 
WHEN load_ rows => 
mux_mO<='O'; 
mO _start<=' I'; 
m I_ start<=' I'; 
load_all<='l '; 
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serial<='O'; 
quarter _rd_ start<='O'; 
done<='O'; 
round <= (std_logic_ vector'("OOOO Ill")); 
WHEN load z => 
mux_mO<='l'; 
mO_start<='l'; 
m l_start<='O'; 
load_all<='O'; 
seriai<='O'; 
ELSE 
quarter _ rd _ start<='O'; 
done<='O'; 
IF ( round<87) THEN 
round <= round + std _logic_ vector'("OOOOOO I"); 
round <= round; 
END IF; 
WHEN quarter_en => 
mux mO<='I'· 
- ' 
mO start<='O'· 
- ' 
m I_ start<='O'; 
load all<='O'· 
- ' 
serial<='O'; 
quarter_ rd_start<='l '; 
done<='O'; 
round <= round; 
WHEN OTHERS => 
END CASE; 
END PROCESS; 
PROCESS (round) 
BEGIN 
roundO <= round(O); 
round I <= round( I); 
round2 <= round(2); 
round3 <= round(3); 
round4 <= round(4); 
roundS <= round(5); 
round6 <= round(6); 
END PROCESS; 
END BEHAVIOR; 
LIBRARY ieee; 
USE ieee.std_logic_ II64.all; 
LIBRARY ieee; 
USE ieee.std_logic_unsigned.all; 
ENTITY CONTRO IS 
PORT (addr : OUT std_ logic_vector (2 DOWNTO 0); 
END; 
CLK,mem_ done, quarter_ done,RESET,start: IN std _logic; 
done,load_all ,mux_mO,mO_start,m I_start,quarter_rd_start,serial : OUT std_ logic); 
ARCHITECTURE BEHAVIOR OF CONTRO IS 
SIGNAL round: std_logic_vector (6 DOWNTO 0); 
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COMPONENTSHELL_CONTRO 
PORT (CLK,mem _ done,quarter _ done,RESET,start: IN std _logic; 
done,load_all,mux_ mO,mO _start,m l_start,quarter _rd _start,roundO,round I ,round2, 
round3,round4,round5,round6,serial : OUT std_logic); 
END COMPONENT; 
BEGIN 
addr<=round(2 DOWNTO 0); 
SHELL I_ CONTRO : SHELL_ CONTRO PORT MAP (CLK =>CLK,mem _ done=>mem _done, 
quarter_ done=>quarter _ done,RESET=>RESET,start=>start,done=>done,load _all=> 
load _all,mux_ mO=>mux _mO,mO _ start=>mO _start,m l_start=>m l_start,quarter _ rd _start=> 
quarter _ rd_start,roundO=>round(O),round I =>round( I ),round2=>round(2),round3=> 
round(3 ),round4=>round( 4 ),roundS=> round( 5 ),roun d6=>round( 6 ),seri a I =>serial); 
END BEHAVIOR; 
library ieee; 
use ieee.std_logic_ li64.ALL; 
use ieee.numeric_std.ALL; 
entity quarterround is 
port ( CLK : m std_ logic; 
dO : in std_ logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
d I : in std _ logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
d2 : m std _ logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
d3 : in std _ logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
RST : m std_logic; 
start: in std_logic; 
done : out std_ logic; 
zO : inout std _ logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
zl : inout std_ logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
z2 : inout std_ logic_vector (31 downto 0); 
z3 : inout std_ logic_ vector (31 downto 0)); 
end quarterround; 
architecture BEHAVIORAL of quarterround is 
signal mux2 : std_ logic; 
signal mux4 : std_ logic_ vector (I downto 0); 
signal reg_ld : std_ logic_ vector (3 downto 0); 
component quarter 
port ( clock : in std _ logic; 
clear : m std_logic; 
d2 : m std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
reg_selO : in std_logic; 
reg_sell : in std_logic; 
reg_se12 : in std_logic; 
reg_se13 : in std_logic; 
mux4 sel xorinl : in std_logic_ vector(l downtoO); 
mux4 sel xorinO : in std_logic_vector (I downto 0); 
mux4_sel_ainl : m std_ logic_vector (I downto 0); 
d3 : m std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
d I : in std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
dO : in std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
mux2 sel : in std_logic; 
zO : in out std _ logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
z2 : in out std _ logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
z3 : in out std_ logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
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zl : inout std_ logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
mux4 sel ainO :in std_ logic_ vector (I downto 0)); 
end component; 
component FSM_QUA 
port ( CLK : m 
RESET : in 
start : m 
done : out 
mux2_input: out 
mux4 :out 
reg_ ld : out 
std_logic; 
std_ logic; 
std_logic; 
std_logic; 
std_ logic; 
std_logic_vector (I downto 0); 
std_ logic_vector (3 downto 0)); 
end component; 
begin 
XLXI_ l :quarter 
port map (clear=>RST, 
clock=>CLK, 
d0(31 downto O)=>d0(31 downto 0), 
d I (31 down to O)=>d I (31 down to 0), 
d2(31 downto O)=>d2(31 downto 0), 
d3(31 downto O)=>d3(31 downto 0), 
mux2_sel=>mux2, 
mux4_sel_ain0(1 downto O)=>mux4(1 downto 0), 
mux4_sel_ainl(l downto O)=>mux4(1 downto 0), 
mux4_sel_xorin0(1 downto O)=>mux4(1 downto 0), 
mux4 _ sel_xorin I (I down to O)=>mux4( I downto 0), 
reg_selO=>reg_ld(O), 
reg_ sell =>reg_ ld( I), 
reg_sel2=>reg_ ld(2), 
reg_ sel3=>reg_ ld(3 ), 
z0(31 downto O)=>z0(31 downto 0), 
zl(31 downto O)=>zl(31 downto 0), 
z2(31 downto O)=>z2(31 downto 0), 
z3(31 downto O)=>z3(31 downto 0)); 
XLXI_2 : FSM_QUA 
port map (CLK=>CLK, 
RESET=>RST, 
start=>start, 
done=>done, 
mux2 _input=>mux2, 
mux4(1 downto O)=>mux4(1 downto 0), 
reg_ ld(3 downto O)=>reg_ld(3 downto 0)); 
end BEHAVIORAL; 
library ieee; 
use ieee.std_logic_ II64.ALL; 
use ieee.numeric_std.ALL; 
entity quarter is 
port (clear 
clock 
dO 
: in std_logic; 
:in std_ logic; 
: m std _ logic_ vector (3 1 down to 0); 
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d I : m std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
d2 : m std_logic_vector (31 downto 0); 
d3 : m std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
mux2 sel : in std_logic; 
mux4 sel ainO : m std_ logic_vector (I downto 0); 
mux4 sel ainl :in std_ logic_vector (I downto 0); 
mux4 sel xorinO: in std_ logic_vector (I downto 0); 
mux4 sel xorin I : in std _ logic_ vector (I down to 0); 
reg_selO : in std_ logic; 
reg_sell : in std_ logic; 
reg_se12 : in std_ logic; 
reg_se13 : in std_ logic; 
zO : in out std_ logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
zl : inout std_ logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
z2 : inout std_ logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
z3 : inout std_ logic_ vector (31 downto 0)); 
end quarter; 
architecture BEHAVIORAL of quarter is 
signal ainO : std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
signal ain 1 : std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
signal regO_in : std_logic_vector (31 downto 0); 
signal reg l_in : std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
signal reg2_in : std_ logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
signal reg3 _in : std _ logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
signal r7 : std _ logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
signal r9 : std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
signal r13 : std _ logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
signal r 18 : std _logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
signal sum : std_ logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
signal xor_inO : std_logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
signal xor_ inl : std_logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
signal zi : std_ logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
component adder _predefined 
port (A : in std _logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
B : in std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
S : out std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0)); 
end component; 
component rotation7 
port ( din : in 
dout: out 
end component; 
component rotation9 
port ( din : in 
dout : out 
end component; 
component rotation 13 
port ( din : in 
dout: out 
end component; 
component rotation 18 
std _ logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
std_logic_ vector (31 downto 0)); 
std_ logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
std_logic_ vector (31 downto 0)); 
std _ logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0)); 
port (din : in std_ logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
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dout : out std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0)); 
end component; 
component mux _ 2to 1 
port ( s : in std_logic; 
iO : in std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
i 1 : in std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
q : inout std_logic_ vector (31 downto 0)); 
end component; 
component mux_ 4tol 
port ( iO : in std _ logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
i 1 : in std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
i2: in std_logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
i3 : in std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
s : in std_ logic_vector (1 downto 0); 
q : inoutstd_logic_vector(31 downtoO)); 
end component; 
component reg 
port (elk: in std_logic; 
clr : in std_ logic; 
s : in std_logic; 
d : in std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
q : inout std _ logic_ vector (31 downto 0)); 
end component; 
component xor_array 
port ( a : in std _logic_ vector (31 down to 0); 
b :in std_logic_ vector (31 downto 0); 
c : out std_logic _vector (31 down to 0)); 
end component; 
begin 
adder : adder _predefined 
port map (A(31 downto O)=>ain0(3 1 downto 0), 
8(31 downto O)=>ainl(31 downto 0), 
S(31 downto O)=>sum(31 downto 0)); 
dr7 : rotation? 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>sum(31 downto 0), 
dout(31 downto O)=>r7(31 downto 0)); 
dr9 : rotation9 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>sum(31 downto 0), 
dout(31 downto O)=>r9(31 downto 0)); 
dr 13 : rotation 13 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>sum(31 downto 0), 
dout(31 down to O)=>r 13(31 downto 0)); 
dr 18 : rotation 18 
port map (din(31 downto O)=>sum(31 downto 0), 
dout(31 downto O)=>rl8(31 downto 0)); 
muxO : mux 2to1 
126 
port map (i0(31 downto O)=>d0(31 downto 0), 
i 1 (31 down to O)=>zi(31 down to 0), 
s=>mux2_sel, 
q(31 down to O)=>regO _ in(31 down to 0)); 
muxl : mux 2tol 
port map (i0(31 down to O)=>d I (31 down to 0), 
i I (31 down to O)=>zi(31 down to 0), 
s=>mux2_sel, 
q(31 downto O)=>regl _ in(31 downto 0)); 
mux2: mux 2tol 
port map (i0(31 downto O)=>d2(31 downto 0), 
i 1 (31 down to O)=>zi(31 down to 0), 
s=>mux2_sel, 
q(31 downto O)=>reg2_ in(31 downto 0)); 
mux3 : mux 2to I 
port map (i0(31 downto O)=>d3(31 downto 0), 
i I (31 down to O)=>zi(31 down to 0), 
s=>mux2_sel, 
q(31 down to O)=>reg3 _in(31 down to 0)); 
mux4 ainO: mux 4tol 
- -
port map (i0(31 downto O)=>z0(31 downto 0), 
i I (3 I down to O)=>zl (31 down to 0), 
i2(3 I downto O)=>z2(31 downto 0), 
i3(31 downto O)=>z3(31 downto 0), 
s(l downto O)=>mux4_ sel_ain0(1 downto 0), 
q(31 downto O)=>ain0(31 downto 0)); 
mux4 ainl: mux 4tol 
- -
port map (i0(31 downto O)=>z3(31 downto 0), 
i I (3 I down to O)=>z0(31 down to 0), 
i2(31 downto O)=>zl(31 downto 0), 
i3(31 downto O)=>z2(31 downto 0), 
s(l downto O)=>mux4_sel_ainl{l downto 0), 
q(31 downto O)=>ain1(31 downto 0)); 
mux4 xor inO: mux 4tol 
- - -
port map (i0(31 downto O)=>zl(31 downto 0), 
i I (31 down to O)=>z2{31 down to 0), 
i2(31 downto O)=>z3{31 downto 0), 
i3(31 downto O)=>z0(31 downto 0), 
s{l downto O)=>mux4_ sel_xorin0(1 downto 0), 
q(31 downto O)=>xor_ in0(31 downto 0)); 
mux4 xor in I : mux 4to I 
- - -
port map (i0(31 downto O)=>r7{31 downto 0), 
registerO : reg 
i I (31 down to O)=>r9(31 down to 0), 
i2(3 I down to O)=>r 13(31 down to 0), 
i3(3 I down to O)=>r 18(31 down to 0), 
s(l downto O)=>mux4_sel_xorinl(l downto 0), 
q(31 down to O)=>xor _ in I (31 down to 0)); 
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port map (clk=>clock, 
clr=>clear, 
d(31 down to O)=>regO _ in(31 down to 0), 
s=>reg_seiO, 
q(31 downto O)=>z0(3 I downto 0)); 
register] : reg 
port map (clk=>clock, 
clr=>clear, 
d(31 down to O)=>reg l_ in(31 down to 0), 
s=>reg_sell , 
q(31 down to O)=>zl (31 down to 0)); 
register2 : reg 
port map (elk=> clock, 
clr=>clear, 
d(31 downto O)=>reg2_in(31 downto 0), 
s=>reg_sel2, 
q(31 downto O)=>z2(31 downto 0)); 
register3 : reg 
port map ( clk=>clock, 
clr=>clear, 
d(31 down to O)=>reg3 _ in(31 down to 0), 
s=>reg_sel3, 
q(31 downto O)=>z3(31 downto 0)); 
xor _gate_ array : xor _array 
port map (a(31 down to O)=>xor _ in 1(31 down to 0), 
b(31 downto O)=>xor_in0(31 downto 0), 
c(31 downto O)=>zi(31 downto 0)); 
end BEHAVIORAL; 
----ASIC basic iterative 
library ieee; 
use ieee.std_ logic _ 1164.all; 
use IEEE.std _ logic _arith.all ; 
use ieee.std _ logic_ unsigned .all; 
entity quarterround is 
port(rst, start, elk: in std_ logic; 
end entity; 
mux_sel, regs_sel: in std_logic_ vector(3 downto 0); 
yO, yl , y2, y3 : in std_logic_ vector(31 downto 0); 
zO, zl , z2, z3 : out std_logic_ vector(31 downto 0) 
); 
architecture rtl of quarterround is 
component xor_array 
PORT( a: in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 1 downto 0); 
b: in STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR (31 downto 0); 
c: out STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR (3 1 downto 0) ); 
end component; 
component mux _ 2to I 
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GENERIC (N: INTEGER :=32); 
PORT(iO, il: IN STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(n-1 DOWNTO 0); 
s: IN STD_LOGIC; 
q: INOUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(n-1 DOWNTO 0)); 
end component; 
component reg 
GENERIC (N: INTEGER :=32); 
PORT( clk,clr,s: IN STD _LOGIC; 
d: IN STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(N-1 DOWNTO 0); 
q: INOUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(N-1 DOWNTO 0)); 
end component; 
type regcolumn is array(O to 3) of std_ logic_ vector(31 downto 0); 
signal reg_in, reg_out, 
add_out, dr, z: regcolumn; 
begin 
MUXO: mux_2tol port map (yO, z(O), mux_sel(O), reg_in(O)); 
MUXI : mux_2tol port map (yl, z(l ), mux_sel(l), reg_ in(!)); 
MUX2: mux_2tol port map (y2, z(2), mux_se1(2), reg_ in(2)); 
MUX3 : mux_2tol port map (y3, z(3), mux_sel(3), reg_in(3)); 
REGS: fori in 0 to 3 generate 
REGI: reg port map (elk, rst, regs_sel(i), 
reg_ in(i),reg_ out(i) ); 
end generate; 
add_ out(O)<=reg_ out(O)+reg_ out(3 ); 
add_ out( I )<=reg_ out( I )+reg_ out(O); 
add_ out(2)<=reg_ out(2)+reg_ out( I); 
add_ out(3)<=reg_ out(3 )+reg_ out(2); 
dr(O)<=add_out(0)(24 DOWNTO O)&add_out(0)(31 DOWNTO 25); 
dr(l)<=add_out(1)(22 DOWNTO O)&add_out(l)(31 DOWNTO 23); 
dr(2)<=add_out(2)(18 DOWNTO O)&add_out(2)(31 DOWNTO 19); 
dr(3)<=add_out(3)(13 DOWNTO O)&add_out(3)(31 DOWNTO 14); 
ziG: xor_array port map (reg_ out(!), dr(O), z(J)); 
z2G: xor_array port map (reg_out(2), dr(l), z(2)); 
z3G: xor_array port map (reg_out(3), dr(2), z(3)); 
zOG: xor_array port map (reg_out(O), dr(3), z(O)); 
zO<=reg_ out(O); z I <=reg_ out( I); 
z2<=reg_ out(2); z3<=reg_ out(3); 
end rtl; 
library ieee; 
use ieee.std_logic_ ll64.all; 
entity fsm is 
port (elk, rst, start: in std_ logic; 
end entity; 
round: in std _logic_ vector( 4 down to 0); 
s: out std_logic_vector(6 downto 0); 
ready: out std_ logic); 
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architecture rtf of fsm is 
type state is (idle, paral_load, zl , z2, z3, zO, done); 
signal ps, ns: state; 
begin 
state _reg: process (rst, elk) 
begin 
if(rst = 'I') then 
ps <= idle; 
elsi f (elk = 'I' and clk'event) then 
ps <= ns; 
end if; 
end process; 
state_transaction: process (start, ps, round) 
begin 
end rtf; 
if start = 'I' then 
case psis 
when idle => 
ready<='O'; 
ns <= paral_load; 
when paral_ load => ns <= zl ; 
when zl => ns <= z2; 
when z2 => ns <= z3; 
when z3 => ns <= zO; 
when zO => 
if (round = II I 0 I 0011 ) then ns <= done; 
else ns <= paral_load; 
end if; 
when done => ready <= 'I'; 
end case; 
end if; 
end process; 
--output_ decode 
with ps select 
s <= 11000000 I 11 when idle, 
11000001011 when paral_load, 
110000 I 0011 when zl , 
11000 I 00011 when z2, 
1100 I 000011 when z3, 
110 I 0000011 when zO, 
II I 00000011 when done; 
---- FPGA _compact 
LIBRARY IEEE; 
USE IEEE.std_logic_ l164.all; 
USE ieee.std_logic_unsigned.ALL; 
ENTITY controller IS 
PORT (clk,clkfast, rst, start: IN STD _LOGIC; 
cddr: INOUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(! DOWNTO 0); 
sm: INOUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(5 DOWNTO 0); 
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addr: INOUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(7 DOWNTO 0); 
wren: OUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(! DOWNTO 0); 
s_reg: INOUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(3 DOWNTO 0); 
ready: INOUT STD_LOGIC); 
END ENTITY; 
ARCHITECTURE rtl OF controller IS 
COMPONENT fsm 
--ready is the signal indicating 20 quarterround funtions are done for the input 
PORT (elk, rst, start, ready, en: IN STD _LOGIC; 
s: OUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(IO DOWNTO 0)); 
END COMPONENT; 
COMPONENT pulse_gen 
PORT ( clk,rst, trigger: IN STD_LOGIC; 
pulse: OUT STD_LOGIC); 
END COMPONENT; 
COMPONENT counter 
PORT (elk, clr: IN STD_LOGIC; 
q: INOUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(S DOWNTO 0)); 
END COMPONENT; 
COMPONENT table 
PORT (addr: IN STD _LOGIC_ VECTOR(S DOWNTO 0); 
output: OUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(3 DOWNTO 0)); 
END COMPONENT; 
COMPONENT output 
PORT (start, elk: IN STD_LOGIC; 
s: IN STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(IO DOWNTO 0); 
count: IN STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(S DOWNTO 0); 
addr_ram: IN STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(3 DOWNTO 0); 
change_s: OUT STD_LOGIC; 
cddr: INOUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(! DOWNTO 0); 
sm: INOUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(S DOWNTO 0); 
addr: INOUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(7 DOWNTO 0); 
wren: OUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(! DOWNTO 0); 
s_reg: INOUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(3 DOWNTO 0); 
ready,key_ready: OUT STD_LOGIC); 
END COMPONENT; 
SIGNALs: STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(lO DOWNTO 0); 
SIGNAL addr_ram: STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(3 DOWNTO 0); 
SIGNAL count: STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(S DOWNTO 0); 
SIGNAL change_state, trigger, 
pulseO, pulse!, pulse,change_to_add: STD_LOGIC; 
BEGIN 
pulse<=pulseO OR pulse I; 
state_machine: fsm PORT MAP( elk, rst, start, change_to_add, change_state,s); 
pulseGenO: pulse_gen PORT MAP(clkfast, rst, s(l ), pulseO); 
pulseGenl : pulse_gen PORT MAP(clkfast, rst, s(2), pulse!); 
countr: counter PORT MAP (elk, pulse, count); 
truth_table: table PORT MAP (count, addr_ram); 
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output_logic: output PORT MAP (start, elkfast, s, count, 
addr_ram, change_state, cddr, 
sm, addr, wren, s_reg, 
change_to_add, ready); 
END rtl; 
LIBRARY IEEE; 
USE IEEE.std_logic_ll64.all; 
ENTITY fsm IS 
--ready is the signal indicating 20 quarterround funtions are done for the input 
PORT (elk, rst, start, ready, en: IN STD _LOGIC; 
s: OUT STD_LOGIC_ YECTOR(IO DOWNTO 0)); 
END ENTITY; 
ARCHITECTURE rtl OF fsm IS 
TYPE state IS (idle, initialize, zcO, zcl, zc2, zc3, zrO, zrl, zr2, zr3, add); 
SIGNAL ps, ns: state; 
BEGIN 
state_reg: PROCESS (rst, elk, en, ns) 
BEGIN 
IF (rst = '1') THEN 
ps <= idle; 
ELSIF (en='1 ')THEN 
IF (elk = 'I' AND elk'event) THEN 
ps <= ns; 
END fF; 
END IF; 
END PROCESS; 
state_transaction: PROCESS (start, ready, ps) 
BEGIN 
IF start = ' 1' THEN 
CASE psIS 
WHEN idle => ns <= initialize; 
WHEN initialize => ns <= zcO; 
WHEN zcO => ns <= zc I ; 
WHEN zcl => ns <= zc2; 
WHEN zc2 => ns <= zc3; 
WHEN zc3 => ns <= zrO; 
WHEN zrO => ns <= zr I; 
WHEN zr I => ns <= zr2; 
WHEN zr2 => ns <= zr3; 
WHEN zr3 => 
IF (ready=' I') THEN ns <= add; 
ELSE ns <= zcO; 
END lF; 
WHEN add => ns <= initialize; 
END CASE; 
ELSE 
ns <= ps; 
END IF; 
END PROCESS; 
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--output_ decode 
WITH ps SELECT 
s <= "00000000001" WHEN idle, 
"000000000 1 0" WHEN initialize, 
"00000000 1 00" WHEN zcO, 
"0000000 I 000" WHEN zc I, 
"000000 1 0000" WHEN zc2, 
"00000 1 00000" WHEN zc3, 
"00001000000" WHEN zrO, 
"00010000000" WHEN zr1, 
"00100000000" WHEN zr2, 
"01000000000" WHEN zr3, 
"1 0000000000" WHEN add; 
END rtl; 
LIBRARY IEEE; 
USE IEEE.std_logic_ 1164.all; 
ENTITY pulse_gen IS 
PORT ( clk,rst, trigger: IN STD _LOGIC; 
pulse: OUT STD_LOGIC); 
END ENTITY; 
ARCHITECTURE rtl OF pulse_gen IS 
SIGNAL qO, qb 1: STD _LOGIC; 
BEGIN 
DFFO:PROCESS(clk, rst,trigger) 
BEGIN 
IF rst='1' THEN 
qO<='O'; 
ELSIF( clk'event AND clk='I')THEN 
qO<=trigger; 
END IF; 
END PROCESS; 
DFF1: PROCESS(clk,rst,qO) 
BEGIN 
IF rst='1' THEN 
qb1 <='1'; 
ELSIF( clk'event AND clk='I')THEN 
qb 1 <= NOT qO; 
END IF; 
END PROCESS; 
pulse <= qO AND qbl; 
END rtl; 
LIBRARY IEEE; 
USE IEEE.std _logic _ I164.all; 
USE ieee.std _ logic_ unsigned.ALL; 
ENTITY table IS 
PORT (addr: IN STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(S DOWNTO 0); --64 entries 
output: OUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(3 DOWNTO 0)); --16*8 bits 
END ENTITY; 
ARCHITECTURE rtl OF table IS 
SUBTYPE WORD IS STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(3 DOWNTO 0); 
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); 
TYPE ROM IS ARRAY (0 TO 63) OF WORD; 
CONSTANT content: ROM := ( "0000", "0011", "0001", "0001", 
"0001", "0000", "0010", "0010", 
"0010", "0001 ", "0011 ", "0011 ", 
"0011", "0010", "0000", "0000", 
BEGIN 
"0101 ", "0100", "0110", "0110", 
"0110", "0101", "0111", "0111", 
"0111 ", "0110", "0100", "0100", 
"0100", "0111", "0101", "0101", 
"1010", "1001 ","lOll", "lOll", 
"1011", "1010", "1000", "1000", 
"1000", "10 11", "1001", "1001", 
"1001 ", "1000", "1010", "1010", 
"III I", "1110", "1100", "1100", 
"1100", "III I", "1 101", "1101", 
"1101", "1100", "1110", "1110", 
"1110", "1101", "1111 "," I III II 
output <= content( conv _ integer(addr)); 
END rtl; 
LIBRARY IEEE; 
USE IEEE.std _logic _ 1164.all; 
USE ieee.std_logic_unsigned.ALL; 
ENTITY output IS 
PORT (start, elk: IN STD_LOGIC; 
s : IN STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(IO DOWNTO 0); 
count: IN STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(5 DOWNTO 0); 
addr_ram: IN STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(3 DOWNTO 0); 
change_s: OUT STD_LOGIC; 
cddr: INOUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR( I DOWNTO 0); 
sm: INOUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(5 DOWNTO 0); 
addr: INOUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(7 DOWNTO 0); 
wren: OUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(! DOWNTO 0); 
s_reg: INOUT STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(3 DOWNTO 0); 
key_stream_en: OUT STD_LOGIC; 
ready,key_ready : OUT STD_LOGIC); 
END ENTITY; 
ARCHITECTURE rtl OF output IS 
SIGNAL round:STD_LOGIC_ VECTOR(3 DOWNTO 0); 
SIGNAL round_no_en, dff: STD_LOGIC; 
BEGIN 
change_s <= (count(3)AND count(2)AND count(I)AND count(O))OR 
(s(O) AND start) ; 
-- OR ((s(2) or s(3)0R s(4)or s(5)0R s(6) or s(7)0R s(8) OR s(9)) AND count( I)AND 
count(O)); 
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control_signals: PROCESS (dff, s, count, addr_ram, round)--sm, cddr, addr, wren, s_reg, done 
VARIABLE addr_half: STD_ LOGIC_ VECTOR(3 DOWNTO 0); 
BEGIN 
CASEs IS 
WHEN "0000000000 I"=> --idle 
cddr <= "00"; 
sm <= (OTHERS=>'O'); 
addr <= "00000000"; 
wren <= "00"; 
ready <= '0'; 
WHEN "000000000 I 0"=> --initialize 
wren <= "II"; 
addr_half:= count(3 DOWNTO 0); 
addr <= addr_half & addr_half; 
CASE count IS 
WHEN "000000"=> --constantO from the ROM 
cddr <= "00"; 
sm (I DOWNTO 0) <= "00"; 
WHEN "000001 "=> --key 
sm (1 DOWNTO 0) <= "OJ"; 
WHEN "000 I 0 I"=> -- constant 1 
cddr <= "0 I"; 
sm (1 DOWNTO 0) <= "00"; 
WHEN "000 11 0"=> -- nonce 
sm (I DOWNTO 0) <= "OJ"; 
WHEN "00 I 0 I 0"=> -- constant2 
cddr <= "I 0"; 
sm (I DOWNTO 0) <= "00"; 
WHEN "00 10 II"=> -- key 
sm (I DOWN TO 0) <= "0 I"; 
WHEN "00 1111 "=> -- constant3 
cddr <= "II"; 
sm (I DOWNTO 0) <= "00"; 
WHEN OTHERS=> NULL; 
END CASE; 
WHEN "1 0000000000"=> --add 
sm(2) <= '1'; --the operands of the adder are from RAMO and RAM I 
sm(3) <= 'I'; --short cut from RAMO 
addr <= count(3 DOWNTO 0) & count(3 DOWNTO 0); 
wren <= "00"; 
--key _ready is asserted when round= 10 (1 0 double quarterround) 
key _ready<= 'I'; 
WHEN OTHERS=> --hash function 
-- input of ramO is from the data path 
--operands of the adder are from ramO 
ready <= round(3)AND (NOT round(2)) AND 
round( I )AND (NOT round(O)); 
sm(3 DOWNTO 0) <= "0010"; 
wren( I) <= '0'; --ram I cannot be written 
IF (count( I downto 0)=" 11 ")THEN 
wren(O) <= 'I'; --write back from datapath 
ELSE wren(O) <= '0'; 
END IF; 
IF ((s(2)0R s(3)0R s( 4)0R s(S))='J')THEN --column 
CASE addr ram IS 
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WHEN"OOOO" => addr(3 DOWNTO 0) <= "0000"; 
WHEN"OOOI" => addr(3 DOWNTO 0) <= "0100"; 
WHEN"OOIO" => addr(3 DOWNTO 0) <= "1000"; 
WHEN"OOII" => addr(3 DOWNTO 0) <= "II 00"; 
WHEN"O I 00" => addr(3 DOWN TO 0) <= "000 I"; 
WHEN"OIOI" => addr(3 DOWNTO 0) <= "0101 "; 
WHEN"OIIO" => addr(3 DOWNTO 0) <= "IOOI"; 
WHEN"O Ill" => addr(3 DOWN TO 0) <= "II 0 I"; 
WHEN"IOOO" => addr(3 DOWNTO 0) <= "0010"; 
WHEN"IOOI" => addr(3 DOWNTO 0) <= "OliO"; 
WHEN"IOIO" => addr(3 DOWNTO 0) <= "1010"; 
WHEN" lOll" => addr(3 DOWNTO 0) <= "IIIO"; 
WHEN" II 00" => addr(3 DOWNTO 0) <= "00 II"; 
WHEN"IIOI" => addr(3 DOWNTO 0) <= "OIII "; 
WHEN" Ill 0" => addr(3 DOWN TO 0) <= "I 0 11 "; 
WHEN"IIII" => addr(3 DOWNTO 0) <= "I III"; 
WHEN OTHERS => addr(3 DOWNTO 0) <= "0000"; 
END CASE; 
ELSE --row 
addr(3 DOWNTO 0)<= addr_ram; 
END IF; 
CASE count(3 downto 0) IS 
WHEN "OOII "=> sm(5 downto 4)<= "00"; 
WHEN "OIII "=> sm(5 downto 4)<= "01 "; 
WHEN "1011 "=> sm(5 downto 4)<= "10"; 
WHEN "1111 "=> sm(5 down to 4)<= "II"; 
WHEN OTHERS=> NULL; 
END CASE; 
END CASE; 
END PROCESS; 
s_regs: PROCESS(s, dft) 
BEGIN 
CASEs IS 
WHEN "0000000000 1 "=> --idle 
s _reg<=( OTHERS=>'O'); 
WHEN "000000000 1 0"=> --initialize 
s_reg <= "0000"; --hold the regs 
WHEN "10000000000"=> --add 
s_reg<="OIIO"; 
key_stream_en<= dff; 
WHEN OTHERS => --hash function 
s_reg(3) <= 'I' ; 
CASE count(I downto 0) IS 
WHEN "00"=> 
IF dff = '0' THEN 
s_reg(2 downto 0) <= "000" ; 
ELSIF dff= 'I' THEN 
s_reg(2 downto 0) <= "001"; 
END IF; 
WHEN"OI"=> 
IF dff = '0' THEN 
s_reg(2 downto 0) <= "000"; 
ELSIF dff = 'I' THEN 
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s _reg(2 downto 0) <= "0 I 0" ; 
END IF; 
WHEN "10"=> 
IF dff = '0' THEN 
s_reg(2 downto 0) <= "000"; 
ELSIF dff = 'I' THEN 
s_reg(2 downto 0) <= "100" ; 
END IF; 
WHEN OTHERS=> NULL; 
END CASE; 
END CASE; 
END PROCESS; 
--increase round_no when count=63 
round_ no_ en<=s(9) AND count(O) AND count( I) AND count(2) AND 
count(3) AND count( 4)AND count(5); 
round_number: PROCESS (s(l), round_no_en) --clear, increase 
BEGIN 
IF s(l)='l' THEN 
round<=(OTHERS=>'O'); 
ELSLF(round_no_en'event AND round_no_en='l ')THEN 
round <= round + I; 
END IF; 
END PROCESS; 
flipflop: PROCESS (s( I), clk)--dff begins to work when initialization begins 
BEGIN 
END rtf; 
IF s(l )='I' THEN 
dff <= '1'; 
ELSIF (elk' event AND elk=' 1 ') THEN 
dff <= not dff; 
END IF; 
END PROCESS; 
Appendix F: Selected Codes for Statistical 
Tests 
package tests; 
import generators.Ks_multiple; 
import generators.PhelixException; 
import tests_algorithms.BlockFrequency; 
import tests_algorithms.DiscreteFourierTransform; 
import tests_algorithms.Frequency; 
import tests_algorithms.Runs; 
import utii.MyMath; 
import utii.Utility; 
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public class TestAII { 
/* • It generate m data sequences. 
• The resulting sequence is tested by the four methods from the test suite 
*I 
public static void main(String[] args) throws PhelixException { 
/*Etype: O-Salsa20 
• 
*I 
int Etype = 0; 
/*Stype: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
*I 
int Stype=2; 
/*Ttype: 
• 
• 
• 
*I 
int Ttype=2; 
1-Phelix 
0-Key/Keystream Correlation Sequences 
I-IV /Keystream Correlation Sequences 
2-Frame Correlation Sequences 
3-Diffusion Sequences 
4-Keystream Sequences 
0-Frequency Test 
!-Block Frequency Test 
2-DiscreteFourierTransform Test 
3-Runs Test 
int pow= 10; // #of the generated sequences=Math.pow(2, pow) 
double[] p_value; 
double newP _value; 
double[] f = new double[81]; 
int pass_No = 0; 
double pass_Frequency = 0; 
for(int i=O; i< IO; i++){ 
f[i]=O.O; 
String[] sequence = null; 
Ks_multiple ks_gen = null; 
switch (Etype){ 
case 0: System.out.println("Test Salsa20");break; 
case I: System.out.println("Test Phelix");break; 
} 
if (Stype<4) 
ks_gen = new Ks_multiple(pow, Etype, Stype); 
else 
ks_gen = new Ks_multiple(pow, Etype, 0); 
switch (Stype){ 
case 0: 
System.out.println("test key/Keystream Correlation Sequences"); 
sequence = ks_gen.ks_k; 
break; 
case 1: 
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----- -------------------------------------------------
System.out.println("test IV /Keystream Correlation Sequences"); 
sequence = ks_gen.ks_IV; 
break; 
case 2: 
System.out.println("test Frame Correlation Sequences"); 
sequence= ks_gen.frame; 
break; 
case 3: 
System.out.println("test Diffusion Correlation Sequences"); 
sequence = ks_gen.diffusion; 
break; 
case 4: 
System.out.println("test Keystream Sequences"); 
sequence = ks_gen.ks_str; 
break; 
int sL = sequence.length; 
p_value = new double[sL]; 
switch (Ttype){ 
case 0: 
System.out.println("Frequency Test: "); 
for(int i=O; i<sL; i++){ 
p_ value[i] = new Frequency(sequence[i]).pvalue; 
Utility.group(p _ value[i], f); 
pass_No = Utility.pass(p_value[i], pass_No); 
break; 
case I: 
System.out.println("BlockFrequency Test: "); 
for(int i=O; i<sequence.length; i++){ 
p_ value[i] = new BlockFrequency(20, sequence[i]).pvalue; 
Utility.group(p _ value[i], f); 
pass_No = Utility.pass(p_value[i], pass_No); 
break; 
case 2: 
System.out.println("DFT Test: "); 
for(int i=O; i<sequence.length; i++){ 
p_ value[i] = new DiscreteFourierTransform(sequence[i]).pvalue; 
Utility.group(p_ value[i], f); 
pass_No = Utility.pass(p_value[i], pass_No); 
break; 
case 3: 
System.out.println("Runs Test: "); 
for(int i=O; i<sequence.Iength; i++){ 
p_ value[i] = new Runs(sequence[i]).pvalue; 
Uti I ity.group(p _ value[i], f); 
pass_No = Utility.pass(p_value[i], pass_No); 
break; 
double x; 
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double chi=O; 
for (int i=O; i< lO; i++){ 
f[i] = f[i]/sL; 
x = f[i)-0 .1; 
chi += x*x / 0.1; 
} 
newP _value = MyMath.igamc( 4.5, chi/2); 
java.text.DecimalFormat df5 new java.text.DecimalFormat("##O.OOOOO"); 
java.text.DecimalFormat df6 new java.text.DecimalFormat("##O.OOOOOO"); 
System.out.println("chi = "+df5 .format(chi)); 
System.out.println("newp_ value = "+df5 .format(newP _value)); 
pass_Frequency = (double)pass_No/sL; 
System.out.println("proportion = "+df6.format(pass_Frequency)); 
ackage tests_algorithms; 
import util.MyMath; 
public class DiscreteFourierTransform { 
public double pvalue; 
public DiscreteFourierTransform(String str){ 
int n = str.length(); 
int count = 0; 
double upperBound = MyMath.sqrt(3*n); 
double percentile, N_l, N_o, d; 
double[] X_ real = new double[n] ; 
double[] X_imag = new double[n]; 
double[] S = new double(n]; //significance 
for( int i=O; i<n; i++ ) 
X_real[i] = (double) MyMath.checkStringMinus(str)[i]; 
MyMath.dft(X _real); 
for( int i=O; i<n/2; i++ ){ 
X_real[i] = MyMath.gr[i]; 
II System.out.println("gr"+i+":"+ X _real[i]); 
X_ imag[i] = MyMath.gi[i]; 
S(i] = Math.sqrt( Math.pow(X_real[i] ,2) + Math.pow(X_imag[i],2) ); 
II System.out.println("S"+i+":"+S[i]); 
II System.out.println("upperBound"+":"+upperBound); 
for(int i=O; i<n/2; i++ ) 
if ( S[i] < upperBound) 
count++; 
percentile = ( double)count/(n/2)* I 00; 
II System.out.println("percentile"+":"+percentile); 
N_l = (double) count; /*number of peaks less than h = sqrt(3*n) *I 
II System.out.println("Nl "+":"+N_ l); 
N_o = (double) 0.95*n/2.; 
lid = (N_l- N_o)/sqrt(n/2.*0.95*0.05); 
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d = (N_I- N_o)/Math.sqrt(n/4.o•o.9s•o.05); 
II System.out.println("d"+":"+d); 
pvalue = MyMath.erfc(Math.abs(d)/Math.sqrt(2.)); 
package generators; 
importjava.math.Biglnteger; 
import java.utii.Arrays; 
import utii.Utility; 
public class Ks_multiple { 
public int[][] key; 
public int[][] IV; 
public int[][] ks; 
public String[] ks_str; 
public String[] ks_k; 
public String[] ks_ IV; 
public String[] frame; 
public String[] diffusion; 
public int ksLen_Salsa = 16; //in words(32 bit) 
public int ksLen_ Phelix = 16; //in words(32 bit) 
public void encryptPhelix(byte[]REF _ KEY, byte[]REF _IV, byte[]REF _ PTXT, byte[]ctxt, int[][)ks, int 
i) throws PhelixException{ 
Phelix phx; 
phx = new Phelix(); 
phx.init(); 
phx.setupKey(REF _KEY, 0, REF _ KEY. length • 8, Phelix.PHELIX_MAC_SIZE); 
phx.setupNonce(REF _IV, 0); 
ctxt = makeOutputBuffer(REF _PTXT.Iength, 0); 
phx.encryptBytes(REF _PTXT, 0, ctxt, 0, REF _PTXT.Iength); 
ks[i] = phx.ks; 
public void encryptSalsa(byte[)REF _KEY, byte[]REF _IV, int[)[]ks, inti){ 
Salsa20 salsa = new Salsa20(REF _KEY, REF _IV); 
key[i)= salsa.kW; 
salsa.keystream _gen(); 
ks[i] = salsa.ks; 
} 
public String tonbitString(int[] data){ 
String temp = null; 
String str = null; 
for (int i=O; i<data.length; i++){ 
temp = lnteger.toBinaryString(data[i]); 
while(temp.length()<32) 
temp = "O".concat(temp); 
if (i==O) 
str = temp; 
else 
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str = str.concat(temp); 
} 
return str; 
} 
public void to32bitStrings(int[][] data, String[] str){ 
for (int i=O; i<data.length; i++){ 
str[i] = tonbitString( data[i]); 
} 
public static byte[] makeOutputBuffer{int nLen, int nExtraLen) 
{ 
/** 
* 
byte[] result = new byte[nLen + nExtraLen]; 
Arrays.fill(result, {byte)Oxcc); 
return result; 
* @param pow: the power of 2 
* @param generator: 0 indicates Salsa20, I indicates Phelix 
* @param type: 0-keystream or Key/Keystream Correlation Sequence. 
* I-IV /Keystream Correlation Sequence. 
* 2-Frame Correlation Sequences. 
* 3-Diffusion Sequence 
• @throws PhelixException 
*I 
public Ks_multiple(int pow, int generator, int type) throws PhelixException{ 
int[][] temp = null; 
int m = (int) Math.pow(2, pow); //#of the generated sequences 
if (generator == I){ //Phelix 
this.ks= new int[m][ksLen_ Phelix] ; 
ks_str = new String[m]; 
byte[] REF _KEY = new byte[60]; //256-bit key 
byte[] REF _IV = new byte[44]; //128-bit IV 
byte[] REF _PTXT = new byte[ksLen_Phelix*4] ; 
byte[] ctxt = null; 
this.key =new int[m][IO]; 
java.util.Random rKey = new java.util.Random(), 
riV=new java.util.Random(), 
rPTXT =new java.util.Random(); 
rPTXT.nextBytes(REF _PTXT); //plaintext fixed 
if (type == 0){ 
ks_k = new String[m]; 
temp = new int[m][key[O].length]; 
riV.nextBytes(REF _ IV); //IV fixed 
for (int i=O; i<m; i++){ 
rKey.nextBytes(REF _KEY); 
intj=O; 
for (int k=O;k<8;k++ ){ 
j=k*4; 
this.key[i][k]= 
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REF_ KEY[j]); 
Utility.byteTolnt(REF _KEY[j+3], REF _KEY[j+2], REF _KEY[j+ 1], 
} 
encryptPhelix(REF _KEY, REF _IV, REF _PTXT, ctxt, this.ks, i ); 
forQ =O; j<key[i] .length; j ++) 
temp[i][j] =ks[i][j]"key[i][j]; //keystream XOR key 
} 
to32bitStrings(this.ks, this.ks _ str); 
to32bitStrings(temp, this.ks_ k); 
System.out.println("Number of Sequences = "+ks_k.length+", " + 
"Sequence Length = "+ks_k[O].length()); 
if (type == I){ 
ks_IV = new String[m]; 
IV = new int[m][6]; 
temp = new int[m][IV[O].length]; 
rKey.nextBytes(REF _KEY); //key fixed 
for (int i=O; i<m; i++){ 
riV.nextBytes(REF _IV); 
intj=O; 
for (int k=O;k<4;k++){ 
j=k*4; 
this.IV[i][k]= 
Utility.byteToint(REF _IV[j+ 3], REF _IV[j+2], REF _IV[j+ 1], REF _IV[j]); 
} 
} 
} 
encryptPhelix(REF _KEY, REF _IV, REF _PTXT, ctxt, this.ks, i ); 
forQ=O; j<IV[i].length; j++) 
temp[i][j] = ks[i][j]" IV[i][j]; /lkeystream XOR IV 
to32bitStrings(this.ks, this.ks _str); 
to32bitStrings(temp, this.ks_IV); 
System.out.println("Number of Sequences = "+ks_IV.length+", " + 
"Sequence Length = "+ks_IV[O].Iength()); 
if (type == 2){ 
ks_IV = new String[m]; 
IV = new int[m][6]; 
frame = new String[5 I 2] ; //the arbitrary length of the frame is 512 
rKey.nextBytes(REF _KEY); //key fixed 
II This procedure is repeated pow(2, I 0) times with incremented values of IV. 
for (int i=O; i<m; i++){ 
if(i<256){ 
REF _IV[O] = (byte)i; 
REF _IV[73] = (byte)O; 
else { 
} 
REF _IV[73] = (byte)i; 
REF _IV[O] = (byte)O; 
for (int iv_index=2; iv_ index<REF _IV.length; iv_index++){ 
REF _ IV[iv _ index]=O; 
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encryptPhelix(REF _KEY, REF _IV, REF _PTXT, ctxt, this.ks, i ); 
} 
to32bitStrings(this.ks, this.ks _str); 
for(int fi=O; fi<512; fi++){ //the arbitrary length ofthe frame is 512 
for (int mi=O; mi<m; mi++){ 
if(mi==O) 
frame[fi] = String.valueOf(ks_str[mi).charAt(O)); 
else 
frame[fi] frame[ fi) .concat(Stri ng. val ueOf(ks _ str[ m i] .char At( fi)) ); 
} 
} 
if (type == 3){ 
byte[] newKey, newlY; 
int sLen = 256 + 128; //k+v sequences 
diffusion = new String[sLen]; 
byte ei = 1; 
int ei_p = 0; //the position of the bit that will change 
int byte_p=O; //the position of the byte that will change 
int[] ks_old = new int[44], 
ks_new =new int[44]; 
String ks_old_str = null; 
String ks_new_str = null; 
Biglnteger b I, b2; 
int[][) diff_int =new int[sLen)[44]; 
for (int i=O; i<sLen; i++){ 
for(int j=O; j<l6; j++) 
diff_int[i][j] = 0; 
for (int i=O; i<m; i++){ 
/* 
• Random key and IV values are chosen. 
• Using this key and IV, a keystream of length L=ksLen_Phelix *4 bits is generated 
*I 
rKey.nextBytes(REF _KEY); //32 bytes 
riV.nextBytes(REF _IV); //16 bytes 
encryptPhelix(REF _KEY, REF _IV, REF _PTXT, ctxt, this.ks, i ); 
ks_old= ks[i]; 
ks_old_str = tonbitString(ks_old); 
I* 
• By changing each bit of key and IV, new keystreams are generated. 
• These keystreams are XORed with the original keystream. 
• Each obtained value is added with the value of diffusion[j] 
*I 
for (int j =O; j<256; j++){ 
ei_p = j% 8; 
byte_p = j/8; 
newKey = REF _KEY; 
newKey[byte_p] "= (int) Math.pow(2, ei_p); 
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} 
encryptPhelix(newKey, REF _IV, REF _PTXT, ctxt, this .ks, i ); 
ks_new = ks[i]; 
ks_new_str = tonbitString(ks_new); 
bl = new Biglnteger(ks_old_str, 2); 
b2 = new Biglnteger(ks_new_str, 2); 
diffusion[j] = b l.add(b2).toString(2); 
while (diffusion[j].length()<512) 
diffusion[j] = "0" .co neat( diffusion[j]); 
for (intj=O; j< I28; j++){ 
ei_p = j% 8; 
byte_p = j/8; 
newlY = REF _IV; 
new!V(byte_p] "= (int) Math.pow(2, ei_p); 
encryptPhelix(REF _KEY, newlY, REF _PTXT, ctxt, this.ks, i ); 
ks_new= ks[i]; 
ks_new_str = tonbitString(ks_new); 
b I = new Biglnteger(ks_old_str, 2); 
b2 = new Biglnteger(ks_new_str, 2); 
diffusion[256+j] = b l.add(b2).toString(2); 
while ( diffusion[256+j].length()<512) 
diffusion[256+j] = "O".concat(diffusion[256+j]); 
if (generator == 0){ //Salsa20 
this.ks= new int[m][ksLen_Salsa]; 
ks_str = new String[m]; 
byte[] REF _KEY = new byte[60]; //256-bit key 
byte[] REF _IV = new byte[44]; //128bit IV 
java.utii.Random rKey = new java.utii.Random(), 
riV = new java.utii.Random(); 
rKey.nextBytes(REF _KEY); //fixed 
riV.nextBytes(REF _IV); //fixed 
this.key = new int[m][lO]; 
if (type == 0){ 
ks_k = new String[m]; 
temp = new int[m][key[O].Iength]; 
riV.nextBytes(REF _IV); //IV fixed 
for (int i=O; i<m; i++){ 
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REF _KEY[j]); 
rKey.nextBytes(REF _KEY); 
intj=O; 
for (int k=O;k<8;k++){ 
j =k*4; 
this.key[i][k]= 
Utility.byteToint(REF _KEY[j+ 3], REF _KEY[j+2], REF _KEY[j+ I], 
} 
encryptSalsa(REF _KEY, REF _ IV, this.ks, i ) ; 
forQ =O; j <key[i] .length; j ++) 
temp[i][j] =ks[i][j]"key[i][j]; //keystream XOR key 
} 
to32bitStrings(this.ks, this.ks _ str); 
to32bitStrings(temp, this .ks_k); 
if(type == I){ 
ks_IV = new String[m]; 
IV = new int[m][6]; 
temp = new int[m][IV[O].Iength]; 
rKey.nextBytes(REF _KEY); //key fixed 
for (int i=O; i<m; i++){ 
riV.nextBytes(REF _IV); 
intj=O; 
for (int k=O;k<4;k++ ){ 
j =k*4; 
this.IV[i][k]= 
Utility.byteTolnt(REF _IV[j+ 3], REF _IV[j+2], REF _IV[j+ I], REF _IV[j]); 
} 
encryptSalsa(REF _KEY, REF _ IV, this.ks, i ); 
forG=O; j <JV[i].length; j++) 
temp[i][j] = ks[i][j]" IV[i][j] ; //keystream XOR IV 
to32bitStrings(this.ks, this.ks _ str); 
to32bitStrings(temp, this.ks_ IV); 
if (type == 2){ 
int l=ksLen_Salsa*32; 
ks_IV = new String[m]; 
IV = new int[m][6]; 
frame = new String[512]; 
rKey.nextBytes(REF _KEY); //key fixed 
II This procedure is repeated pow(2, I 0) times with incremented values of IV. 
for (int i=O; i<m; i++){ 
if(i<256){ 
REF _IV[O] = (byte)i; 
REF _ IV[73] = (byte)O; 
else { 
REF _ IV[73] = (byte)i; 
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REF _IV[O] = (byte)O; 
} 
for (int iv _ index=2; iv _ index<REF _IV. length; iv _index++){ 
REF _ IV[iv _ index]=O; 
encryptSalsa(REF _KEY, REF _IV, this.ks, i ); 
} 
to32bitStrings(this.ks, this.ks _ str); 
for(int fi=O; fi<l; fi++){ //the arbitrary length of the frame is I 
for (int mi=O; mi<m; mi++){ 
if(mi==O) 
frame[ fi] = String. valueOf(ks _ str[ mi] .charAt(O)); 
else 
frame[fi] = frame[fi].concat(String.valueOf(ks_str[mi] .charAt(fi))); 
} 
} 
if(type == 3){ 
byte[] newKey, newlY; 
int sLen = 256 + 128; //k+v sequences 
diffusion = new String[sLen]; 
byte ei = I; 
int ei_p = 0; //the position of the bit that will change 
int byte_p=O; //the position of the byte that will change 
int[] ks _old = new int[ 44], 
ks_new = new int[44]; 
String ks_old_str = null; 
String ks_new_str = null; 
Biginteger b I, b2; 
int[][] diff_ int = new int[sLen][ 44]; 
for (int i=O; i<sLen; i++){ 
for(int j =O; j < 16; j ++) 
diff_ int[i][j] = 0; 
for (int i=O; i<m; i++){ 
/* 
* Random key and IV values are chosen. 
*Using this key and IV, a keystream of length L=ksLen_Salsa *4 bits is generated 
*I 
rKey.nextBytes(REF _KEY); //32 bytes 
riV.nextBytes(REF _IV); /116 bytes 
encryptSalsa(REF _KEY, REF _IV, this.ks, i ); 
ks_old= ks[i]; 
ks_old_str = tonbitString(ks_old); 
/* 
* By changing each bit of key and IV, new keystreams are generated. 
* These keystreams are XORed with the original keystream. 
* Each obtained value is added with the value of diffusion[j] 
*I 
for (intj=O; j <256; j ++){ 
ei_p = j % 8; 
byte_p = j /8; 
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} 
} 
} 
newKey = REF _KEY; 
newKey[byte_p] /\= (int) Math.pow(2, ei_p); 
encryptSalsa(newKey, REF _ IV, this.ks, i ); 
ks_new = ks[i]; 
ks _new_ str = tonbitString(ks _new); 
bi = new Biginteger(ks_old_str, 2); 
b2 = new Biginteger(ks_new_str, 2); 
diffusion[j] = bl.add(b2).toString(2); 
while ( diffusion[j].length()<512) 
diffusion[j] = "O".concat( diffusion[j]); 
for (int j=O; j<128; j++){ 
ei_p = j % 8; 
byte_p = j /8; 
new IV = REF _IV; 
newiV[byte_p] /\= (int) Math.pow(2, ei_p); 
encryptSalsa(REF _KEY, newlY, this.ks, i ); 
ks_new= ks[i]; 
ks_new_str = tonbitString(ks_new); 
b I = new Biglnteger(ks_old_str, 2); 
b2 = new Biglnteger(ks_new_str, 2); 
diffusion[256+j] = b l.add(b2).toString(2); 
while ( diffusion[256+j].length{)<5I 2) 
diffusion[256+j] = "0" .co neat( diffusion[256+j]); 
Appendix G: A Test Example to Illustrate the 
Distribution of P-values 
Test Salsa20 
Frequency Test : 
1024 independent sequ ences (1024 keys and 1024 nonce are generated randomly), 
each is of 512 bits , generate 1024 P- values : 
0 . 531 97 0 . 90052 0 . 31731 0.70766 0 . 70766 0 . 90052 0 . 80259 0.45325 
0 . 3173 1 0 . 61 708 0.31731 0 . 80259 0 . 70766 0 . 90052 0 . 26059 0.21130 
0 . 31731 0 . 10416 0 . 10416 0 . 31731 0 . 61708 1. 00000 0 . 06079 0 . 53197 
0 . 31731 0 . 31731 0.26059 0 . 31731 0 . 61708 0.90052 0.21130 0 . 90052 
0 . 61708 0 . 06079 0.90052 0.80259 0 . 31731 0 . 26059 1 .00000 0 . 53197 
0.53197 0 . 90052 0.80259 0 . 38157 0 . 90052 0 . 26059 0 . 53197 0 . 21130 
0 . 90052 0 . 90052 0 . 53 197 0 . 21130 0 . 104 1 6 0.31731 1. 00000 0 . 61708 
0 . 80259 0 . 70766 0 . 90052 0 . 90052 0 . 21 130 0.38157 0.61708 0 . 31731 
0.26059 0 . 70766 0 . 21130 0 . 31731 0 . 45325 0 . 38157 0 . 90052 0 . 90052 
0 . 10416 0 . 31731 0 . 10416 0 . 31731 0 . 70766 0 . 26059 0.61708 0 . 53197 
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0 . 70766 1.00000 0 . 13361 0 . 45325 1.00000 0.06079 0.00866 0.16913 
0 . 53197 0 . 31731 0 . 70766 0 . 21130 0 . 26059 0.61708 0 .13361 0.13361 
0 . 70766 0 . 70766 0 . 53197 0 .7 0766 0.80259 0.26059 0 . 53197 0 . 26059 
0 . 61708 0 . 53197 0.80259 0.80259 0.70766 0 . 10416 0 . 26059 0.70766 
0.04550 0 . 70766 0 . 31731 0 . 53197 0.70766 0.80259 0.53197 0.80259 
0.13361 0.16913 1.00000 0 . 31731 0 . 61708 0.13361 0 . 53197 0 . 80259 
1. 00000 0 . 21130 0.70766 0.90052 1.00000 0.61708 0 . 70766 0.61708 
1. 00000 0.26059 0 . 31731 0.61708 0.53197 0.70766 0.70766 0.61708 
0.80259 0 . 31731 0.10416 0 . 61708 1. 00000 0.70766 0 . 80259 0.70766 
0 . 38157 0.80259 0.53197 0 . 90052 0 . 45325 0 . 70766 0 . 45325 0.70766 
0 . 13361 0.45325 0 . 08012 0 . 53197 0 . 70766 0 . 31731 0 . 90052 0 . 53197 
0 . 38157 0 . 53197 0.70766 0 . 45325 0 . 90052 0 . 70766 0 .4 5325 0.61708 
0.26059 0 . 10416 0.26059 0 . 70766 0.31731 0 . 31731 0.53197 0.70766 
0.61708 0.90052 0 . 53197 0 . 90052 0.26059 0 . 21130 0 . 21130 0.53197 
0 . 31731 0.45325 0.45325 0 . 61708 0.26059 0 . 16913 0.53197 0.61708 
0 . 90052 0.45325 0 . 80259 1.00000 0.26059 0.61708 0.70766 0.80259 
0.26059 0.26059 0.80259 0.80259 0.70766 0.80259 0.38157 0.61708 
0.80259 0 . 38157 0 . 08012 0.80259 0.08012 0.38157 0 . 00866 0 . 04550 
0 . 53197 0 . 70766 0 . 26059 0 . 31731 0.06079 0 .10416 0.61708 0.70766 
0.26059 0 . 80259 1 . 00000 0 . 80259 1.00000 0 . 26059 0.45325 0.45325 
0 . 61708 0 . 53197 0 . 80259 0 . 90052 0. 00115 0.61708 0.03359 0 . 61708 
0 . 53197 0 . 38157 0.31731 0 . 90052 0.31731 0.04550 0.38157 0.90052 
0 . 31731 0 . 45325 0 . 70766 0 . 61708 0 . 53197 0 . 70766 0.45325 1 . 00000 
0.08012 0.45325 0.45325 0 . 61708 0.70766 1.00000 1. 00000 0 . 53197 
0.31731 0 . 53197 0 . 53197 0.26059 0 . 70766 1.00000 0 .1 0416 0 . 38157 
0.31731 0 . 31731 0 .13361 0.90052 0.02445 0 . 90052 0 .1 0416 1 . 00000 
0 . 21130 0 . 90052 0 . 08012 1.00000 0.38157 0.06079 0.53197 0.21130 
0 .1 0416 0 . 90052 0 . 26059 0 . 90052 0.90052 1.00000 0 .1 3361 0.31731 
0 .1 0416 0 . 31731 0 . 21130 0.61708 0 . 70766 1.00000 0.16913 0 . 03359 
0.38157 0 . 53197 0 . 21130 0 . 26059 0.70766 0 . 70766 0 .1 6913 0 . 01755 
0 . 45325 0 . 21130 0 . 80259 1 . 00000 0 .1 3361 0 . 90052 0.38157 0.38157 
0.21130 0 .1 6913 0 . 21130 0 . 80259 0 . 90052 0 .1 3361 0.90052 0.70766 
0 . 90052 0 . 90052 0 . 26059 0 . 26059 1. 00000 0 . 08012 0 . 26059 0.26059 
0 . 13361 0 . 38157 0.70766 1.00000 0 . 61708 1.00000 0 .4 5325 0 . 61708 
0.38157 0 . 90052 1.00000 0 . 70766 1.00000 0.38157 0.10416 0.45325 
0 . 70766 0 . 70766 0 . 31731 0 . 21130 0.80259 0 . 70766 0.53197 0 . 13361 
0 . 53197 0 . 03359 0 . 06079 0.80259 0.70766 0 . 38157 0 . 08012 0.61708 
0 . 06079 0.53197 0 . 61708 0 . 31731 0 .1 6913 0 . 80259 0 . 70766 0 . 16913 
0 . 13361 0.26059 0 . 45325 0 . 90052 0.80259 0.04550 0.16913 0.38157 
0 . 61708 0.06079 0 .7 0766 0 . 38157 0.70766 0 . 38157 0. 21130 0 . 70766 
0.80259 0.00596 0 .10416 0 . 04550 0 . 08012 0 . 45325 0.21130 1. 00000 
0 . 16913 0.16913 0 . 13361 0.26059 0 . 31731 0.70766 0 . 06079 0.80259 
0 . 21130 0.08012 0 . 70766 0 . 38157 0 . 80259 0 . 70766 0 . 21130 1. 00000 
0 . 80259 1.00000 0.61708 0.61708 0 . 61708 0 . 45325 0 . 21130 0.38157 
0.90052 0 . 70766 0.45325 0.45325 0 . 53197 0.02445 0 . 38157 0.70766 
0.61708 0.16913 0.70766 0 . 26059 0.13361 0 . 61708 0 . 90052 0 . 31731 
0.70766 0.45325 0.90052 1.00000 0.61708 1.00000 0 . 61708 0.90052 
1.00000 1. 00000 0 . 53197 0.53197 0.53197 0 . 53197 0 . 90052 0.31731 
0.10416 0 . 80259 0.70766 0.45325 0.45325 0.53197 0.02445 0.38157 
0.31731 0.45325 1.00000 0.45325 0.04550 0.26059 0. 70766 0.61708 
0 . 61708 0 . 61708 0 . 90052 0.53197 0.53197 0 . 70766 0 . 31731 0.26059 
0 . 26059 0.03359 0 . 80259 0 . 01755 1.00000 0 . 80259 0.08012 0.90052 
0 . 53197 0. 21130 0.80259 1.00000 0 . 45325 0. 21130 0.90052 0 . 70766 
0 . 31731 0 . 61708 0.31731 0.45325 0.26059 0.70766 0.38157 0.38157 
0 . 90052 0.10416 0 .06079 0 . 26059 0.80259 0 . 53197 0 . 26059 0.26059 
0.13361 0.45325 0 . 53197 0.70766 0 . 61708 0.90052 0.90052 0.90052 
0.70766 0.45325 0.10416 0.61708 0.53197 0.80259 0 . 80259 0 . 31731 
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0 .1 3361 0 . 80259 0 . 06079 0 . 90052 0 . 90052 0 . 70766 0 . 70766 0 . 16913 
0 .1 6913 0 . 70766 0 . 26059 0 . 90052 0 . 21130 0 . 21130 0.80259 0 . 45325 
0 . 53197 0 . 61708 0 . 01755 0 . 26059 0.61708 0 . 80259 0 . 38157 0 . 38157 
0 . 80259 0 . 53197 0 . 80259 0 . 26059 0 . 21130 0.45325 0.53197 0 . 61708 
0 . 53197 1.00000 0 . 80259 0 . 80259 0 . 70766 0 . 04550 0.53197 0 . 38157 
0.90052 0.31731 0 . 08012 0 . 16913 0.80259 0 . 53197 1 . 00000 0 . 70766 
0 . 45325 0 .01 755 0 . 90052 0 . 70766 1.00000 0 . 10416 0.45325 0 . 80259 
0.531 97 0.38157 0 . 90052 0 .1 3361 0 . 31731 0 . 80259 0.16913 0.26059 
0.31731 0 . 01755 0.90052 0.53197 0 . 90052 0 . 02445 0 . 70766 0 . 90052 
0. 70766 0.02445 0.10416 0 . 61708 0.13361 0 . 01242 0 . 80259 0 . 31731 
0 . 61708 0.00404 0 . 61708 0 . 80259 0.70766 1.00000 0 . 16913 0 . 45325 
0 . 90052 0.38 157 0 . 31731 0.80259 0 . 26059 0 . 80259 0 . 31731 0 . 16913 
0.61708 0 . 53197 0.13361 0.80259 0 . 16913 0 . 26059 0 . 16913 0 . 61708 
0.90052 0.70766 0 . 90052 0 . 80259 0 . 61708 0 . 80259 0 . 61708 0 .1 0416 
0.38157 0 . 90052 0 . 53197 0 . 38157 0 . 38157 0 . 26059 0 . 21130 0.38157 
0.38157 0 . 26059 0 . 90052 0. 70766 0 . 26059 0 . 31731 0 . 80259 0.61708 
0.80259 0.90052 0 . 90052 0 . 21130 0.16913 0 . 61708 0 . 90052 0 . 31731 
0 . 13361 0 . 38157 0 . 70766 0.61708 0 . 61708 0 . 80259 0 . 90052 0 . 61708 
0 . 21130 0.38157 0 . 90052 0.06079 1. 00000 0.16913 0 . 16913 1 . 00000 
0.00596 0.06079 0 . 70766 0 . 26059 0 . 38157 0 . 45325 0 . 26059 0.00178 
0. 61708 0 . 53197 0 .13361 1 . 00000 0 . 45325 0.10416 0.80259 0 . 80259 
0.70766 0 . 26059 0 . 38157 0 . 80259 0.31731 0.61708 0 . 04550 0.61708 
0.00404 0.70766 0 . 70766 0 . 10416 0 . 13361 0 .13361 0.70766 0 . 13361 
0.80259 0 . 61708 0 . 26059 0 . 45325 0 . 38157 0.61708 0 . 53197 1. 00000 
0 . 70766 0 . 53197 0 . 61708 0 . 45325 0 . 38157 0 . 90052 0 . 90052 0 . 45325 
0 . 03359 0 . 10416 0 . 31731 0.08012 0 . 53197 0 . 70766 0.26059 0.61708 
0 . 45325 1 . 00000 0 . 61708 0 . 16913 0 . 26059 0.45325 0 . 13361 0 . 45325 
0 . 53197 0 . 53197 0 . 21130 0 . 70766 0 . 45325 0.53197 0 . 53197 0.53197 
1.00000 1. 00000 0 . 61708 0.45325 0 . 90052 0 . 31731 1.00000 0 . 53197 
1.00000 0 . 31731 0 . 10416 0 . 70766 0 . 45325 0 . 26059 0 . 61708 0.38157 
0 . 90052 0.08012 0 . 38157 0.90052 0 . 53197 0 . 10416 0 . 80259 0 . 61708 
0 . 80259 0.61708 1. 00000 0 . 31731 0 . 21130 0 . 70766 1.00000 0 . 45325 
1. 00000 0 . 80259 0 . 31731 0.45325 0 . 38157 0 . 70766 0.16913 0 . 53197 
0 . 61708 0 . 26059 0 . 70766 0 . 80259 0 . 04550 0 . 70766 1.00000 0 . 70766 
0.80259 0.61708 1 . 00000 0.13361 0 . 90052 0 . 31731 0 . 16913 0 . 80259 
1 . 00000 0.21130 0 . 80259 0.01755 0 . 04550 0 . 90052 0 . 38157 0 . 61708 
0.70766 0 . 31731 0.61708 0 . 90052 0 . 61708 0 . 53197 1. 00000 0 . 26059 
0 . 70766 0 . 45325 0 . 61708 0 . 31731 1.00000 0.38157 0 . 00596 0 . 80259 
0 . 80259 0 . 21130 0 . 90052 0. 70766 0.01755 1 . 00000 0 . 61708 0.70766 
1. 00000 0 . 26059 0 .1 0416 0 . 90052 0 . 61708 0 . 10416 0 . 70766 0.90052 
0 . 13361 0 . 80259 0 . 26059 0 . 38157 0.10416 0.08012 0 . 16913 0 . 21130 
0 . 13361 0 . 53197 0 . 90052 0 . 45325 0 . 04550 0 . 31731 0 . 31731 0.21130 
0 . 45325 0 . 06079 0 . 31731 0 . 08012 0 . 10416 0 . 53197 0 . 80259 0.90052 
0.53197 0.53197 0 . 61708 0 . 38157 0 . 16913 0 . 31731 0 . 31731 0 . 13361 
0 . 38157 0 . 26059 0.53197 1.00000 0 . 21130 0 . 80259 0.13361 0.13361 
0.45325 0 . 61708 0 . 31731 0 . 26059 0 . 53197 0 . 90052 0 . 61708 0.90052 
0.38157 0 . 04550 0 . 00404 0 . 38157 0 . 53197 0 . 45325 0 . 90052 0.90052 
0 . 80259 0 . 70766 0.10416 0.53197 0 . 06079 0 . 31731 0 . 31731 0.90052 
0 . 80259 0.53197 0.10416 0 . 38157 0 . 38157 0 . 45325 1.00000 0 . 53197 
0 . 90052 0 . 21130 0 . 53197 0 . 61708 0.16913 0 . 45325 1.00000 0.06079 
0 . 10416 0.10416 0 . 531 97 0.31731 0 . 45325 0 . 53197 0 . 61708 0.13361 
0 . 45325 0.08012 0 . 90052 0 . 08012 0.31731 0.61708 0.70766 0.13361 
0.45325 0.70766 0 . 38157 0.61708 0 . 70766 0 . 13361 1.00000 0.80259 
0.26059 0 . 90052 0 . 13361 0.38157 0.26059 0.26059 0 . 16913 0.21130 
0 . 90052 0 . 21130 0 . 31731 0 . 31731 0.45325 0.08012 0.31731 0.80259 
0 . 13361 0 . 61708 0 . 61708 0 . 70766 0 . 45325 0 . 80259 0 . 70766 0.10416 
0 . 53197 0 . 31731 0 . 26059 0 . 01755 0 . 45325 1.00000 0 . 01242 0.08012 
150 
------ ---------
0.70766 0.08012 0.00866 0 . 26059 1.00000 0.45325 0.13361 0 . 80259 
1.00000 0.16913 0.61708 0 . 90052 0 . 16913 0 . 31731 0.70766 0.26059 
1.00000 0.61708 0 . 06079 0.38157 0 . 31731 0 . 70766 0.61708 0 . 31731 
0.80259 1.00000 0 . 61708 0 . 21130 0 . 90052 0 . 02445 0.70766 0 . 53197 
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